Based on
Japan's Residual Sovereignty HoonTing
Before the Summit between the Japanese Prime Minister Suga and the US President Biden on April 18th, Kurt Campbell, the White House National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, flew to Tokyo for the review. One of the issues he provided is said to urge the Japanese version Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).
Japanese version Taiwan Relations Act, which Kurt Campbell provided, has
long been an objective of the members of the Taiwan Independence movement.
However, those people forget to ask a critical question: Does Japan have the
similar authority to make her TRA? Are there any other countries that are
qualified to do it?
To answer that question, we have to study the contents of TRA, especially
the authority that allows the U.S. to do so.
TRA is guideline legislation to manage the situation after the break-off
of the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Governing Authority in
Taiwan, or the Republic of China as they call. After the break-off, it is
natural to shift the diplomacy to the consul, a long traditional institution to
serve “people-to-people” relations. The U.S. had a consulate in Taiwan during
the Qing Era and the Japanese rule before the Pacific War without any problem.
The issue becomes: Why the U.S. had to do it in a complicated way?
As the result of deforming diplomacy, TRA expresses a form of civil law
while performs the nature of public law. It repeatedly designates that the U.S.
has to “help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific;”
as well as “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character,” to “make
available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services,” “to resist any
resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security,
or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan,” and the using of
force and the coercion will be considered as “a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States”
etc. in specific.
The question then becomes: Why TRA concerns with the West Pacific region,
rather than Taiwan and Penghu, which it is expected to do? Why the invasion of
Taiwan will jeopardize the peace of the region?
The West Pacific is the maritime war zone during the Pacific War. Formosa
and the Pescadores, known as Taiwan and Penghu, are within the U.S.'s Central
Pacific Theater. Being the leading power of the Pacific War, the primary
contributor to the victory, the vital role to draft the peace, and the
“Principal Occupying Power” of the Treaty of Peace with Japan especially, the
U.S. holds the sole and ultimate responsibility to arrange the territories in
the Theater. The U.S. leads the battles throughout the War and carries out the
peace.
The U.S. responsibility for Taiwan has various forms from designating the
military occupation, the conclusion of the mutual defense treaty to the
drafting of TRA. In the U.S. constitutional context, Taiwan becomes an
"organized but unincorporated territory," or territory with the
nature of “foreign in a domestic sense.”
Although Japan renounced Formosa and the Pescadores in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951, the procedure of renouncing is yet to complete. When the
victorious countries settle and the Taiwanese people concur, Japan, being a
former administering authority, has to “agree” the said settlement in a treaty
concerning the status of Taiwan to finish the whole process. The "power to
agree" is based on Japan’s Residual Sovereignty: to formalize the
renunciation, not to resume any.
During waiting for the result, Japan, the former administering authority,
and the U.S., the Principal Occupying Power, as well as the UN members, have
treaty obligations in maintaining the status quo of Taiwan and keep it from the
invasion of any rogue nation. Deploying the JADF around the Taiwan area and across
Taiwan Strait is one option, which is also the basis of the “situations in
areas surrounding Japan” system. Under such context, Beijing’s Anti-Secession
Law of 2005, a blunder of the reverse causation, is worthless to mention.
It would seem that the permission of the Allied Powers would be needed for Japan to "retain residual sovereignty", as the case of Ryukyu Islands shows (see attached text below.) In which case, the U.S. seemed to have made the decision alone, likely as the prime occupaying force.
回覆刪除Now, one can argue that, by asking Japan to pass a TRA, the U.S. implicitly is permitting Japan to "retain residual sovereignty" over Taiwan and Pescadores Islands, on behalf of the Allied Powers? Can't one?
Attached:
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John Foster Dulles on the Status of Okinawa
8th September, 1951
Article 3 deals with the Ryukyus and other islands to the south and southeast of Japan. These, since the surrender, have been under the sole administration of the United States.
Several of the Allied Powers urged that the treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of United States sovereignty. Others suggested that these islands should be restored completely to Japan.
In the face of this division of Allied opinion, the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the U.N. trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority.
You will recall that the Charter of the United Nations contemplates extension of the trusteeship system to "territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War" (article 77). The future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, determine the future civil status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan while affording the administering authority the possibility of carrying out article 84 of the Charter, which provides that "It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security.
(Source: http://ryukyu-okinawa.net/pages/archive/dulles.html_
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