CSIS兵推摘要 Taimcracy＋Bellwoody 譯

【縛雞之論】英文拷到 G / D 找中文翻譯
感謝網友Bellwoody無私分享。本文，將invasion翻譯為「侵略」，而非入侵—一種定義未明的用語。

The First Battle of the Next War：Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan    CSIS / Taimocracy＋Bellwoody譯 20230113

Executive Summary 摘要

What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defense came at high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is therefore not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.

The Challenge  挑戰

China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[1] Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.

Because “a Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario” for the U.S. military, it is critical to have a shared, rigorous, and transparent understanding of the operational dynamics of such an invasion.[2] Just as such an understanding was developed concerning the Cold War’s Fulda Gap, so too must analysts consider the Taiwan invasion scenario. This understanding is important because U.S. policy would be radically different if the defense were hopeless than if successful defense were achievable. If Taiwan can defend itself from China without U.S. assistance, then there is no reason to tailor U.S. strategy to such a contingency.  正如對冷戰的富爾達裂口形成了這樣的理解一樣，分析人員也必須考慮台灣被侵略的情景。這種理解很重要，因為如果防禦無望與成功防禦可以實現，美國的政策將截然不同。如果台灣可以在沒有美國援助的情況下抵禦中國，那麼美國就沒有理由針對這種突發事件調整戰略。

At the other extreme, if no amount of U.S. assistance can save Taiwan from a Chinese invasion, then the United States should not mount a quixotic effort to defend the island. However, if U.S. intervention can thwart an invasion under certain conditions and by relying on certain key capabilities, then U.S. policy should be shaped accordingly. In this way, China would also be more likely to be deterred from an invasion in the first place. However, such shaping of U.S. strategy requires policymakers to have a shared understanding of the problem.  另一個極端是，如果美國再多的援助也無法將台灣從中國的入侵中拯救出來，那麼美國就不應該做出不切實際的保衛台灣的努力。然而，如果美國的干預能夠在特定條件下並依靠特定的關鍵能力阻止入侵，那麼該相應地制定美國政策。這樣一來，中國的侵略也更有可能被阻止於未然。然而，美國戰略的這種塑造需要決策者對問題有共同的理解。

Yet, there is no rigorous, open-source analysis of the operational dynamics and outcomes of an invasion despite its critical nature. Previous unclassified analyses either focus on one aspect of an invasion, are not rigorously structured, or do not focus on military operations. Classified wargames are not transparent to the public. Without a suitable analysis, public debate will remain unanchored. 然而，儘管入侵具有關鍵性，但還沒有對侵略的作戰動態和結果進行嚴格的開源分析。以前的非機密分析若非側重於侵略方面、結構不嚴謹，便是不側重於軍事行動。機密兵棋推演對公眾不透明。如果沒有適當的分析，公共辯論將無法進行。

Therefore, this CSIS project designed a wargame using historical data and operations research to model a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan in 2026. Some rules were designed using analogies with past military operations; for example, the Chinese amphibious lift was based on analysis of Normandy, Okinawa, and the Falklands. Other rules were based on theoretical weapons performance data, such as determining the number of ballistic missiles required to cover an airport. Most rules combined these two methods. In this way, the results of combat in the wargame were determined by analytically based rules instead of by personal judgment. The same set of rules applied to the first iteration and to the last iteration, ensuring consistency. 因此，該 CSIS 項目使用歷史數據和運籌學設計了一個兵棋推演，以模擬中國在 2026 年兩棲侵略台灣。一些規則是通過類比過去的軍事行動來設計的；例如，中國的兩棲運輸是基於對諾曼地、沖繩和福克蘭群島的分析。其他規則基於理論武器性能數據，例如確定覆蓋機場所需的彈道導彈數量。 大多數規則結合了這兩種方法。 通過這種方式，兵棋推演中的戰鬥結果是由基於分析的規則而不是個人判斷決定的。同一組規則應用於第一輪和最後一輪，確保一致性。

Based on interviews and a literature review, the project posited a “base scenario” that incorporated the most likely values for key assumptions. The project team ran that base scenario three times. A variety of excursion cases then explored the effects of varying assumptions.[3] The impact of these varying assumptions on the likely outcome is depicted in a Taiwan Invasion Scorecard (see Figure 8). In all, 24 iterations of the game mapped the contours of the conflict and produced a coherent and rigorously derived picture of a major threat facing the United States. 基於訪談和文獻回顧，該項目提出了一個「基本情景」，其中包含關鍵假設的最可能值。項目團隊將該基本場景運行了三次。然後，各種偏移案例探討了不同假設的影響。這些不同假設對可能結果的影響在台灣侵略記分卡中進行了描述（見圖 8）。總之，24 次兵推描繪了衝突的輪廓，並產生了一幅連貫且嚴格推導的美國面臨的主要威脅的圖景。

The Results

The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities. Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island. Tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious craft and civilian rollon, roll-off ships, while air assault and airborne troops land behind the beachheads.

However, in the most likely “base scenario ” the Chinese invasion quickly founders. Despite massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground forces stream to the beachhead, where the invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland. Meanwhile U.S. submarines, bombers, and fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese amphibious fleet. China’s strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result: Taiwan remains autonomous. 然而，在最有可能的「基本情景」中，中國的侵略很快就會失敗。儘管中國進行了大規模轟炸，但台灣地面部隊仍湧向灘頭陣地，侵略者在那裡艱難地建立補給並向內陸移動。同時，通常由日本自衛隊增援的美國潛艇、轟炸機和戰鬥機/攻擊機迅速削弱了中國的兩棲艦隊。中國對日本基地和美國水面艦艇的打擊無法改變結果：台灣仍然是自治的。

There is one major assumption here: Taiwan must resist and not capitulate. If Taiwan surrenders before U.S. forces can be brought to bear, the rest is futile.

This defense comes at a high cost. The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of servicemembers. Such losses would damage the U.S. global position for many years. While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services. China also suffers heavily. Its navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers are prisoners of war. 還有一個主要假設：台灣必須抵抗而不是投降。如果台灣在美軍可以承受之前投降，剩下的一切都是徒勞的。

這種防禦代價高昂。美國和日本損失了數十艘船隻、數百架飛機和數千名軍人。這種損失將損害美國多年的全球地位。雖然台灣的軍隊完好無損，但已經嚴重退化，只能在沒有電力和基本服務的島上保衛受損的經濟。中國也深受其害。它的海軍一團糟，兩棲部隊的核心被打破，數以萬計的士兵成為戰俘。

Conditions for Success  成功的條件

Analysis of the 24 game iterations showed four necessary conditions to defeat a Chinese invasion.

1. Taiwanese forces must hold the line. 台灣部隊必須撐住前線

Recommendation: Strengthen Taiwanese ground forces. Because some Chinese forces will always land on the island, Taiwanese ground forces must be able to contain any beachhead and then counterattack forcefully as Chinese logistics weaken. However, the Taiwanese ground forces have severe weaknesses. Therefore, Taiwan must fill its ranks and conduct rigorous, combined arms training. Ground forces must become the center of Taiwan’s defense effort. 建議：強化台灣的地面部隊，因為總有部份共軍能成功登陸。（註：未計入算台灣內部協力者的部份）

台灣的地面部隊必須要能夠圍困任何灘頭堡，然後在共軍的後勤虛弱之後發動反擊。

然而台灣的地面部隊有嚴重弱點，所以台灣必須要填滿部隊編制並進行嚴格的綜合武器訓練，地面部隊必須成為防禦作為的中心。

2. There is no “Ukraine model” for Taiwan.  台灣沒有烏克蘭模式

Recommendation: In peacetime, the United States and Taiwan must work together to provide Taiwan with the weapons it needs; in wartime, if the United States decides to defend Taiwan, U.S. forces must quickly engage in direct combat. In the Ukraine war, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have not sent troops directly into combat but have sent massive amounts of equipment and supplies to Ukraine. Russia has been unable to interdict this overland flow. However, the “Ukraine model” cannot be replicated in Taiwan because China can isolate the island for weeks or even months. Taiwan must start the war with everything it needs. Further, delays and half measures by the United States would make the defense harder, increase U.S. casualties, allow China to create a stronger lodgment, and raise the risk of escalation. 建議：和平時期，美台必須合作，提供台灣防衛的一切所需軍備；戰時，美國一但決心協防台灣，美軍必須快速加入正面戰鬥迎擊。

在烏克蘭，美國與北約並沒有直接派兵直接交戰，而是送出了海量的裝備和補給援助烏克蘭，俄國則一直無法阻止這樣的地面流動。然而，烏克蘭模式不適用於台灣，因為中國可以將台灣封所數週到數月。在開戰時，台灣必須要擁有戰爭所需要的一切。

任何美國方面的延遲或三心二意，將會讓防衛更為艱難，增加美方傷亡，讓中國軍隊能夠創造更強大的橋頭堡工事，並升高危機的等級.

3. The United States must be able to use its bases in Japan for combat operations. 美國必須能動用在駐日基地進行戰鬥任務

Recommendation: Deepen diplomatic and military ties with Japan. While other allies (e.g., Australia and South Korea) are important in the broader competition with China and may play some role in the defense of Taiwan, Japan is the linchpin. Without the use of U.S. bases in Japan, U.S. fighter/attack aircraft cannot effectively participate in the war.  建議：強化外交與軍事的綁定

雖然其他盟友如澳洲和韓國，在廣範圍的與中國競爭中可以為保護台灣擔任部份角色，日本是關鍵。沒有駐日美軍基地的話，美國的戰鬥與攻擊機隊將無法有效參與戰事。

4. The United States must be able to strike the Chinese fleet rapidly and en masse from outside the Chinese defensive zone. 美國必須中國防禦區外快速攻擊解放軍艦隊

Recommendation: Increase the arsenal of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Bombers capable of launching standoff, anti-ship ordnance offer the fastest way to defeat the invasion with the least amount of U.S. losses. Procuring such missiles and upgrading existing missiles with this anti-ship capability needs to be the top procurement priority. 建議：增加長程反艦飛彈的軍械庫

轟炸機有能力發射長常的反艦武器，提供可以快速的擊敗侵略的方法，並且讓美國損失最少。採購這類飛彈或升級已經服役的飛彈達到反艦能力，應該是最高優先採購。

Avoiding a Pyrrhic Victory 避免得不償失的勝利

Victory is not everything. The United States might win a pyrrhic victory, suffering more in the long run than the “defeated” Chinese. Furthermore, the perception of high costs might undermine deterrence: if China believes that the United States would be unwilling to bear the high costs of defending Taiwan, then China might risk an invasion. The United States should therefore institute policies and programs to make winning less costly in the event of conflict. Such measures would include: 勝利不是一切。美國可能會贏得代價高昂的勝利，從長遠來看比「戰敗」的中國遭受更多的痛苦。此外，高成本的認知可能會削弱威懾力：如果中國認為美國不願意承擔保衛台灣的高成本，那麼中國可能會冒著侵略的風險。因此，美國應該制定政策和計劃，以在發生衝突時降低取勝成本。

POLITICS AND STRATEGY 政策與戰略

▪ Clarify war plan assumptions. 釐清戰爭計劃的前提 There is a seeming gap between war plans, which assume prewar deployments to Taiwan and neutral countries, and political realities. 在戰爭計畫之間有著落差，其中假設台灣與各中立國間的戰前部署，以及政治情勢。

▪ Do not plan on striking the mainland. 不要試圖攻擊中國本土 The National Command Authority might withhold permission because of the grave risks of escalation with a nuclear power. 指揮當局應該保留許可權（攻擊中國本土），因為對核武強權的攻擊會導致升級為重大風險。（註：國家強大了，外國人就不敢救你們了）

▪ Recognize the need to continue operations in the face of heavy casualties. 承認持續任務要面對巨大傷亡 In three weeks, the United States will suffer about half as many casualties as it did in 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. 在三週的時間裡，美軍將要承受約相當於20年阿富汗與伊拉克反恐戰爭，約一半的傷亡數。

▪ Move Taiwanese air and naval forces toward asymmetry. 將台灣的海空軍朝向不對稱武力發展.  Despite rhetoric about adopting a “porcupine strategy, ” Taiwan still spends most of its defense budget on expensive ships and aircraft that China will quickly destroy. 儘管有著豪豬戰略的說法，台灣還是將大部份的軍費花在昂貴，但很容易被中國摧毀的船艦和飛機上。

DOCTRINE AND POSTURE 信條與態度

▪ Fortify and expand air bases in Japan and Guam. 武裝與擴張日本與關島空軍基地 Dispersion and hardening dilute the effects of missile attacks. 以分散和加固，來抵銷飛彈攻擊的效果。

▪ Revise U.S. Air Force doctrine and restructure procurement to increase aircraft survivability on the ground. Ninety percent of aircraft losses occurred on the ground. 調整美國空軍的教範和採購方向到提高飛機在地面的生存能力。（註：這兩條是批評美空軍機場的防禦薄弱，以致於90%飛機損失都在地面。因為這顯然是可以避免的）

▪ Do not plan on overflying the Chinese mainland. 不要試圖飛越中國本土  Chinese air defense is too strong, the targets take a long time to produce operational results, and the air missions around Taiwan take priority. 中國本土的防空太過於強大，這些目標需要浪費大量時間以達成作戰實效，空中任務應該要以台灣周圍為優先事項。（註：有那麼可怕嗎？那空軍軍歌怎麼唱的? “Nothing to stop the USAF”；不過攻擊中國本土的目標，的確不是很有效率，因為重點還是摧毀共軍海空武力。）

▪ Recognize the limitations of Marine Littoral Regiments and Army Multi-Domain Task Forces and cap their numbers. 承認海軍陸戰隊濱海戰鬥團與陸軍多領域特遣部隊的人數限制  These units are designed to counter China and do provide some value, but political and operational difficulties put limits on their utility.  這些單位雖然組建的目的就是反制中國，並且有相對應的價值，但政治環境和作戰困難，將限制他們的理論功能的發揮。（譯註：政治環境指的是怕承受傷亡，作戰困難就是難以接近實際交戰區；某種程度意指應該直接駐軍台灣，否則濱海戰鬥團和多域特遣隊，都將會作用不大）

▪ Avoid crisis deployments that create vulnerabilities. 避免脆弱部署產生的危機  Military doctrine calls for forward deployments to enhance deterrence during a crisis, but these forces make tempting targets. 軍事教範指出在危機發生時，前進部署可以帶來威懾的效果，但這些武力也成為誘人的靶子。

WEAPONS AND PLATFORMS 武器與平台

▪ Shift to smaller, more survivable ships and develop rescue mechanisms to deal with crippled ships and multiple sinkings.  轉向小型、更具生存力的船艦，與發展救難機制以因應船艦受損和大量沉船  Surface ships are extremely vulnerable, with the United States typically losing two carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants in game iterations. 水面艦顯的脆弱不堪，導致在不同的兵推中，美軍都要損失兩艘航空母艦和10-20艘大型水面作戰艦。

▪ Prioritize submarines and other undersea platforms. 潛艦與其他水下平台優先  Submarines were able to enter the Chinese defensive zone and wreak havoc with the Chinese fleet, but numbers were inadequate. 潛艦能夠進入中國的防禦區域，並且對中國艦隊造成重大破壞，然而數量還不足夠。（註：不擴大造船能量的話, 美國的潛艦建造排單已經排到20幾年後了）

▪ Continue development and fielding of hypersonic weapons but recognize that they are niche weapons. 持續發展與部署極音速  Their high cost limits inventories, so they lack the volume needed to counter the immense numbers of Chinese air and naval platforms. 極音速武器的高單價限制了整體存量，缺乏足以反制中國海空作戰平台所需要的數量。

▪ Prioritize sustainment of the bomber fleet over fighters. 優先維護轟炸機而非戰鬥機  The range, missile standoff distance, and high carrying capacity of bombers presented the People’s Liberation Army with daunting challenges. 轟炸機的續航力和長飛彈射程，以及高載彈量優勢，證明會對共軍帶來巨大的挑戰風險。

▪ Produce more, cheaper fighters and balance the acquisition of stealth aircraft with production of non-stealth aircraft. 生產更多、更便宜的戰鬥機, 並平衡隱形飛機的採購與非隱形飛機的生產。  With so many aircraft lost early in the conflict, the Air Force risks running out of fighter/attack aircraft and becoming a secondary player in the conflict unless it has a large enough force to sustain the losses. 由於前期戰鬥中損失太多飛機，空軍將可能因為損失過多戰鬥機或攻擊機，而衰退為次要作戰力量的風險，除非它規模大到足以承受這樣的損失。

Finally, the project and its recommendations need some caveats. Modeling an invasion does not imply that it is inevitable or even probable. The Chinese leadership might adopt a strategy of diplomatic isolation, gray zone pressure, or economic coercion against Taiwan; even if China opts for military force, this might take the form of a blockade rather than an outright invasion. However, the risk of invasion is real enough and potentially so destructive that analysis is worthwhile. 模擬侵略並不意味著它是不可避免的，甚至是可能發生的。中國領導人可能對台灣採取外交孤立、灰色地帶施壓或經濟脅迫的策略；即使中國選擇使用武力，也可能採取封鎖的形式，而非直接侵略。但侵略的風險是真實存在的，且具有破壞性，因此值得進行分析。

The project does not take a position on whether the benefits of defending Taiwan outweigh the prospective costs, or how to weigh those costs and benefits. Instead, the purpose is to enhance the public debate and thus allow the nation to make better-informed decisions on this critical national security challenge. 本計劃未就保衛台灣的收益是否超過預期成本，或如何權衡這些成本和收益表明立場。相反的，計劃目的是加強公眾辯論，從而使國家能夠就這一關鍵的國家安全挑戰做出更明智的決定。

 

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[1]  The project uses “China” to refer to the People’s Republic of China, recognizing that many on Taiwan consider themselves Chinese also.

[2]  Ely Ratner, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Future of U.S. Policy on Taiwan,” 117th Cong., 1st sess., 2021, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/the-future-of-us-policy-ontaiwan120821.

[3]  Excursion cases include assumptions that are plausible although not considered the most likely.