Taiwan Defense Act (TDA) Taimocracy翻譯

20171117 維持現狀，哪一種？

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Taiwan Defense Act (TDA)

 

MCC20291 S.L.C. N53 5D 8RK

116TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION S.___

To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, and for other purposes. 維持美國武裝部隊遏止中華人民共和國對台灣和其他目的造成「既成事實」的能力。

 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES ___ Mr. HAWLEY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on ___

 

A BILL To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, and for other purposes. 本法旨在維持美國武裝部隊遏止中華人民共和國對台灣及其他目的造成「既成事實」的能力。

 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Defense Act’’.

本法案可被稱為〈台灣防衛法案〉。

 

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act: (1) DENY.—The term ‘‘deny’’ means to use combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, resulting in—「遏止」，是指透過跨國跨領域行動行動來延遲、降低並最終擊敗中華人民共和國對台灣實施「既成事實」的企圖，從而導致-

(A) the termination of hostilities or, at a minimum, the termination of the attempted fait accompli; or終止敵對行動，或至少終止造成「既成事實」的企圖； 或

(B) the neutralization of the ability of the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan. 削弱中華人民共和國對台灣造成「既成事實」的能力。

 

(2) FAIT ACCOMPLI.—The term ‘‘fait accompli’’ means the strategy of the People’s Republic of China designed to allow the People’s Republic of China to use military force to seize control of Taiwan before the United States Armed Forces are able to respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effective combined joint response by the United States Armed Forces by convincing the United States that mounting such a response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.

既成事實：「既成事實」一詞是指中華人民共和國的戰略，旨在使中華人民共和國能夠在美國武裝部隊能有效做出反應前，利用軍事力量奪取對台灣的控制權，同時說服美國採取反制行動將是極其困難或昂貴的，以阻止美國武裝部隊進行有效的跨國聯合軍種應對。

 

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Taiwan is— 台灣是

(A) a beacon of democracy in Asia; and 亞洲的民主燈塔

(B) a steadfast partner of the United States in the common pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific region in which—具有追求自由與開放的印太地區美國的堅定夥伴

(i) all societies enjoy sovereign autonomy; 全社會享有主權的自治

(ii) people live securely, prosperously, and with dignity; and 人民安全、繁榮並具尊嚴的生活

(iii) the societies of the region rise and fall not by coercion but on the basis of peaceful competition. 本地區社會的興衰並非因強制造成，而是和平競爭的結果

 

(2) If the Government of the People’s Republic of China were to use military force to compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China—若中華人民共和國政府使用軍事力量強迫台灣與中華人民共和國統一，則：

(A) the world would lose one of the great champions of freedom and democracy; 世界將失去自由與民主的偉大擁護者之一；

(B) the United States and allies and partners of the United States would face severe difficulty in maintaining favorable balances of power relative to the People’s Republic of China in Northeast and Southeast Asia; and美國及其同盟國和夥伴在維持相對於中華人民共和國在東北亞和東南亞的有利勢力均衡將面臨嚴重困難；和

(C) as the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region shifted in favor of the People’s Republic of China, the Government of the People’s Republic of China would possess an increasing ability—隨著印太地區的均衡朝向有利於中華人民共和國的方向發展，中華人民共和國政府將擁有越來越大的能力，

(i) to impose its will throughout the Indo-Pacific region; and強加其意志在整個印太地區；和

(ii) to prevent United States access to key trade routes and markets in the Indo-Pacific region, thereby imposing severe economic hardship on middle-class and working-class people of the United States and undermining the American way of life. 阻止美國進入印太地區主要貿易路線和市場，從而給美國中產階級和工人階級人民帶來嚴重的經濟困難，並破壞美國的生活方式。

 

(3) In January 2019, the Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that the ‘‘longstanding’’ intent of the Government of the People’s Republic of China to compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China, and deter any attempt by Taiwan to declare independence, was the ‘‘primary driver for China’s military modernization’’. 2019年1月，美國國防情報局評估了「中國軍事現代化的主要動力」，是中華人民共和國政府強迫台灣與中華人民共和國統一的「長期」意圖，且為阻止台灣宣布獨立的任何企圖。

 

(4) The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report released in June 2019, states that the Government of the People’s Republic of China is ‘‘preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf’’. 國防部在2019年6月發布的《印度太平洋戰略報告》中指出，中華人民共和國政府「正在準備緊急情況，以武力統一台灣與大陸，且在同時威懾、拖延或拒絕代表台灣進行任何第三方干預」。

 

(5) Department of Defense statements and publications indicate that the Government of the People’s Republic of China is developing the plans and capabilities required to employ the fait accompli strategy to compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China, including—國防部的聲明和出版物表明，中華人民共和國政府正在制訂計劃和能力，以運用「既成事實」戰略來迫使台灣與中華人民共和國統一，其中包括：

 

(A) the assessment by the Defense Science Board in 2017 that the Government of the People’s Republic of China had adopted a theory of victory whereby once conflict with the United States appeared inevitable, as might be the case if the Government of the People’s Republic of China attempted to use military force to compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China, then the Government of the People’s Republic of China ‘‘will attempt to achieve a decisive outcome very quickly, presenting the United States and its allies with a fait accompli’’ and ‘‘then seek to demonstrate that the United States and its allies will incur significant costs in seeking to reverse that outcome’’; 國防科學委員會在2017年的評估中認為，中華人民共和國政府採用了一種勝利理論，即一旦與美國發生衝突不可避免，而如果中華人民共和國政府試圖用軍事力量迫使台灣與中華人民共和國統一，則中華人民共和國政府「將試圖迅速取得決定性的結果，向美國及其盟國展示既成事實」 並且「然後試圖證明美國及其盟國在尋求扭轉這一結果方面將招致重大費用」；

 

(B) the assessment in the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report that, if the Government of the People’s Republic of China or another competitor in the Indo-Pacific region decides ‘‘to advance their interests through force, they are likely to enjoy a local military advantage at the onset of conflict.  In a fait accompli scenario, competitors would seek to employ their capabilities quickly to achieve limited objectives and forestall a response from the United States and its allies and partners’’; 《印太戰略報告》中評估，若中華人民共和國政府或印太地區的另一競爭者決定「以武力增進其利益，則他們很可能會在該地區享有當地軍事優勢。衝突的開始。在既成事實的情況下，競爭對手將尋求迅速利用自己的能力來實現有限的目標，並阻止美國及其盟國和合作夥伴的回應。」

 

(C) testimony by then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan in March 2019 that—當時的代理國防部長Patrick Shanahan在2019年3月的證詞—

(i) the Government of the People’s Republic of China ‘‘has made investments specifically intended to offset U.S. advantages’’; and 中華人民共和國政府「進行了專以抵消美國優勢的投資」；和

(ii) if deployed in the initial stages of a conflict, ‘‘these capabilities could seek to achieve a ‘fait accompli’ that would make reversing Chinese gains more difficult, militarily and politically’’; and 如果在衝突的初期部署，「這些功能可能會尋求達成既成事實，使在軍事上和政治上逆轉中國人的利益變得更加困難」。和

(D) testimony by then Commanding General of Marine Corps Combat Development Command Lieutenant General David Berger in April 2019 that peer adversaries of the United States seek ‘‘to create strategic dilemmas through fait accompli scenarios’’. 當時海軍陸戰隊作戰發展司令部中將David Berger在2019年4月證詞中說，美國對手在尋求「通過既成事實來製造戰略困境」。

 

(6) In March 2019, then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan testified that the implementation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy would ensure the United States has ‘‘the capabilities, posture, and employment of forces’’ required to prevent a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China. 2019年3月，時任國防大臣Patrick Shanahan作證說，《2018年國防戰略》的實施將確保美國擁有防止中華人民共和國製造既成事實所需的「能力，態勢和部隊部署」。

 

(7) According to the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, ‘‘[t]he National Defense Strategy implicitly acknowledges the most stressing potential scenarios will occur along our competitors’ peripheries’’.  An attempted fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan should therefore be expected to constitute a ‘‘most stressing’’ potential scenario for the United States Armed Forces. 根據《印太戰略報告》，「國防戰略隱含認識到，最具挑戰性的潛在情況，發生在對手的外圍地區」。因此，應該預期中華人民共和國對台灣造成的「既成事實」，將構成美國武裝部隊可能「最嚴厲」的情況。

 

(8) The National Defense Strategy Commission found that the United States Armed Forces must be postured ‘‘to deter and prevent a fait accompli by an agile opportunistic adversary’’ in order to compete effectively in the Indo-Pacific region and stated that ‘‘the United States must develop new operational concepts to achieve strategic advantage, including by addressing the ability of aggressive regimes to achieve a fait accompli against states on their periphery,’’ in recognition of—國防戰略委員會發現，美國武裝部隊必須以「威懾和阻止敏捷的機會主義防止對手的既成事實」，以便在印太地區進行有效競爭，並指出「美國必須制定新的作戰概念以取得戰略優勢，包括解決侵略性政權針對周邊國家達成既成事實的能力」，認識到—

(A) the unique challenges to the United States Armed Forces posed by the employment of the fait accompli strategy by the Government of the People’s Republic of China or another strategic competitor; and中華人民共和國政府或其他戰略競爭對手，採用既成事實戰略給美國武裝部隊的獨特挑戰； 和

 

(B) the consequent urgent need for new thinking and steady focus by the Department of Defense on ensuring the ability of the United States Armed Forces to prevent an adversary from using the fait accompli strategy to advance its interests at the expense of those of the United States. 國防部迫切需要採取新的思路，並不斷關注確保美國武裝部隊，防止對方利用既成事實戰略來推進其利益，而犧牲美國的利益的能力。

 

(9) Department of Defense strategic guidance and official statements underscore the essential role that denial operations will play in preventing a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, including—國防部的戰略指導和官方聲明強調，遏止行動將對中華人民共和國對台灣造成既成事實方面發揮重要的防止作用，其中包括：

(A) the incorporation in the National Defense Strategy of the Global Operating Model that includes a ‘‘blunt layer’’ of combat-credible forward forces postured and employed to ‘‘delay, degrade, or deny adversary aggression’’; 將「全球作戰模式」納入國防戰略，其中包括以「反制武力」（鈍層）構成可戰鬥的前鋒部隊，這些勢力已經部署並被用來「延誤、削弱或遏止敵人的侵略」；

(B) the conclusion by the National Defense Strategy Commission that the Department of Defense must position ‘‘substantial capability forward’’ in the form of the ‘‘blunt layer’’ included in the Global Operating Model to ‘‘deter and prevent a fait accompli’’；國防戰略委員會得出的結論是，國防部必須以「全球行動模式」中包括的「鈍層」的形式，定位「實質前置能力」，以「制止和防止既定事實」；

(C) the statement for the record by the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, in April 4 2018 in which he concludes, ‘‘[d]ue to the distances involved in the Indo-Pacific, we cannot rely solely on surge forces from the continental United States to deter Chinese aggression or prevent a fait accompli. PACOM must maintain a robust blunt layer that effectively deters Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific’’；美國印太司令部司令海軍上將Phil Davidson於2018年4月4日發表的聲明記錄，他在結論中說：「（由於）印太距離遙遠，我們不能僅依靠來自美國大陸的突擊部隊，來阻止中國的侵略或阻止既成事實。太平洋司令部必須保持穩健的「鈍層」，以有效阻止中國在印太地區的侵略。」

(D) the Joint Operating Concept for Deterrence Operations, which states that forward deployed forces, such as those included in the blunt layer of the Global Operating Model and referenced by the National Defense Strategy Commission and the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, contribute to ‘‘denying benefits’’ and thereby reduce ‘‘the likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or tactical surprise, thus helping to prevent adversary decision makers from concluding they might achieve a military fait accompli that could be extremely costly for the [United States] to reverse by force’’; 《威懾行動聯合作戰概念》指出，前進部署的部隊（例如包括全球作戰模型的鈍層，由國防戰略委員會和美國印太司令部司令引用的部隊）有助於「否認利益」，從而減少「對手取得戰略或戰術上的驚喜的可能性，從而有助於防止對手的決策者得出結論，他們可能會達成軍事既成事實，這對[美國]而言以武力扭轉情勢是非常昂貴的」；

(E) the United States Army Multi-Domain Operations concept document, which states that the Armed Forces must demonstrate the capability ‘‘to immediately deny a fait accompli attack’’ in order to deter a near-peer adversary; and美國陸軍「多域作戰」概念文件指出，武裝部隊必須表現出「立即遏止既成事實攻擊」的能力，以威懾近鄰對手； 和

(F) the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 report, which states that forward-deployed forces ‘‘that can continue to operate inside an adversary’s long-range precision-fire weapons engagement zone (WEZ) are more operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly maneuver to positions outside the WEZ in order to remain survivable,’’ and that such ‘‘stand-in’’ forces possess the capability to ‘‘attrite adversary forces, enable joint force access requirements, complicate targeting and consume adversary [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] resources, and prevent fait accompli scenarios’’. 〈美國海軍陸戰隊2030年部隊設計〉報告中指出，前進部署的部隊「可繼續在敵方遠程精確發射武器交戰區（WEZ）內行動，與必須迅速調動陣地的部隊相比，在業務上更具相關性。為了維持生存能力，這種「內在」部隊具有「攻擊敵方部隊，滿足跨軍種部隊介入的要求，使目標複雜化，和消耗對手（情報、監視、偵察）資源的能力，並防止既成事實」。

 

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the ability of the United States to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific region would be severely compromised if the Government of the People’s Republic of China were able to compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China, particularly if the People’s Republic of China were able to do so by military force; 若中華人民共和國政府能強迫台灣與中華人民共和國統一，那麼美國維持個自由開放的印太地區的能力將受到嚴重損害，尤其是中華人民共和國能以軍事力做到這一點；

 

(2) the loss by the United States of the ability to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region would result in the significantly increased vulnerability of the middle-class and working-class people of the United States and the allies and partners of 10 the United States to economic coercion by the Government of the People’s Republic of China; 美國喪失維持自由和開放的印太地區的能力，將大大增加美國中產階級和工人階級人民以及美國10個盟國和夥伴，對中華人民共和國政府的經濟脅迫時的脆弱性；

 

(3) the fate of Taiwan is therefore crucially linked to the fates of all countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including to the fate of the United States; 因此，台灣的命運與印太地區所有國家的命運，包括美國的命運，都至關重要。

 

(4) under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 17 3301 et seq.), it is the policy of the United States 18 to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means to be of grave concern to the United States; 根據《台灣關係法》（22 USC 17 3301等），美國採取的政策是，任何企圖以非和平方式來決定臺灣的前途之舉，為美國所嚴重關切；

 

(5) since 1979, the United States Government has consistently upheld the commitments of the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 24 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.); 自1979年以來，美國政府一直根據《台灣關係法》（22 24 U.S.C. 3301等）維護美國的承諾；

 

(6) the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) reaffirms that the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et 4 seq.) and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’ are the cornerstones of United States relations with Taiwan; 2020財年《國防授權法》（公法第116-92號）重申《台灣關係法》（22 USC 3301 et 4 seq。）和〈六項保證〉是美國與台灣關係的基石;

 

(7) the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 7 et seq.) further establishes the policy of the United States ‘‘to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan’’; 《台灣關係法》（22 USC 3301 7 et seq。）進一步確立了美國的政策是「維持美國的能力，以抵抗任何訴諸武力、或使用其他方式高壓手段，而危及臺灣人民安全及社會經濟制度的行動」;

 

(8) the Government of the People’s Republic of China appears to be developing the plans and capabilities required to use the fait accompli strategy to compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China, thereby jeopardizing the security and the social and economic system of the people of Taiwan; 中華人民共和國政府似乎正在制訂使用「既成事實」戰略，來迫使台灣與中華人民共和國統一的計劃和能力，從而危及台灣的安全和台灣人民的社會、經濟體系；

 

(9) denial operations will have an essential role in any strategy to prevent a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan; and遏止行動將在防止中華人民共和國對台灣實施任何「既成事實」的戰略中發揮重要作用；和

 

(10) implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) therefore requires the United States to maintain the ability to defeat a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, especially by denial operations. 《台灣關係法》（《美國法典》第22卷3301等）的實施，因此要求美國保持能擊敗中華人民共和國對台灣造成「既成事實」的能力，特別是透過遏止行動。

 

SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan. 維持美國武裝部隊遏止中華人民共和國對台灣造成「既成事實」的能力，是美國的政策。

 

SEC. 6. REPORT ON PROGRESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WITH RESPECT TO DENYING A FAIT ACCOMPLI BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AGAINST TAIWAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 30 each year, beginning in 2021 and ending in 2026, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the progress of the Department of Defense with respect to improving the ability of the United States Armed Forces to conduct combined joint operations to deny the ability of the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan. 從2021年到2026年，國防部長應在每年不遲於4月30日前，向國會國防委員會提交一份有關國防部在提高美國武裝部隊能力方面，就進行跨國跨領域行動，以遏止中華人民共和國對台灣造成「既成事實」的能力進展的報告

 

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An explanation of the objectives for the United States Armed Forces that would be necessary to deny the fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan. 說明美國武裝部隊的目標，這對於遏止中華人民共和國對台灣造成「既成事實」是必要的。

 

(2) An identification of joint warfighting capabilities and current efforts to organize, train, and equip the United States Armed Forces in support of the objectives referred to in paragraph (1), including—確定跨領域聯合作戰能力，以及目前為組織、訓練和裝備美國武裝部隊以支持第（1）款所述目標而進行的努力，包括-

(A) an assessment of whether the programs included in the most recent future-years defense program submitted to Congress under section 2 of title 10, United States Code, are sufficient to enable the United States Armed Forces to conduct joint combined operations to achieve such objectives;根據美國法典第10條第2款提交國會，最新近幾年國防計劃中所包含的計劃，是否足以使美國武裝部隊進行跨國跨領域行動以實現上述目標之評估；

(B) a description of additional investments or force posture adjustments required to maintain or improve the ability of the United States Armed Forces to conduct joint combined operations to achieve such objectives; 為保持或提高美國武裝部隊為實現上述目標進行跨國跨領域行動，所需的額外投資或部隊態勢調整的說明；

(C) a description of the manner in which the Secretary of Defense intends to develop and integrate Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force operational concepts to maintain or improve the ability of the United States Armed Forces to conduct joint combined operations to achieve such objectives; and 國防部長打算發展和整合陸軍，海軍，空軍，海軍陸戰隊和太空部隊的作戰構想，以維持或提高美國武裝部隊聯合作戰能力方式的報告；和

(D) an assessment of the manner in which different options for pre-delegating authorities, including authorities relating to kinetic strikes against targets on the mainland of the People’s Republic of China, may improve the ability of the United States Armed Forces to conduct joint combined operations to achieve such objectives. 評估預授權機關（包括對中華人民共和國本土目標進行靜態打擊有關的機關）實現此等目標的不同選擇方式，可能會提高美國武裝部隊開展跨國跨軍種行動的能力。

 

(3) An assessment of the role of the nuclear forces of the United States in deterring or defeating a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, including concepts for—評估美國在阻止或擊敗中華人民共和國對台灣造成「既成事實」作用中的核力量，包括以下概念：

(A) deterring limited use of nuclear weapons by the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region without undermining the ability of the United States Armed Forces to maintain nuclear deterrence at the strategic and theater levels against the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and 遏制中華人民共和國在印太地區有限使用核武器，同時不損害美國武裝部隊在戰略和戰區中，對俄羅斯聯邦和民主人民共和國與朝鮮人民民主共和國保持核威懾的能力；和

(B) ensuring the United States Armed Forces are able to continue combined joint operations to defend Taiwan in a nuclear environment following nuclear weapons use by the People’s Republic of China or the United States. 確保在中華人民共和國或美國使用核武器後，美國武裝部隊能夠繼續跨國行動，在核武環境中保衛台灣。

 

(c) FORM.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form but may include an unclassified executive summary.

 

(d) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DE5 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘congressional defense committees’’ has the meaning given the term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.