20230223 布林肯解釋台海與「新冷戰」

Secretary Antony J. Blinken Virtual Conversation on “Russia’s War on Ukraine: One Year Later” With Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic    DoS 20230223

 

MR GOLDBERG:  Does the Ukraine reinvasion over the last year make it more likely or less likely that China will do something precipitous against Taiwan in the near future?  過去一年烏克蘭的重新入侵是會讓中國更可能或更不可能在不久的將來對台灣採取一些不負責任的行動？

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  One of the reasons I think that other countries far beyond Europe have joined this effort is because they’ve understood the consequences, the repercussions, the implications for issues well beyond Europe.  And so, for example, Japan has been one of our staunchest partners in this effort from day one, South Korea and others.  And there’s, of course, the fundamental point of principle here that if aggression is allowed to go forward with impunity, it could open a Pandora’s box, where other would-be aggressors conclude that they can take matters into their own hands and get away with it.  我認為其他遠在歐洲之外的國家參與這一努力的原因之一是，他們已經了解到這對歐洲以外的問題的後果、影響和含義。例如，日本從一開始就是我們這一努力中最堅定的合作夥伴之一，韓國和其他國家也是如此。當然，這裡還有一個基本原則，如果容許侵略行為無法受到制止，這可能會開啟潘朵拉盒子，使其他想要侵略的國家得出結論，他們可自行行動且不受懲罰。

So I think the fact that so many countries have come together in the way they’ve come together has to be something that China factors into its own thinking about Taiwan, including at some point in the future any potential use of force – and not just the support to Ukraine itself, but, of course, the sanctions, the export controls that have been imposed on Russia and that are doing serious damage – damage, by the way, that’s going to accumulate, not decrease, in ways that we can get into.  So I think that that’s something that China has to factor into its thinking about the future.  I think it has to factor into its thinking the huge reputational costs that Russia has incurred.  因此，我認為如此多的國家以這樣的方式聚集在一起，這必須是中國考慮台灣問題的因素之一，包括未來任何潛在使用武力的時候。這不僅僅是支持烏克蘭本身，還包括對俄羅斯實施的制裁和出口管制，這些措施正在造成嚴重的損失，順便說一下，這種損失將會累積，而不是減少，我們可以進一步討論這一點。因此，我認為這是中國必須考慮到未來的一件事情。我認為它必須考慮到俄羅斯已經遭受的巨大聲譽損失。

Now, how all of that nets out, I can’t tell you.  But there’s something else that’s really important, and I know we may want to get onto this later if we have time, but one of the reasons that the world is so concerned about a crisis across the Taiwan Strait is because this is not an internal matter, as China would have it, based on its sovereignty.  It’s a matter of concern to quite literally the entire world.  現在，這些因素的綜合效應如何，我不能告訴您。但有另一個非常重要的問題，如果有時間，我知道我們可能稍後會討論它，但世界對台灣海峽危機如此關注的原因之一是，這不是中國主權內部事務，正如中國所宣稱的那樣。這是全球關注的問題。

Fifty percent of the commercial container traffic goes through that strait every day.  A big majority of the semiconductors that the world needs for everything from our smartphones, our dishwashers, to our automobiles are produced on Taiwan.  If there were a crisis in Taiwan as a result of China’s aggression in some fashion, that would have I think disastrous consequences for the world economy and for countries around the world.  And that’s a message too that Beijing is hearing increasingly.  每天有百分之五十的商業貨櫃運輸通過該海峽。世界所需的大多數半導體，從智慧型手機、洗碗機到汽車等等，都是在台灣生產的。如果因為中國的某種侵略行為導致台灣發生危機，這將對世界經濟和全球各國造成災難性後果。這也是北京方面越來越多聽到的訊息。

 

MR GOLDBERG:  All right.  Do you – very large question for you – are we in a new Cold War?  好，一個大哉問是：我們處於新冷戰中嗎？
SECRETARY BLINKEN:  I really resist labeling things, including using labels like “cold war” that are in some ways easy to pull out and it gives people a frame of reference, but I don’t think it reflects the current reality in a few ways.  我真的不太喜歡使用標籤，包括像「冷戰」這樣容易引人注意的標籤，因為我認為它沒有反映當前現實的幾個方面。

First, when it comes to China, of course, we are in so many ways so much more integrated than we were with the Soviet Union, and not just us, countries around the world.  And we also continue to have some fundamental interests in common, although eliciting Chinese cooperation on them is challenging – everything from climate to global health to counternarcotics to macroeconomy.  But of course, we are in a fundamental competition, and it’s a competition really to shape what comes next, what comes after the post-Cold War era, which is over.  And China’s vision for a world order is fundamentally different from ours.  Ours is based on the ideal of having a liberal world order; China’s is an illiberal one.  They need an order, they want an order, but it’s profoundly illiberal, not liberal.  首先，當談到中國時，我們在許多方面都比與蘇聯時更加緊密地整合在一起，不僅是我們，世界各國也是如此。而且，我們還繼續有一些根本性的共同利益，盡管要獲得中國在這些問題上的合作是具有挑戰性的，包括從氣候、全球健康到禁毒、宏觀經濟等各方面。但是，我們當然是在根本性的競爭中，這是一場競爭，真正的目的是塑造接下來的局勢，塑造在後冷戰時代到來之後會發生什麼事情。而中國對世界秩序的願景根本不同於我們的。我們的理念是基於建立一個自由的世界秩序；中國的理念是非自由的。他們需要秩序，也想要秩序，但是這種秩序是非常非自由的，而不是自由的。

But at the same time, the complexity of the world is such that we’re not dividing it into ideological blocs.  There are many countries in the world that have different systems than ours, different ideologies, different approaches, that nonetheless want what we’ve infamously called a rules-based order, an order that functions on the premise of international law.  And there’s a good reason for that.  但同時，世界的複雜性使我們不能將其分成意識形態集團。世界上有許多國家擁有與我們不同的體制、不同的意識形態、不同的方法，但仍然希望擁有我們所謂的基於規則的秩序，一個基於國際法的前提下運作的秩序。這其中有很好的原因。

These very same countries came together after two world wars to try to put in place understandings, rules, norms, standards, common understandings to try to make sure that another or a third world war wouldn’t emerge.  And the countries that came together in the UN Charter – or for that matter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – weren’t just the Western countries.  It was countries from all sorts of different ideologies, backgrounds, and perspectives – including, by the way, China; including countries that, again, are not democracies as we would call them.  這些國家在兩次世界大戰之後聚集在一起，試圖制定理解、規則、規範、標準、共同理解，以確保不會再次爆發第三次世界大戰。〈聯合國憲章〉或〈人權宣言〉所聚集的國家不僅僅是西方國家，它們來自各種意識形態、背景和觀點的國家，包括中國；包括那些不是我們所謂的民主國家的國家。

So I think our challenge now is to make sure that all countries that believe that we have to have an international system that functions on some basic rules and understandings – and hopefully themselves will make the full transition to democracy, but nonetheless already believe in the need for rules – stand together and help put those rules in place, update them as necessary, update the international organizations where many of those rules are decided and applied, and come together in that way.  That’s fundamentally what this is about.  我認為我們現在面臨的挑戰是要確保所有相信我們必須建立一個基於一些基本規則和理解運作的國際體系的國家，並希望自己能夠完全轉型為民主制度，但已經相信需要規則的國家，能夠團結起來，幫助制定這些規則，必要時更新它們，更新這些規則被制定和應用的國際組織，並以這種方式團結起來。這才是這個問題的根本所在。

 

MR GOLDBERG:  I want to just one minute push back a little bit on this Cold War answer, at least in the Russian context, because it seems to me at least as if the United States and Russia are not merely in a cold war reminiscent of the old Cold War, but it’s – this period seems to be reminiscent of the most tense periods of the Cold War of the late ‘40s to the 1990 or so.  I mean, talk about the state of Russian-U.S. relations – put this in context historically for us.  我想要花一點時間反駁一下關於「冷戰」的回答，至少在俄羅斯的情況下，因為對我來說，美國和俄羅斯之間的關係不僅僅是一個讓人聯想到舊冷戰的新冷戰，而且這段時期似乎更像是20世紀後期冷戰最緊張的時期。我是說，談談俄美關係的現狀，將其歷史脈絡放在這裡。
SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Yeah.  Well, Jeff, in a funny way you’re right.  And it may even be in one sense worse.  For example, take the news this week that Russia is suspending participation in the New START agreement.  It’s the one remaining arms control agreement that’s clearly to the benefit of both countries, but also to the world.  It’s a profoundly irresponsible action, and one that I think the world sees as yet another negative – deeply negative step.  And even during the Cold War, by the time we got around to forging these arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, we both abided by them even at some of the worst moments.  是的，傑夫，某種程度上你是對的。甚至在某些方面可能更糟。例如，就本週俄羅斯暫停參與《新削減戰略武器條約》而言，這是唯一一項對兩國以及全世界都明顯有利的軍控協議，這是一個極端不負責任的行動，我認為全世界都視其為又一個極為負面的步驟。即使在冷戰期間，當我們最終簽署與蘇聯的這些軍控協議時，即使在最糟糕的時刻，我們也會遵守這些協議。

But having said that, this conflict with – between many countries and Russia over Ukraine – it’s not about ideology, as the Cold War was.  It wasn’t communism versus the free world.  It is about an imperialist power that is seeking to aggress another country, and to aggress the principles at the heart of the UN Charter that are there to try to keep the peace around the world, and many countries standing up against that.  但是，同時，與俄羅斯之間關於烏克蘭的這場衝突不是像冷戰那樣關於意識形態。這不是共產主義對抗自由世界。這是一個帝國主義大國試圖侵略另一個國家，並侵犯〈聯合國憲章〉核心原則以維持全球和平，有許多國家站出來反對這種行為。

So in that sense, I don’t see it as a cold war; I see it as a large part of the world united in standing up against aggression; and standing up aggression because it not only poses a threat to Ukraine and its people, but to peace and security around the world to the extent that other would-be aggressors get the wrong message from what Russia’s doing.  因此，從這個意義上講，我不認為這是一場冷戰；我認為這是全球大部分國家團結一致，反對侵略行為；他們反對侵略行為不僅因為它對烏克蘭和其人民構成威脅，還因為對世界和平與安全構成威脅，若其他潛在侵略者從俄羅斯所做的事情中得到錯誤信息，也會對和平與安全構成威脅。表單的頂端

 

 

https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-virtual-conversation-on-russias-war-on-ukraine-one-year-later-with-jeffrey-goldberg-of-the-atlantic/