烏克蘭的新軍事安全戰略 PISM 20210505 Taimocracy翻譯

Ukraine’s New Military Security Strategy    PISM 20210505  Taimocracy翻譯

Ukraine’s new Military Security Strategy, adopted in March 2021, is based on the concept of comprehensive security. The potential for further Russian incursions is to be prevented by raising the costs of aggression through, among other things, the development of territorial defence forces, the modernisation of armaments, and the use of asymmetric defensive actions. The strategy sets achievable goals and its implementation will have a positive impact on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against a massive Russian invasion. However, it will not prevent periodic escalations along the demarcation line in Donbas.  於 2021 年 3 月烏克蘭的新軍事安全戰略基於「全面安全概念」。透過發展領土防禦力量、武器現代化和使用不對稱防禦行動等方式，提高侵略成本，以防止俄羅斯進一步入侵的可能性。 該戰略設定了可實現的目標，其實施將對烏克蘭抵禦俄羅斯大規模入侵的能力產生積極影響。但是，它無法防止沿頓巴斯分界線的周期性升級。

The Strategy’s Assumptions

Approved by President Volodymyr Zelensky on 25 March 2021, Ukraine’s new Military Security Strategy replaces the 2015 Military Doctrine formulated during the fierce first phase of the conflict with Russia. The previous document stipulated that Ukraine should aim to achieve the ability to defend itself against Russian aggression on its own and to achieve full interoperability with NATO forces by 2020. Both goals were overly ambitious and not met.  烏克蘭新的軍事安全戰略於 2021 年 3 月 25 日獲得總統沃洛德米爾·澤連斯基的批准，取代了在與俄羅斯激烈衝突的第一階段制訂的 2015 年軍事準則。之前的文件規定，烏克蘭的目標是在 2020 年之前實現獨立防禦俄羅斯侵略的能力，並實現與北約部隊的全面操作互通性。這兩個目標都過於雄心勃勃，沒有實現。

The Military Security Strategy assumes that the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation, which has been identified as a military adversary, continues to be the greatest threat to Ukraine’s security. The document assesses aggression by another state or dragging Ukraine into an external conflict as less likely. Ukraine’s main objective is to deter Russia from further escalation of the war by increasing the cost of a potential offensive and occupation to an unacceptable level. Deterrence is to be achieved through diplomatic means and the implementation of a comprehensive security concept that considers both military and non-military activities, such as propaganda and cyber warfare. It is intended to maximise the use of Ukraine’s potential without over-militarising the country.  軍事安全戰略假定，已被確定為軍事對手的俄羅斯聯邦的侵略政策仍然是對烏克蘭安全的最大威脅。 該文件評估了另一個國家的侵略或將烏克蘭拖入外部衝突的可能性較小。烏克蘭的主要目標是透過將潛在進攻和占領的成本提高到不可接受的水平來阻止俄羅斯進一步升級戰爭。威懾將透過外交手段和實施綜合考慮軍事和非軍事活動（如宣傳和網絡戰）的安全概念來實現。它旨在最大限度地利用烏克蘭的潛力，而不會使國家過度軍事化。

The Military Aspect

The strategy indicates the need to adapt the armed forces to operate on the modern battlefield, given the experience of the war with Russia. Great emphasis is put on the development of tactical missile and anti-aircraft forces as well as use of drones, satellite communications and navigation to increase the cost of conducting military operations by an aggressor on Ukrainian territory. It is planned to implement the concept of network-centric warfare, which envisages the creation of an information exchange network using modern communication and reconnaissance systems and decentralisation of command. This is intended to enable Ukraine to conduct asymmetric operations against a stronger opponent.  鑑於與俄羅斯的戰爭經驗，該戰略表明需要調整武裝部隊在現代戰場上的行動。高度重視發展戰術導彈和防空部隊以及使用無人機、衛星通信和導航來增加侵略者在烏克蘭領土上進行軍事行動的成本。計劃實施以網路為中心的戰爭概念，設想使用現代通信和偵察系統以及指揮下放來創建資訊交換網絡。這是為了讓烏克蘭能夠針對更強大的對手進行不對稱行動。

The strategy gives priority to the modernisation and use of the land forces, which are to cooperate with Ukrainian society in ensuring the defence of the country. At present, a contract army forms the basis of the armed forces. It is supplemented by conscription and voluntary service in the reserve and territorial defence forces. The strategy envisages the development of territorial defence potential and the replacement of conscription with compulsory training in the reserves, which would prepare society for the creation of a resistance movement in case of occupation.  該戰略優先考慮陸軍的現代化和使用，與烏克蘭社會合作以確保國家的防禦。目前，僱傭部隊是武裝部隊的基礎。並由後備和領土防禦部隊中的徵兵和志願役補充。該戰略設想發展領土防禦潛力，並以預備役義務訓練取代徵兵，這將為社會在被佔領的情況下發起抵抗運動做好準備。

The strategy outlines a defence scenario divided into four stages. In the first, regular armed forces and territorial defence forces are to be used. They will aim to deter offensives using asymmetric actions, including in enemy territory. The second stage includes support from reserve forces and the formation of resistance in occupied areas. This is to gain the time needed to implement the third stage, which is to carry out general mobilisation and obtain foreign military support. The fourth stage is to be post-conflict stabilisation using the armed forces.  該戰略概述了一個分為四個階段的防禦方案。首先，將使用正規武裝力量和領土防禦力量。其目標是使用不對稱行動來威懾入侵方，包括在敵方領土上。第二階段包括後備力量的支持和在佔領區建立抵抗軍。這是為了爭取實施第三階段所需的時間，即進行總動員並獲得外國軍事支持。第四階段是使用武裝部隊進行衝突後穩定。

The strategy deals superficially with the issues of the modernisation of the navy. Although, unlike the Military Doctrine, it highlights the potential threat to shipping in the Black and Azov seas posed by Russia’s aggressive policy, it limits itself to increasing reconnaissance and missile strike capabilities. The strategy does not mention the reinforcement of the fleet with small coastal defence vessels, which is currently being undertaken. The modernisation of the air force likewise has been treated superficially. The strategy only mentions the need to acquire multirole combat aircraft in the long term.  該戰略表面上處理了海軍現代化的問題。儘管與軍事準則不同，它強調了俄羅斯的侵略政策對黑海和亞速海航運的潛在威脅，但它僅限於提高偵察和導彈打擊能力。該戰略沒有提到用目前正在進行的小型海防船加強艦隊。空軍的現代化同樣被膚淺地對待。該戰略僅提到需要長期採購多用途戰鬥機。 

The Non-Military Aspect

To stop Russia’s aggressive actions, the strategy envisages the use of international political and economic sanctions. Ukraine is to strive for their extension and the imposition of new ones in case of further hostile actions on the part of Russia (e.g., violation of the ceasefire in Donbas). The strategy, in contrast to the Military Doctrine, does not directly point to the possibility of regaining control over the occupied territories as a result of a military operation. This is to be achieved through diplomatic efforts. One example of these is the Ukrainian efforts to set up the Crimean Platform in which states that oppose the occupation of the peninsula (Poland, Turkey, the U.S. and the UK have declared their support) would participate.  為了阻止俄羅斯的侵略行動，該戰略設想使用國際政治和經濟制裁。如果俄羅斯方面採取進一步的敵對行動（例如違反頓巴斯停火協議），烏克蘭將努力擴大和實施新的措施。與軍事準則相反，該戰略並未直接指出透過軍事行動重新控制被佔領土的可能性。這將透過外交努力來實現。其中一個例子是烏克蘭努力建立克里米亞平台，反對占領該半島的國家（波蘭、土耳其、美國和英國已宣布支持）將參與其中。

According to the strategy, Ukraine’s defence policy is designed to lead to NATO membership. Further implementation of NATO standards, increasing the interoperability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the forces of the Alliance, and fulfilling the criteria for NATO membership are envisaged. Increasing Ukraine’s involvement in international NATO missions is also intended to bring the prospect of accession closer. This is meant to build Ukraine’s position as a potentially valuable ally, not only a “recipient” of international security but also a “provider”. Currently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are taking part in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In April this year, Ukraine announced its intention to become involved in missions in the Mediterranean Sea and Iraq.  根據該戰略，烏克蘭的國防政策旨在促成加入北約。設想進一步實施北約標準，增加烏克蘭武裝部隊與聯盟部隊的操作互通性，並滿足北約成員資格的標準。增加烏克蘭對國際北約使命的參與也旨在拉近加入北約的前景。這是為了建立烏克蘭作為潛在有價值盟友的地位，不僅是國際安全的「接受者」，更是「提供者」。目前，烏克蘭武裝部隊正在參與北約在科索沃和阿富汗的行動。今年4月，烏克蘭宣布有意參與地中海和伊拉克的任務。

Given its limited financial and technological capabilities, Ukraine will seek international technical and financial support for the modernisation of the army and cooperation with foreign investors in the joint production of armaments. Actions in this direction are already being taken: for example, the Ukrainian-Turkish joint-venture Black Sea Shield is working on guided anti-tank missiles, drones, and radio-electronic warfare systems. Ukraine has signed a letter of intent with the United Kingdom on the construction of missile boats as well.  鑑於其有限的財政和技術能力，烏克蘭將尋求國際技術和財政支持，以支持軍隊的現代化以及與外國投資者在聯合生產軍備方面的合作。朝這個方向採取的行動已經開始：例如，烏克蘭-土耳其合資企業黑海盾正在研究制導反坦克導彈、無人機和無線電電子戰系統。烏克蘭也與英國簽署了建造導彈艇的意向書。

Conclusions

The defence strategy is less ambitious than the doctrine that preceded it, but it is characterised by greater realism in the selection of measures aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s deterrent potential. The focus on the development of the ground forces, especially the mobilisation capabilities of the reserve and territorial defence forces, stems from the experience of the war with Russia, when poor training and equipment, as well as problems in conscription, made it impossible to effectively resist the well-trained Russian infantry. The measures envisaged by the strategy should reduce the likelihood of a repeat of the scenario of the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas. However, they will not prevent periodic escalations of conflict along the demarcation line, which are provocations by Russia to exert political pressure on Ukraine, NATO, and the EU.  與之前的準則相比，防禦戰略沒有那麼雄心勃勃，但其特點是在選擇更加現實加強烏克蘭威懾潛力。重點發展地面部隊，特別是後備和領土防禦部隊的動員能力，源於與俄羅斯的戰爭經驗，當時訓練和裝備差，以及徵兵問題導致無法有效地抵抗訓練有素的俄羅斯步兵。該戰略設想的措施應減少重蹈吞併克里米亞和占領頓巴斯的覆轍。然而，他們不會阻止分界線沿線衝突的周期性升級，這是俄羅斯對烏克蘭、北約和歐盟施加政治壓力的挑釁。

Investment in the air force and navy has received cursory attention, which may result in a decline in their combat potential in the medium term. Modernisation of these types of armed forces is the most expensive, and Ukraine’s economic potential does not allow it to strengthen them to a level that would prevent Russia from dominating Ukraine’s airspace and sea. However, the development of missile and air defence forces and the acquisition of coastal defence vessels would allow Ukraine to partially replace these capabilities, using its defence industry.  未強調對空軍和海軍的投資，這可能導致它們在中期內作戰潛力下降。這些類型的武裝部隊的現代化是最昂貴的，烏克蘭的經濟潛力不允許其將其加強到阻止俄羅斯主導烏克蘭領空和海洋的水平。然而，導彈和防空力量的發展以及海防艦艇的採購將使烏克蘭能夠利用其國防工業部分取代這些能力。

Further support for Ukraine from NATO countries—financial and in the form of military equipment and exercises—will be necessary to fully implement the strategy. Poland may intensify military cooperation with Ukraine by conducting joint exercises of Ukrainian and Polish territorial defence forces and developing joint armaments, in particular artillery, radar and communications systems, and drones. Poland may also seek to increase the effectiveness of cooperation within the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG).  北約國家對烏克蘭的進一步支持——財政和軍事裝備和演習的形式——將是全面實施該戰略所必需的。波蘭可能透過舉行烏克蘭和波蘭領土防禦部隊的聯合演習和發展聯合武器，特別是火砲、雷達和通信系統以及無人機，來加強與烏克蘭的軍事合作。波蘭還可能尋求提高立陶宛-波蘭-烏克蘭旅級部隊合作的有效性。