毒蛙戰略：防止中國針對台灣離島造成既成事實 202110 Center for New America Security Taimocracy翻譯

毒蛙戰略：防止中國針對台灣離島造成既成事實    Center for New America Security、

Taimocracy翻譯

The Poison Frog Strategy: Preventing a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwanese Islands    Center for New America Security /Taimocracy翻譯202110 

Introduction 概要

How could Taiwan and the United States respond if China seized one of Taiwan’s outlying islands, such as Pratas/Dongsha (hereafter Dongsha) in the South China Sea? Whereas the U.S. national security community has focused on defending Taiwan against Chinese invasion, China’s recent military activities suggest that this kind of coercion and limited aggression might be an equally urgent question.  More worryingly, such a scenario could be a prelude or pathway to war involving China, Taiwan, and the United States.
如果中國在南海奪取了台灣的一個離島，例如普拉塔斯/東沙（以下簡稱東沙），台灣和美國將如何應對？儘管美國國家安全界一直專注於保衛台灣免受中國入侵，但中國最近的軍事活動表明，這種脅迫和有限的侵略可能是一個同樣緊迫的問題。更令人擔憂的是，這種情況可能是涉及中國、台灣和美國的戰爭的前奏或道路。 

To explore potential policy and strategy options to prevent such a calamity, the Gaming Lab at CNAS wargamed this scenario with Taiwanese, American, and regional experts.  Worryingly, the game found few credible options for pushing China to abandon Dongsha and return to the status quo.  However, the game found numerous areas where preparation and multilateral coordination—particularly in concert with Japan—could deter limited Chinese aggression against Taiwan.
為了探索預防此類災難的潛在政策和戰略選擇，CNAS 的兵棋推演室與台灣、美國和地區專家對這種情況進行了推演。令人擔憂的是，該兵推幾乎沒有找到推動中國放棄東沙並回歸現狀的可靠選項。然而，這場博弈發現，在許多領域，準備和多邊協調——尤其是與日本的協調——可以阻止中國對台灣的有限侵略。 

During the game, the teams representing the United States and Taiwan struggled to compel a Chinese withdrawal from Dongsha without escalating the crisis.  The team representing China avoided further escalation given its first-mover advantage, constrained territorial gains, and geographic proximity.  In contrast, the U.S. team had to push its forces far forward in ways that were risky and would be difficult to sustain.  Punitive non-military options, such as economic sanctions or information campaigns, took too long to produce effects and appeared too weak to compel China to abandon its gains.  More aggressive military responses risked escalation to war, which both the U.S. and Taiwan teams wished to avoid.  With few viable coercive options and the onus of escalation falling on the U.S. and Taiwan teams, the game reaffirmed the difficulty of rolling back territorial aggression of this kind.
兵推中，代表美國和台灣的團隊在不升級危機的情況下努力迫使中國撤出東沙。中國隊則在具有先發優勢、有限的領土收益和地理接近位置，避免進一步的升級。相比之下，美國隊不得不以危險且難以維持的方式命其部隊向前推進。懲罰性的非軍事選擇，例如經濟制裁或宣傳運動，需要很長時間才能產生效果，而且顯得太弱，無法迫使中國放棄其成果。更激進的軍事反應有升級為戰爭的風險，這是美國隊和台灣隊都希望避免的。由於幾乎沒有可行的強制選擇，而且升級的責任落在美國隊和台灣隊的身上，這場兵推重申了難以遏制這種領土侵略。 

Indeed, discouraging China from seizing Taiwanese territory before it happens is the most salient lesson of the game.  The United States and Taiwan must begin coordinating today to build a credible deterrent against limited Chinese aggression or coercion toward Taiwan.  Doing so will help identify ways to make a territorial fait accompli by China—such as the seizure of Dongsha—too unpalatable to consider, while also communicating the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan.  This strategy will require advance planning and communication of joint responses and defenses against coercion and territorial aggression.  Rather than scrambling to respond to a fait accompli, as occurred in this game, the United States and Taiwan should prepare to implement coordinated, whole-of-government deterrent measures quickly and ensure immediate consequences for Chinese coercion or aggression short of war.
事實上，在事前阻止中國搶占台灣領土是這場兵推最重要的教訓。美國和台灣必須從今天開始協調，以建立可信的威懾力量，以對抗中國對台灣的有限侵略或脅迫。這樣做將有助於找出使中國在領土上造成既成事實（如奪取東沙）變得難以下嚥，同時也傳達美國對保衛台灣的承諾。該戰略將需要針對脅迫和領土侵略的聯合響應和防禦提前規劃和溝通。美國和台灣不應像這場博弈中那樣匆忙應對既成事實，而應準備迅速實施協調一致的全政府威懾措施，以確保在非戰爭的情況下對中國的脅迫或侵略產生立即後果。 

Japan’s cooperation is essential in this type of scenario because it could change China’s calculations of the military and diplomatic risks of coercion or aggression.  A joint statement from Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and U.S. President Joseph R. Biden in April 2021 referenced “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” and encouraged “the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”  The United States would rely heavily on Japan for basing infrastructure to conduct military operations to support Taiwan.  And, although the statement did not elaborate further, unambiguous Japanese support will be necessary to create a regional, as opposed to bilateral U.S.-Taiwan, response to Chinese coercion or aggression.  Specifically, Japan’s involvement could enable coordination with India and Australia via the Quad relationships.  It could also create opportunities to work with other states facing Chinese coercion and territorial aggression, such as Vietnam and the Philippines.
在這種情況下，日本的合作至關重要，因為它可能會改變中國對脅迫或侵略的軍事和外交風險的計算。日本首相菅義偉和美國總統拜登在 2021 年 4 月的聯合聲明中提到了「台灣海峽兩岸的和平與穩定」，並鼓勵「和平解決兩岸問題」。美國將深度依賴日本的基礎設施，來開展支持台灣的軍事行動。而且，雖然聲明沒有進一步詳細說明，但應對中國的脅迫或侵略，日本的明確支持而不是美國與台灣的雙邊關係是必要的。特別是，日本可透過四方關係與印度和澳大利亞的協調來參與。它還可以創造與面臨中國脅迫和領土侵略的其他國家合作的機會，例如越南和菲律賓。

Wargames are not predictive, but they are useful tools for exploring decision-making and identifying vulnerabilities.  As China’s assertiveness rises, failure to prepare for the threat of an incursion against Taiwanese territory presents grave risks to Indo-Pacific security.  The United States, Taiwan, and regional allies and partners can better understand how to build an effective deterrence strategy to discourage Chinese aggression or coercion through multilateral gaming, to include crisis simulations and exercises.
兵棋推演不是預測性的，但它們是探索決策和識別弱點的有用工具。隨著中國的更加獨斷，若未能為入侵台灣領土的威脅做好準備，將對印太安全構成嚴重威脅。美國、台灣以及地區盟友和合作夥伴可以更深入了解如何建立有效的威懾戰略，透過多邊博弈來阻止中國的侵略或脅迫，包括危機模擬和演習。 

STRUCTURE 架構

The Gaming Lab at CNAS conducted a virtual strategy game to examine potential U.S. and Taiwanese responses to Chinese coercive measures, beginning with a scenario in which Chinese forces seized Dongsha Island, in the South China Sea.  Players consisted of multinational defense and policy experts as well as subject matter experts.  These players comprised three teams: the Blue Team, representing the United States; the Green Team, representing Taiwan; and the White Cell/Red Team, which combined China experts, the adjudicators, and other important international actors.  The game consisted of three moves over the course of two three-hour sessions.  Each move required all teams to take at least one diplomatic, military, information, and economic action.  Players were free to take any reasonable action, but they had to explain why they had chosen one specific action over another and what they expected the outcomes of each action to be.  Although the teams were given objectives to prioritize, they had freedom to build and determine their actions.  The three teams were divided into separate virtual rooms but encouraged to coordinate with one another as desired.
CNAS 的兵棋推演室進行了一個虛擬戰略推演，以檢視美國和台灣對中國強制措施的潛在反應，場景從中國軍隊佔領南海東沙島開始。參與者包括多國國防和政策專家以及相關領域專家。這些參與者組成：藍隊代表美國；綠隊代表台灣；以及由中國專家、裁判員和其他重要國際參與者組成的白細胞/紅隊。這場兵推包括在兩、三個小時過程中的三個行動。每一項舉措都要求所有團隊至少採取一項外交、軍事、資訊和經濟行動。參與者可以自由採取任何合理的行動，但他們必須解釋為什麼他們選擇了一個特定的行動而不是另一個，以及他們期望每個行動的結果是什麼。儘管各隊被賦予了優先目標，但他們可以自由地構建和決定他們的行動。這三個團隊被分配到不同的虛擬空間，但鼓勵根據需要相互協調。 

SCENARIO  想定

The game began with a scenario many China-watchers view as increasingly plausible: In the year 2025, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marines and special-operations forces rapidly seize Taiwanese controlled Dongsha Island, a small atoll about 190 miles southeast of Hong Kong and 270 miles southwest of Kaohsiung.  Under cover of an exercise, PLA forces come ashore on Dongsha without warning and capture its garrison of 500 Taiwanese marines.  PLA forces secure the island and return to mainland China, People’s Armed Police personnel and 300 “civilians” on Dongsha, who begin preparing the island to function as a military base.
沙盤推演以許多中國觀察家認為越來越可能的情況開始：2025年，中國人民解放軍海軍陸戰隊和特種作戰部隊迅速佔領了台灣控制的東沙島，這個小環礁位於香港東南約190英里和高雄西南270英里。在一次演習的掩護下，解放軍部隊在沒有警告的情況下登上了東沙島，並俘獲了由500名台灣海軍陸戰隊員組成的駐軍。解放軍部隊確保了該島的防衛後，退回中國大陸，並駐紮人民武裝警察和300名「平民」，以開始準備將該島作為一個軍事基地使用。 

To further signal its military might, China increases its military exercises, focusing on dispersal and readiness, in the South China Sea.  China follows up its military moves with additional economic coercion against Taiwan, including investigating Taiwanese companies with investments in mainland China and delaying cross-strait business deals.  Simultaneously, in the information space, Chinese patriotic hackers deface several commercial Taiwanese websites.  To shield themselves from potential trade repercussions, Chinese manufacturers preemptively stockpile such critical economic inputs as semiconductors and oil.  To ward off interference from other states, China frames the situation as an “internal matter.”  Apart from the United States, which condemns the Chinese seizure and urges a restoration of the status quo ante, no other country speaks out in support of Taiwan.
中國為進一步顯示其軍事力量，增加了南海的軍事演習，重點在分散和備戰。在軍事行動後，中國對台灣進行了更多的經濟脅迫，包括調查在中國大陸投資的台灣公司和拖延兩岸商業交易。同時，在資訊領域，中國愛國的駭客們破壞了一些台灣的商業網站。為了保護自己免受潛在的貿易影響。中國製造商先發制人地囤積諸如半導體和石油等關鍵經濟資產。為了避免其他國家干涉，中國把這種情況說成是「內部事務」。除了美國譴責中國的奪取行為並敦促恢復原狀之外，沒有其他國家公開支持台灣。 

Move 1行動一

This scenario intentionally placed the onus of escalation on the U.S. and Taiwan teams. As a result, both teams had to balance between moderating actions to avoid escalating a crisis into a conflict and ensuring that China’s actions did not go unpunished.  While the Taiwan team undertook military actions, its strategy focused on diplomacy to stabilize the situation, including overtures to garner international support.  Although these efforts had some success, they mostly resulted in anodyne statements of concern from states and international bodies.
這個想定有意將升級的義務放在美國和台灣隊身上。因此，兩隊都必須在溫和的行動之間取得平衡，以避免危機升級為衝突。兩隊都必須在溫和的行動間取得平衡，以避免危機升級為衝突，並確保中國的行動不會不受懲罰。雖然台灣隊採取了軍事行動，但其戰略重點是以外交手段來穩定局勢，包括爭取國際支持。雖然這些努力取得了一些成功，但它們大多導致了各國和國際機構無關痛癢的關切聲明。 

The Taiwan team was also concerned about the effects of Dongsha’s seizure on Taiwanese public attitude and therefore made efforts to increase its economic and cyber resiliency to reassure its citizens.  To demonstrate readiness, protect its sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and deter further Chinese aggression, the Taiwan team deployed naval forces in the vicinity of Dongsha and elsewhere in its territorial waters.  However, the Taiwan team carefully tailored its military responses to avoid unnecessary escalation.
台灣方面也擔心東沙被奪取對台灣公眾態度的影響。因此努力提高其經濟和網路對應力，以安撫公民的情緒。為了展示備戰情況、保護其海上交通線（SLOCs）、阻止中國的進一步侵略，台灣隊在東沙附近和領海其他地方部署了海軍部隊。然而，台灣隊謹慎地調整其軍事反應，以避免不必要的升級。 

The Taiwan team and U.S. team failed to communicate in a clear and timely fashion during the early stages of the game.  The teams faced technical challenges, a language barrier, and differing perspectives and assumptions about the nature of the scenario and potential responses.  As a result, although the Taiwan team wanted to take a deliberate, diplomacy-led approach to regain Dongsha, the U.S. team immediately started planning military options to retake the island.  The lack of coordination on a strategic approach hamstrung the response and led the U.S. team to implement escalatory actions in preparation for a retaking of Dongsha, including deploying U.S. Marines and an Army task force into Taiwan.  This finding reinforces the need for regular planning exercises between Taiwanese and U.S. personnel.
在兵推初期，台灣隊和美國隊沒有進行明確和及時的溝通。兩隊面臨著技術上的挑戰，語言上的障礙，以及對想定的性質和潛在的反應有不同的看法和假設。結果是，儘管台灣隊希望採取審慎的、以外交為主導的方法來奪回東沙，美國隊則立即開始計畫以軍事手段奪回東沙。在戰略方法上缺乏協調阻礙了反應，導致美國隊採取升級行動，為奪回東沙做準備，包括將美國海軍陸戰隊和陸軍特遣部隊部署到台灣。這一發現加強了台灣和美國人員間應定期規劃演習的必要性。 

During Move 1, the U.S. team pursued policies that would take a considerable amount of time to implement. For example, in the information space, the U.S. team established counter-disinformation fusion centers and defensive cyber measures modeled after Department of Homeland Security /Department of Justice counterviolent-extremist fusion centers to protect potential private sector targets and encourage public-private partnership.  In the diplomatic space, the U.S. team began to lay the groundwork for an Indo-Pacific security partnership, which would include Taiwan as well as a larger coalition of regional states that already were or could be affected by Chinese economic coercion. Though potentially important in the future, these actions would realistically not have much effect in the immediate term.
在行動一期間，美國隊追求需要花費大量時間才能實施的政策。例如，在資訊領域，美國隊仿照國土安全部/司法部反暴力極端主義融合中心，建立了反假訊息整合中心和防禦性網路措施，以保護潛在的私部門目標，並鼓勵公私部門合作。在外交領域，美國隊開始為印太安全夥伴關係奠定基礎作業，其中包括台灣以及已經或可能受到中國經濟脅迫影響的地區國家的更大聯盟。儘管在未來可能很重要，但這些行動在短期內實際上不會產生太大影響。 

Move 2行動二

As the game progressed, the Taiwan team continued to signal to its domestic audiences that the government was in control of the crisis and well prepared to mitigate risks to the public.  The Taiwan and U.S. teams engaged in more direct communication, which aided the U.S. team in framing the crisis.  By Move 2, the U.S. team had accepted that using military force to retake Dongsha would be too escalatory and might disrupt the formation of any counter-China coalition.  Accordingly, the team reframed the takeover of Dongsha as an opportunity to expose Chinese belligerence and to encourage states to join together to balance against China’s aggressive behavior.  The U.S. team also saw this as an intelligence opportunity to observe PLA operations and learn about their capabilities.
隨著兵推的進行，台灣隊繼續向國內人民發出訊息，說政府已經控制了危機，並為減輕公眾的風險做好了準備。台灣和美國隊進行了更直接的溝通，此舉有助於美國隊估算危機。到行動二，美國隊已接受了：使用軍事力量奪回東沙的做法不僅會使危機升級，並可能無助於形成反中聯盟。因此，美國隊將奪取中國東沙的行動重新定位為揭露中國好戰行為的機會，並鼓勵各國聯合起來平衡中國的侵略行為。美國隊還將此視為一個情報機會，以觀察解放軍的行動並瞭解其能力。 

The U.S. team’s decision to place U.S. military forces on Taiwan during Move 1 became a key driver for the rest of the game.  From the U.S. team’s perspective, this was a “tit for tat” response to China’s seizure of Dongsha, giving the U.S.-Taiwan coalition leverage and something to trade for Chinese withdrawal.  It also made clear that further Chinese escalation against Taiwan would very likely trigger a larger conflict involving the United States.  However, the Chinese team saw things differently.  They believed the U.S. forces on Taiwan constrained U.S. escalation space for following moves and gave China more diplomatic leverage and the ability to be more opportunistic.
美國隊在行動一中決定在台灣部署美國軍隊，成為兵推的其餘部分的一個關鍵驅動因素。從美國隊的角度看，這是對中國奪取東沙的一個以牙還牙的回應。東沙為美台聯盟提供籌碼，以換取中國撤軍。它還表明，中國對台灣的進一步升級將很可能引發涉及美國的更大衝突。然而，中國隊對事情的看法不同。他們認為，美軍在台灣限制了美國後續行動的升級空間，而給了中國更多的外交槓桿和使中國更有機會。 

If U.S. forces were to leave Taiwan, the Chinese team could declare victory.  If they stayed, the United States would be forced to maintain a potentially unsustainable and unprotected forward presence in the theater.  Moreover, the Chinese team made removal of U.S. troops from Taiwan a prerequisite for any cross-strait negotiations on the crisis, limiting Taiwan’s direct diplomatic options.  The move to put troops on Taiwanese territory reflected a broader U.S. team bias toward a somewhat symmetrical action-reaction strategy when responding to the China team.  For example, when the Chinese team targeted U.S. satellites, the U.S. team responded by targeting Chinese satellites.  This impulse could be interpreted as a means of avoiding escalation, but strategically it tended to cede the initiative to China.  This finding reinforces the need for pre-crisis planning so that every U.S. or Taiwanese move is not simply a response to Chinese actions.
如果美軍必須離開台灣，中國隊可以宣佈勝利。如果美軍留下來，美國將被迫在該地區維持一個可能無法持續的、不受保護的前沿駐留。此外，中國隊將美軍撤離台灣作為任何兩岸危機談判的先決條件，從而限制了台灣直接的外交選擇。在台灣領土上派駐軍隊的舉動，反映了美國隊對某種程度上的「行動-反應」策略的廣泛偏愛。例如，當中國隊以美國衛星為目標時，美國隊就以中國衛星作為回應。這種衝動可以被解釋為是為了避免升級的一種手段，但從戰略上看，等於將主動權讓給中國。這一發現加強了危機前計畫的必要性，使美國或台灣的每一個舉動都不是簡單地對中國的行動作出反應而已。 

Move 3行動三

By Move 3, both the U.S. and Taiwan teams were in difficult positions.  The U.S. team did not want to let Chinese aggression go unpunished, both for the sake of Taiwan and within the context of the broader regional competition.  At the same time, the U.S. team wanted to show its partners and allies that it was a responsible power capable of negotiating and avoiding all-out war.  The Taiwan team was caught in an escalating great-power crisis that threatened to pull Taiwan into a war that it was trying to avoid.  The Taiwan team had to balance its relationships and policies with the United States and China while simultaneously spearheading de-escalation.  And in the early part of the game, before communication between the United States and Taiwan teams improved, the Taiwan team had, unbeknownst to the U.S. team, set up a back channel with the China team.  At the same time the back-channel negotiations were ongoing, the U.S. team was still, in fact, considering additional escalatory action against the China team.  Although back-channel communications certainly made sense in the context of the game, the lack of coordination threatened to undermine any potential resolution.
到了行動三，美國和台灣隊都處於困難的境地。美國隊不想讓中國的侵略行為不受懲罰，這既是為了台灣，也是為更廣泛的區域競爭脈絡。同時，美國隊想向其夥伴和盟友表明，它是一個有能力進行談判和避免全面戰爭的負責任的國家。台灣隊則陷入了一個不斷升級的大國危機，這個危機有可能將台灣拉入一場它試圖避免的戰爭。台灣隊必須在同時在帶頭緩和局勢下，平衡其與美國和中國的關係和政策。而在兵推初期，在美國和台灣隊間溝通改善前，台灣隊在美國隊不知道的情況下，與中國隊建立了一個秘密管道。在秘密管道談判進行同時，美國隊實際上仍在考慮對中國隊採取額外的升級行動。儘管在兵推的背景下，秘密管道的溝通肯定是有意義的，但缺乏協調有可能破壞任何潛在的解決方案。 

Toward the end of the game, the U.S. and Taiwan teams’ main strategy was to isolate China diplomatically and economically and garner enough international backing among allies and partners to make that isolation painful.  To this end, the Taiwan team focused on pulling in some of its regional partners, such as Japan, while the U.S. team reached out to its NATO allies.  To avoid unwanted escalation or permanent effects, the U.S. and Taiwan teams limited their offensive military operations to non-kinetic and reversible actions such as cyberattacks and electronic warfare.
兵推接近尾聲時，美國和台灣隊的主要戰略是在外交和經濟上孤立中國，並在盟友和夥伴中獲得足夠的國際支援，使這種孤立變得痛苦。為此，台灣隊專注於拉攏一些地區夥伴，如日本，而美國隊則拉攏北約盟友。為避免不必要的升級或永久性影響，美國和台灣隊將其進攻性軍事行動限制在非動能和可逆轉的行動上，如網路攻擊和電子戰。 

Key Takeaways and Policy Recommendations關鍵要點和政策建議

Given the inherent difficulty of defending small, distant offshore islands like Dongsha, Taiwan and the United States should strive to turn them into what the players called “poison frogs.”  This approach would make Chinese attempts to seize these islands so militarily, economically, and politically painful from the outset that the costs of coercion or aggression would be greater than the benefits.  Militarily, this would entail local garrisons capable of preventing a bloodless fait accompli, thereby pushing China to escalate to the use of force.  Taiwan should also be prepared to destroy critical infrastructure on such islands to deny its use to China.  And Taiwan and the United States should be ready to exploit China’s belligerence and aggression in the information domain.  This move could help galvanize a regional or international response to Chinese aggression that would underpin a strategy of economically and politically isolating and punishing China’s leadership for this behavior.
鑑於保衛東沙等遙遠的小島存在固有的困難，台灣和美國應該努力將它們變成參與者所說的「毒蛙」。此舉使中國從一開始在奪取這些島嶼時，即面臨軍事上、經濟上和政治上的痛苦，且成本大於收益。在軍事上，需要當地駐軍能夠阻止中國以不流血方式造成既成事實的企圖，從而逼使中國升級到使用武力。台灣也應該準備好摧毀這些島嶼上的關鍵基礎設施，以阻止中國使用。台灣和美國應該準備好揭露中國在資訊領域的敵意和侵略。此舉可能有助於激發地區或國際對中國侵略的反應，以加強經濟和政治上孤立和懲罰中國領導地位的戰略。 

Much as poison frogs advertise the risk they pose to predators through bright colors, executing this strategy would require the United States and Taiwan to plan, coordinate, and above all communicate their deterrence policies in advance of a crisis rather than improvising a response after China has acted.  In the game scenario, once China acted aggressively it was difficult for the United States, Taiwan, and the international community to push Beijing to reverse its actions without unacceptable escalation.  Additionally, most non-military responses—such as economic sanctions or trade embargoes—took too long to implement and even longer to have any effect.  This finding reinforces the need to debate, develop, and prepare coordinated policies well in advance of a potential crisis or conflict.
就像毒蛙以展示鮮豔的顏色的方式，宣告自己對捕食者會構成風險一樣，執行此策略將要求美國和台灣在危機發生之前計劃、協調，尤其是傳達其威懾政策，而不是在中國採取行動後被動做出回應。在兵棋想定中，一旦中國採取激進行動，美國、台灣和國際社會就很難在不升級到不可收拾的情況下，讓北京撤回行動。此外，大多數非軍事反應——例如經濟制裁或貿易禁運——動員所需時間太長，甚至要更長的時間才產生任何效果。這一發現強化了在潛在危機或衝突發生前就辯論、制訂和準備協調政策的必要性。 

During a crisis, this strategy would require close communication between the United States and Taiwan.  A lack of coordination between the two countries could cause misunderstandings over priorities and risk tolerance, derail negotiations, and escalate tensions.  Clear lines of communication would not only facilitate policy coordination but also allay perceptions on both sides of being dragged from a crisis into a conflict— something that is of great concern to both Taiwanese and U.S. policymakers.
在危機期間，這一戰略需要美國和台灣間的密切溝通。兩國間缺乏協調，可能會導致誤解優先事項和風險承受能力，而使談判歪樓並加劇緊張局勢。清晰的溝通管道不僅會促進政策協調，而且會減輕雙方從危機中淪入衝突的認知——這是台灣和美國政策制定者都非常關注的問題。 

Japanese involvement was essential in this game.  The U.S. and Taiwan teams made repeated inquiries about Japan’s position, suggesting that without Japan’s backing, the U.S. and Taiwanese negotiating position was weakened.  In a potential conflict, a lack of unambiguous Japanese support for Taiwan in this context would undermine efforts to urge Chinese withdrawal and could set a precedent for future unchecked Chinese aggression in other territorial disputes, including those over Japanese territory, such as the Senkaku Islands.  The United States and Taiwan need to convince Japan and other regional partners that they, too, have a stake in this fight.
日本人的參與在這場兵推中至關重要。美台團隊多次詢問日方立場，暗示沒有日方支持，美台談判地位被削弱。在潛在的衝突中，如果日本在這種情況下未明確支持台灣，將破壞敦促中國撤軍的努力，並建立先例讓中國認為將來可肆意侵略領土，包括在如尖閣諸島等日本領土。美國和台灣需要說服日本和其他地區夥伴，他們在這場鬥爭中也有利益。 

Asian multilateral security agreements and organizations have long been an object of desire for U.S. policymakers and an object of derision for regional experts.  This game adhered to this pattern to a degree:
長期以來，美國決策者一直渴望亞洲多邊安全協議和組織，但也是地區專家嘲笑的對象。這兵推在一定程度上遵循了這種模式： 

the U.S. and Taiwan teams both tried to rally a coalition of regional states to stand up to China’s bullying behavior, while regional experts representing these states proved reluctant to put themselves in China’s crosshairs on behalf of Taiwan.
美國和台灣的團隊都試圖召集一個地區國家聯盟，來對抗中國的欺凌行為，而代表這些國家的地區專家認定它們不願意為台灣而將自己置於中國的瞄準器下。 

There are, however, some opportunities for greater regional cooperation.  First, China’s increasing aggressiveness and belligerent tone under President Xi Jinping has helped harden regional perceptions of the country.  Second, this belligerence has pushed states including Japan, which has largely eschewed an active regional role since 1945, and India, which has pursued an independent foreign policy since its founding, toward greater regional engagement and multilateral coordination.  Their engagement through the Quad and other forums could create opportunities for bringing together other regional states that are wary of multilateral cooperation, but even warier of Chinese coercion and aggression.  
然而，還有一些加強區域合作的機會。首先，中國在習近平主席領導下日益增強的侵略性和好戰基調，有助於強化地區對中國的看法。其次，這種好戰促使包括自 1945 年以來基本上迴避積極區域角色的日本和自建國以來奉行獨立外交政策的印度在內的國家，加強了區域參與和多邊協調。他們透過四方會議和參與其他論壇創造機會，將其他對多邊合作持謹慎態度、但對中國的脅迫和侵略更加警惕的地區國家聚集在一起。 

Finally, the nascent success of the Quad itself suggests that regional coordination to address such key issues as territorial sovereignty may not require creating an official standing organization or alliance, like the much-derided “Asian NATO” concept that Washington policymakers often suggest. Instead, informal organizations such as the Quad may give regional states facing Chinese coercion or aggression—and at this point, that is almost all of them—an opportunity to cooperate and coordinate responses without feeling “locked in” to particular policies.
最後，四國聯盟本身的初步成功表明，解決領土主權等關鍵問題，可能不需要建立一個常設的官方組織或同盟，就像華盛頓決策者經常提出而備受嘲笑的「亞洲北約」概念一樣的區域協調建制。相反的，四國集團等非正式組織，可能會給面臨中國脅迫或侵略的地區國家（幾乎是區域的所有國家），一個機會合作和協調應對措施，而不會感到「被綁」在特定政策上。 

Conclusion結論

Although not predictive, strategy games like this one provide an opportunity to explore the tools at the disposals of the United States and Taiwan to respond to Chinese coercion or aggression toward Taiwan.
像這樣的戰略兵推雖然不是預測性的，但提供了一個機會來探索美國和台灣可以使用的工具，以應對中國對台灣的脅迫或侵略。

A Chinese seizure of Dongsha, despite its small size, would have broader implications for China’s efforts to incrementally change the status quo regarding Taiwan and other territorial disputes with U.S. allies and partners. For instance, seizing Dongsha could be a way for China to test the waters ahead of a more aggressive campaign, such as seizing Quemoy, Matsu, or the Penghu Islands.  In fact, such actions could be the first step toward an invasion of Taiwan.
儘管東沙面積很小，但中國奪取東沙將對中國漸進行為以改變台灣與其他美國盟友和夥伴的領土現狀產生更廣泛的影響。例如，奪取東沙可能是中國在更具侵略性的戰役（例如奪取金門、馬祖或澎湖列島）前，一個試水溫的方式。事實上，這樣的行動可能是入侵台灣的第一步。 

Perhaps most important, the way the United States responds to smaller-scale territorial Chinese aggression may affect Chinese future decision-making; if the United States allows Chinese coercion or aggression to go unopposed, China may extend its aggressive behavior elsewhere and may even posit that the United States wouldn’t defend Taiwan from invasion.  Such actions, or lack thereof, could undermine deterrence by calling into question U.S. willingness to uphold its
security commitments.
或許最重要的是，美國應對中國小規模領土侵略的方式可能會影響中國未來的決策；如果美國容許中國的脅迫或侵略而不反對，中國可能會將其侵略行為擴展到其他地方，甚至可能假定美國不會保護台灣免受入侵。採取或不採取行動，可能會令人因質疑美國是否願意遵守其安全承諾而削弱威懾力。 

With Chinese assertiveness rising, U.S. and Taiwanese policymakers need to think through the challenges of responding to a crisis strongly enough to defend their security interests without turning crisis into conflict.
隨著中國越來越自信，美國和台灣的政策制定者需要仔細考慮應對危機的挑戰，以在不將危機轉化為衝突的情況下捍衛他們的安全利益。 

By gaming out these challenges, the United States and Taiwan can fully grasp the urgency of building an effective deterrence strategy now to help prevent a future Chinese fait accompli.
透過應對這些挑戰，美國和台灣可以充分把握現在制訂有效威懾戰略的緊迫性，以有助於防止未來中國造成既成事實。