對吉米‧卡特撤銷承認台北的重新評價 譚慎格＠自由 20241020（中英文）

【雙魚之論】英文拷到 G / D 找中文翻譯
Is John J. Tkacik, Jr.’s article—published by the retired U.S. foreign service officer—attempting to seal Jimmy Carter’s legacy just months after his 100th birthday? As has been argued before, it was Zbigniew Brzezinski, not Henry Kissinger, whose influence had more detrimental effects on Taiwan.
In my article for the Taiwan Association of University Professors last month, I noted the lengthy phrasing in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)—“the governing authorities on Taiwan, recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979,” is a legal term of art, but it leaves ambiguous whether the "Republic of China" refers to the state established in 1912 or the regime that took shape in 1950.
From Tkacik’s article, which reveals that the ROC merely “exercises governing power over Taiwan on behalf of China,” it becomes clear that this "Republic of China (Taiwan)" has no connection to 1912. Therefore, China does not possess sovereignty over Taiwan.

譚慎格的文章，似乎在替卡特蓋棺？而正如我以往的觀點：布里辛斯基才是超越季辛吉，是對台灣很不好的美國官員。正如我去年台教會文章所言TRA中落落長的落落長的「美國在一九七九年一月一日之前承認為中華民國的台灣統治當局」，是一個專有名詞。但並未確認此中華民國是自1912起，還是1950起？
從譚慎格的本文「僅接受中華民國在台灣「行使中國的統治權」」來看，此中華民國與1912無關，也不是承認中國擁有台灣主權。

對吉米‧卡特撤銷承認台北的重新評價    譚慎格＠自由 20241020

美國前總統吉米‧卡特（Jimmy Carter）本月歡度百歲生日，自從他在一九七八年決定不再承認台北為「中華民國」所在地以來，台灣對他的評價一直不高。然而，隨著半個世紀過去，卡特總統撤銷承認中華民國的往事，若與他透過直率的外交策略，來維持美國與台灣關係的實質內容相結合來看，現在已經可以成就更為正面的形象，尤其是相較於在他之前的尼克森（Richard Nixon）和福特（Gerald Ford）兩位總統而言。 President Jimmy Carter, who turned 100 years old this month, has not been highly thought of in Taiwan since his 1978 decision to derecognize Taipei as the seat of the “Republic of China.” But with a half-century’s hindsight, President Carter’s derecognition of the ROC, viewed together with his straightforward diplomacy to preserve the full substance of America’s relations with Taiwan, can now be seen in a far more positive light, especially when compared to his predecessors, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.

 

79年後美台協定續生效 鄧小平默許

在評價卡特決定承認中華人民共和國為「中國唯一合法政府」，並與台北的中華民國斷交時，我們必須記住，美國早在一九五○年一月五日，就已經不再承認中華民國為「中國」政府，而是僅接受中華民國在台灣「行使中國的統治權」。因此，卡特總統對台北「撤銷承認」的基礎，是中華民國政權自我認定為「中國」，而不是台北當局在台灣實際「行使統治權」。一九七八年十二月卅一日之後，「中華民國」並未消失，美國仍然與中華民國維持關係，只是不再使用這個名稱。卡特總統指示美國政府繼續與一個實體維持關係，該實體被稱為「美國在一九七九年一月一日之前承認為中華民國的台灣統治當局」。時至今日，這仍然是美國與台灣關係的根基。此外，卡特還指示，所有「美國與台灣締結生效的國際協定和安排，在一九七九年一月一日之後將繼續維持效力。」最令人驚訝的是，卡特總統還迫使鄧小平默許這種安排。  In considering Carter’s decisions to recognize the People’s Republic of China as the “sole legal government of China” and break relations with the ROC in Taipei, we must remember that the United States on January 5, 1950, ceased to recognize the ROC as the government of “China” while only accepting the ROC’s “exercise of Chinese authority” over Taiwan. Thus, the basis of President Carter’s “derecognition” of Taipei was the ROC regime’s self-identification as “China” and not Taipei’s actual “exercise of authority” on Taiwan. The “Republic of China” still existed after December 31, 1978, and the US did continue relations with the ROC, though not under that name. President Carter instructed the US government to continue relations with an entity called the “governing authority on Taiwan recognized by the United States prior to January 1, 1979 as the Republic of China.” That remains the basis of US relations with Taiwan today. Additionally, Carter directed that all “international agreements and arrangements in force between the United States and Taiwan shall continue in force” after January 1, 1979.” Most surprising, President Carter gained Deng Xiaoping’s (鄧小平) acquiescence to this arrangement.

 

為什麼鄧小平願意讓步？很簡單，鄧小平在一九七八年需要與美國建立新的關係，以推行他的戰略，讓中國從毛澤東主義統治廿年的災難中重新站起來。  Why did Deng Xiaoping relent? The short answer is that Deng needed a new relationship with the United States in 1978 to implement his strategy for China’s recovery from two catastrophic decades of Maoism.

 

歷史學家長期以來一直認為，卡特在一九七八年九月促成的以色列—埃及「大衛營協議」，展現了非凡的外交才能。然而，其實在更早之前的一九七七年六月，當時剛上任的卡特與國家安全會議（NSC）討論他的中國—台灣對策時，就已經展露高明的手腕。  Historians have long seen Carter’s extraordinary talent for diplomacy in his Israel-Egypt “Camp David Accords” of September 1978. But his talent was evident as early as June 1977 as the new President Carter reviewed his China-Taiwan options with his National Security Council.

 

當時，卡特的國家安全顧問布里辛斯基（Zbigniew Brzezinski），為他勾勒出與中國關係正常化所需要的條件。他說，美國需要「中國接受美國與台灣繼續維持安全關係，這將取代正式的共同防禦條約。」卡特仔細審閱了布里辛斯基的報告：在布里辛斯基寫下「台灣將可以取得武器」之處，卡特畫了一個箭頭符號，並寫下「重要」；在布里辛斯基寫到美國「將宣示對不使用武力的持續關注」的地方，卡特加註「這是底線」。  His top aide then, Zbigniew Brzezinski, sketched for him the conditions necessary for normal relations with China. The US, he said, needed “Chinese acceptance of a continued US-Taiwan security relationship which would take the place of the formal mutual defense treaty.” Carter considered Brzezinski’s paper: where Brzezinski wrote “Taiwan would enjoy access to arms,” Carter drew an arrow and wrote “important”; where he wrote the US “would declare a continued American interest in non-use of force,” Carter added “at a minimum.”

 

卡特的其他顧問也發表意見參與討論。財政部長布魯門塔（Michael Blumenthal）主張，「應該為美國與台灣維持經濟關係提供法律基礎」，並呼籲國會制定與台灣關係的相關法規。國務卿范錫（Cyrus Vance）警告說：「我們從未與中國討論關係正常化後對台軍售的問題…我們必須提出這個問題。」卡特同意：「我贊成開誠布公。直言不諱。」為了緩和卡特的直率，布里辛斯基希望美國向中國保證，永遠不承認台灣獨立。但范錫反對這項提議，認為此舉「將會放棄一個我們本來可以在和平解決無望時採取的選項。」卡特同意他的看法。  Carter’s other advisors weighed in. Treasury secretary Michael Blumenthal urged a “legal basis for continuing US economic relations with Taiwan” and called for Congressional legislation on Taiwan relations. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance warned “the issue of arms sales to Taiwan in the post-normalization era has never been raised with the Chinese … We must raise it.” Carter agreed: “I am for laying it on the line. Use the direct approach.” To temper Carter’s directness, Brzezinski wanted the US to offer China a pledge never to recognize an independent Taiwan. Vance objected, doing so “would be foregoing an option that we could exercise in the event a peaceful solution does not seem in the offing.” Carter agreed.

 

指示對中談判代表 「不急於一時」

後來，在一九七八年五月中蘇關係緊張加劇之際，布里辛斯基前往北京，與鄧小平和當時擔任國務院總理的華國鋒直接談判。鄧、華兩人都向布里辛斯基強調，中國不會做出「和平解放台灣的承諾」。鄧小平稍做讓步，聲稱「貴國可以表達這個期望」，但中國如何以及何時解決台灣問題，是中國人自己的事。華國鋒則說得更明白：一方面，「如果我們承諾不以武力解放台灣，但另一方面，美國又以其軍事裝備協助武裝台灣…我認為這是製造一個中國、一個台灣，或是兩個中國。」  Finally, during heightened Soviet-China tensions in May 1978, Brzezinski went to Beijing for direct talks with Deng and then-premier Hua Guofeng (華國鋒). Both stressed to Brzezinski that China would give “no pledge of peaceful liberation of Taiwan.” Deng conceded “your side can express its hopes,” but how and when China solves the Taiwan problem is the business of the Chinese themselves. Hua separately spelled it out: on one hand, “if we undertake a commitment that China not liberate Taiwan by arms, then on the other hand, the US side is helping and arming Taiwan with its military equipment, … I think it is the creation of one China, one Taiwan or two Chinas.”

 

在華盛頓，卡特的首席中國顧問奧森柏格（Michel Oksenberg）將鄧小平和華國鋒的說法，合乎邏輯地解讀為「中國理解並接受我們打算在關係正常化後，繼續向台灣提供軍備。」  In Washington, Michel Oksenberg, Carter’s top China advisor, logically interpreted this as “the Chinese understand and accept that we intend to sustain an arms sales relationship with Taiwan after normalization.”

 

美國國會在一九七八年七月通過一項法案，要求總統在終止美國與台灣的共同防禦條約之前，必須與參議院協商，這對卡特與中國談判的立場而言，可謂一大助力。隨後，卡特指示他的對中談判代表，在美中關係正常化進程中「不必急於一時」。  Fortuitously for Carter’s bargaining position, in July 1978 Congress passed legislation requiring the President to consult with the Senate before he could terminate the US-Taiwan defense treaty. At this, Carter directed his China negotiators to be in “no hurry” for normalization.

 

九月十九日，卡特總統在華盛頓會見中國駐美國聯絡處主任柴澤民，並提出美國對美中關係的底線：「我們將繼續與台灣維持貿易關係，包括限量銷售一些經過謹慎挑選的防禦性武器，（這些武器）不會危及區域和平前景及中國周邊情勢。我知道這點對貴國來說非常敏感。」柴澤民沒有反應。卡特接著說：「我還想再補充一點」，即在宣布兩國關係正常化時，美國將「聲明我們期望台灣議題透過和平方式解決」，而且「我們不期望貴國肯定這項聲明，但我們希望中國政府不會提出反對意見。」柴澤民發了幾句牢騷，表示會向北京回報。  On September 19, President Carter met China’s liaison envoy in Washington and laid out America’s bottom line for relations with Beijing: “we will continue to trade with Taiwan, including the restrained sale of some very carefully selected defensive arms [that will] not endanger the prospects of peace in the region and the situation surrounding China. I recognize this is very sensitive for you.” Beijing’s envoy was impassive. Carter continued, “I would like to make one last point.” When normalization is announced, Carter said, the US will “state our expectations of a settlement of the Taiwan issue through peaceful means” and added “we do not expect you to confirm that statement, but we would expect that the Chinese Government will not contradict us.” The envoy grumbled and said he would report back to Beijing.

 

停止軍售、台屬一中 卡特未妥協

儘管卡特「不急於一時」，鄧小平卻顯然很著急。十月和十一月接連過去，鄧小平已經將十二月十八日訂為中國共產黨第十一屆中央委員會第三次全體會議（十一屆三中全會）的開幕日，這次全會象徵中國歷史性的「改革開放」時代來臨。為此，與美國建立外交關係至關重要。但是，卡特總統仍然沒有在對台軍售，或將台灣視為「一個中國」的一部分問題上讓步。  While Carter was “in no hurry,” Deng Xiaoping certainly was. October and November came and went, and already Deng had set December 18 as the opening day of the Chinese Communist Party’s “Third Plenum” (三中全會), China’s historic “Reform and Opening” (改革開放) Plenum. For this, diplomatic ties with America were essential. Still the US President had not backed down from either arms sales to Taiwan or demurring on Taiwan as part of “One China.”

 

十二月四日，北京方面再次堅稱，美國必須「確認世界上只有一個中國，台灣省是中華人民共和國的一部分，並承諾永遠不會製造任何形式的兩個中國。」在華盛頓，卡特劃線標註這句冒犯的話，並寫道：「我們沒有這麼做—堅持《上海公報》的措辭。」卡特將這項指示傳達給美國駐北京聯絡處主任伍考克（Leonard Woodcock），並為可能出現的僵局預作準備。伍考克將卡特的訊息傳達給中國談判對手，告訴他在繼續進行談判之前，美國總統必須「確認是否存在談判一份聯合公報的基礎」。  In Beijing on December 4, the Chinese side again insisted that the US “affirm that there is only one China and that Taiwan province is a part of the People’s Republic of China, and it pledges that it will never create any variations of two Chinas.” In Washington, Carter underlined this offending sentence and wrote “we have not — stick to the Shanghai language.” Carter sent this instruction to Ambassador Woodcock in Peking and prepared for an impasse. Woodcock delivered the message and told his Chinese counterpart that before proceeding the American President had to “ascertain whether a basis exists to negotiate a joint communique.”

 

伍考克的中方對手韓念龍強烈批評美國的立場，伍考克認為談判即將破裂。這位中國外交官以戲劇化的堅決口吻，為談判劃下句點：「我現在給你（中國的）聯合公報草案，有中文和英文兩個版本。我的話說完了。」  Woodcock’s Chinese interlocutor blasted the American stance and Woodcock saw the talks collapsing. The Chinese diplomat concluded with mock finality: “I am now giving you the [Chinese] draft communique for your study both in Chinese and English versions. I have finished.”

 

可是，韓念龍並未真的拂袖而去。在伍考克主任站起身來準備離開時，韓念龍又對他說：「最後，我想告訴你，副總理（鄧小平）希望儘快與你會面。我們會通知你確切的時間。」在白宮，卡特看到最後這句話，並用力地畫了線。鄧小平屈服了！  But he wasn’t finished. As Ambassador Woodcock stood up and prepared to leave, he called after him: “Finally, I would like to tell you that Vice Premier [Deng] would like to meet you at an early date. We will let you know the definite time.” At the White House, Carter saw this last sentence and underlined it boldly. The Chinese leader had caved!

 

卡特總統個人下達的「不急於一時」指令，在美中關係正常化的最後階段發揮作用。現在，換成鄧小平承受時間壓力。十二月十八日快速逼近，鄧小平需要一個驚天動地的事件，來確立他在三中全會的合法性，導致他一反常態地將自己置於嚴峻的時間限制之下。鄧小平最後被迫接受美國繼續與台灣維持關係的現實。鄧小平不容許卡特拒絕接受中國對台灣的主權超出《上海公報》措辭的立場，成為破壞他治國大計的阻力。  President Carter’s personal instruction to be in “no hurry” paid dividends in the normalization endgame. It was now Deng who was under time pressure. December 18 was fast approaching. Deng needed an earth-shaking event to establish the legitimacy of his “Third Plenum” and uncharacteristically put himself under severe time constraint. Deng finally accepted the reality of America’s continuing relations with Taiwan. Carter’s refusal to accept Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan beyond the language of the Shanghai Communique could not be allowed to derail Deng’s plans.

 

鄧小平突然認輸，是因為他需要在十二月十六日週六上午九點前宣布美中建交，為十八日週一上午召開的三中全會拉開序幕。伍考克直到十二月十五日下午五點，才與鄧小平會談，並尋求卡特總統的指示。伍考克與鄧小平的最後會談結束僅數小時後，官方便宣布美中關係正常化的消息。  Deng tipped his king quite suddenly. Deng needed the normalization announcement done by 0900 hours on Saturday, December 16, in order to preface the Monday morning opening of the Third Plenum. Woodcock conferred with Deng as late as five p.m. on the 15th and sought President Carter’s instructions. Woodcock’s final talks with Deng had ended only hours before the official announcement.

 

最終，鄧小平接受了卡特模稜兩可的措辭，即美國「認知到中國的立場，即只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分。」而美國曾認為，這種表述「甚至更模糊地傳達出美國接受中國認為台灣是中國領土的觀點」。  In the end, Deng accepted Carter’s ambiguous language that the United States “acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China,” a formulation the United States once believed “convey[ed] even less of a sense of US acceptance of the PRC view that the island is Chinese territory.”

 

更讓鄧副總理感到懊惱的是，美國在公報的措辭中明確表示：「…美國人民將同台灣人民保持文化、商務和其他非官方關係。」美國明確表示，「其他關係」包括繼續對台軍售。  More to Vice Premier Deng’s chagrin, the United States side was explicit in the communique language: “… the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” “Other relations,” the US was clear, included continued US arms sales to Taiwan.

 

鄧小平也同意，根據《共同防禦條約》第十條的規定，該條約可以在斷交一年後才自動失效，他還接受美國與台灣的所有其他條約和協定，可以繼續生效。  Deng also agreed that the defense treaty could lapse a year later under its own Article X terms and he accepted that all other US treaties and agreements with Taiwan could remain in force.

 

台灣議題 未做出超越前任的讓步

美中關係正常化是如此輝煌的成就，以至於中共機關報《人民日報》在一九七八年十二月十六日週六中午，發行自中華人民共和國成立以來的第二次號外（此前的唯一一次，是一九六四年中國宣布原子彈試爆成功）。卡特總統穩健的對中外交策略，促成了中國推動經濟和政治改革的十年，也加速了冷戰的結束。卡特無法預見天安門事件，也沒有料想到中國共產黨在天安門事件後再次顯現的極權主義本能。而在此過程中，他在台灣議題上並未做出超越前任總統的讓步。後來的繼任者若能效法他對北京採取的「不急於一時」策略，或許會做得更好。歷史已經對這位獲頒諾貝爾和平獎的總統展現善意，如今他已高齡百歲，這份殊榮當之無愧。  So magnificent was US-China normalization that for only the second time since the founding of the People’s Republic, the People’s Daily reported it at noon Saturday, December 16, 1978, with a crimson “extra” hao wai (號外) edition (the only previous one in 1964 announced China’s atomic bomb). President Jimmy Carter’s steady diplomacy with China launched a decade of Chinese economic and political reforms and hastened the end of the Cold War. Carter could not have foreseen Tiananmen or the recrudescence of the Chinese Communist Party’s totalitarian instincts post-Tiananmen. And in the process, he conceded nothing on Taiwan which his predecessors had not already given away. His successors would have done well to emulate his “no-hurry” approach to dealing with Beijing. History has already been kind to our Nobel laureate president, not 100 years old, and rightly so.