Wuhan is
the latest crisis to face China's Xi, and it's exposing major flaws in his
model of control CNN 20200124
Hong Kong (CNN)Speaking on the 10th anniversary of the 2003 SARS crisis,
Zhong Nanshan, one of the heroes in China's fight against that disease,
described it as a "turning point" for the nation.
"SARS forced the whole country to pay attention to the livelihood of
the people," he said, before adding a warning. "We've made huge progress, but our
footsteps are slow, especially in terms of healthcare."
With the Wuhan coronavirus spreading across the country, killing at least
25 people so far, China is now facing a major test
of just how much it has changed since 2003, both in terms of the
healthcare system's ability to react to a new deadly pathogen -- and crucially,
how the central government handles the developing crisis.
Speaking this week, Chinese President Xi Jinping ordered "all-out
efforts" to contain the virus' spread and treat those affected. His intervention seemed to carry with it a
clear message: the mistakes of SARS will not be repeated.
Wuhan is only the latest crisis to face Xi since he
secured personal control of the Communist Party, joining
the US-China trade war, ongoing anti-government unrest in Hong Kong, and the
recent Taiwan election, in which Tsai Ing-wen, much loathed by Beijing, handily
won reelection against a more pro-China candidate.
More than any leader since Mao Zedong, Xi has
centralized power around himself. He is the state, and while this gives him
immense control, it also means that every crisis is a test of his leadership --
Wuhan perhaps most of all, as the country looks to their leader for reassurance
and confidence.
Since Xi's statement, efforts to control the virus have ramped up
nationwide, with health authorities ordering the highest level response,
typically used to tackle outbreaks of plague or cholera. On Thursday, Wuhan itself -- all 11 million
people -- was partially quarantined, with
public transport "temporarily suspended," including all planes and
trains departing the city.
In state media, editorials urged greater
transparency and lauded the central government's quick response and that
of Chinese scientists and doctors, who quickly released the virus' genome in
order to aid the work of other researchers worldwide in coming up with a
vaccine.
Despite the laudatory efforts of Chinese healthcare workers, however, and
forceful statements from Beijing, allegations of an initial -- and potentially
even ongoing -- cover-up continue to hang over
the Wuhan outbreak.
This virus could have been China's chance to exorcise the ghosts of SARS
once and for all, instead it may have exposed that, for
all the progress in the past 17 years, fundamental flaws remain in place when
it comes to handling a crisis like this -- ones that could result in
far greater danger in future.
Crisis and
cover-up
The first cases of what would later be called severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) were identified in southern China in November 2002. The virus
would go on to infect more than 8,000 people worldwide, the majority of them in
China.
Even as the deadly pathogen spread throughout Guangdong province,
however, media reports were censored and patients and their families prevented
from speaking out. If they addressed the issue at all, officials downplayed
it, unwilling to risk upsetting the economy or "social stability" --
important metrics for future promotion.
It was not until whisteblower Jiang Yanyong, a retired Chinese army
doctor, came forward in early 2003 that much of China and the rest of the world
became aware of the true danger -- by which time
SARS had already spread widely. The
virus was soon declared a "global threat" by the World Health
Organization (WHO) and efforts to contain its spread were put in place
worldwide.
In the months that followed, China's
government officially apologized for its slow reporting of the outbreak,
and the country's health minister was sacked, along with the mayor of Beijing
at the time. "Never again" was
the message of the day, one that has been repeated ad nauseum regarding the
Wuhan virus.
While the Communist Party's grasp on power in China has grown stronger
than ever under Xi, it's popular legitimacy is much more fragile. The SARS scandal,
and similarly mishandled crises such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, had a
devastating effect on that legitimacy, greatly alarming officials who place
"stability" above all else.
Xi's gathering of power around himself also means the Wuhan crisis will be more of a test of his personal control of the
Party and country -- and of the highly-centralized system he's put in place in
recent years.
Initial
problems
By a number of measures, China's handling of the current crisis has been
infinitely better than during SARS. Authorities
in Wuhan alerted the public to the new virus in mid-December, soon after the
first cases were identified. Xi's statement four weeks later drastically
boosted the response and publicized the risk.
In 2003, by comparison, it was over two
months after the first patients were diagnosed with SARS that the WHO
was alerted -- by a whistleblower, not the Chinese authorities -- of a
"strange contagious disease" that has "already left more than
100 people dead."
But behind this outwardly competent handling of a crisis there are signs of a deeper problem.
One of the oldest cliches in Chinese politics is that "the mountains
are high and the emperor is far away." Despite being an intensely centralized state,
provincial authorities do not always act as Beijing would prefer, nor do
commandments from on high -- to crack down on corruption or reign in pollution,
or to increase transparency -- always trickle down to the provinces.
While unconfirmed, there are numerous indications that officials in Wuhan downplayed the risks of the virus for
several weeks, delaying proper action and potentially increasing its spread.
Though the first case was detected on
December 8 -- it was not until
January 14 that officials in Wuhan introduced any screening measures.
In the intervening period, a major
meeting of the Hubei provincial party was held in the city, and more than
40,000 families were invited to attend a banquet in an attempt to set a world
record.
Speaking to state media, Wuhan officials downplayed the danger, saying
the virus was unlikely to be spread from human to human. State officials
initially repeated this assessment: Wang Guangfa, head of a team of researchers
sent from Beijing to investigate the situation, said on January 11 that it was
under control -- he has since been diagnosed with the virus.
At the same time, Wuhan authorities also tried to clamp down on discussion
of the virus. State media reported that police arrested eight people in early
January for spreading "rumors" that the virus was related to SARS,
something which has since been confirmed by health authorities.
Even as researchers in the UK estimated
that the initial spread of the virus could have affected at least 1,700 people, no new cases were reported in Wuhan itself, despite
patients being identified in other countries. "Does the virus only affect overseas
travelers?" people asked darkly on Chinese social media, where
accusations of a cover-up quickly spread and were censored.
It was not until inspectors sent from Beijing had assessed the situation
that the alarm was properly raised. In an interview with state broadcaster
CCTV, Zhong Nanshan, the SARS hero, said there
was "definitely human-to-human transmission," and warned
the infection rate was "climbing."
Passengers who arrived on one of the last flights from the Chinese city
of Wuhan walk through a health screening station at Narita airport in Chiba
prefecture, outside Tokyo, on January 23, 2020.
Passengers who arrived on one of the last flights from the Chinese city
of Wuhan walk through a health screening station at Narita airport in Chiba
prefecture, outside Tokyo, on January 23, 2020.
Worst possible
timing
Speaking to state media this week, Wuhan Mayor Zhou Xianwang admitted
that the city's "warnings were not sufficient."
Whether because of bureaucratic incompetence
or a politically-motivated cover-up, the delay could not have
come at a worse time. China is currently
in the middle of the Lunar New Year
travel rush, in which hundreds of millions of people move across the country,
packed close together on trains, coaches and planes.
Revelations about the true spread and severity of the virus only came
after the four-week travel period had got underway, and restrictions on people
leaving Wuhan itself did not come into place until Thursday. One woman identified as having the virus in South
Korea even told health officials there that she visited a doctor in Wuhan with
symptoms -- after screening measures were introduced -- but got sent on her way
and was able to leave the country.
The pervasive censorship of the Chinese press and
internet undoubtedly played a role in this, as did Xi's years-long crackdown on
civil society groups, forcing people to rely on official accounts and the
transparency of officials whose own motivations are often completely apposite.
Once Xi intervened, essentially signaling that the Wuhan virus was fair
game for Chinese media, reporters rushed to the scene. Both Caixin and the Beijing News -- some of
the most independently minded outlets in the country -- quickly began producing
in-depth coverage, some of which exposed oversights by local officials and
punched holes in their narrative. Writing on WeChat from Wuhan, Caixin reporter
Gao Yu compared the situation to SARS, saying that "the lack of
transparency, public supervision and truth (have) caused huge damage to public
safety."
China learned hard lessons in 2003 at a terrible cost. The legacy of SARS could be seen in the
central government's response this month, and that of Chinese scientists, both
of which deserve a great deal of credit.
But Xi has also reversed gradual
liberalization and opening up which occurred post-SARS, massively centralizing
power within the Communist Party once again. At the same time, he has overseen a crackdown
on the internet, the press and civil society, and an anti-corruption purge that,
while it has turfed out plenty of bad apples, may also have left provincial
officials more afraid of angering Beijing.
Xi is the closest China has had to an emperor since Mao, but like the old
saying goes, he's often far away. The
Wuhan virus shows what happens when the country has to rely on information
filtering up to the top for decisive action to be taken.
土冥合的因與果
回覆刪除https://blog.xuite.net/bobchen7/wretch/588845376
去年下半,好幾個1990年代前後出生的香港人、台灣人來解盤,有在中國工作或移居的,尤其有個人星體日月火在摩羯/巨蟹22度前後,都會提醒他們今年初能小心就小心,能先離開就去更安心的地方,中國會是土冥合業力顯現之地,因為他們壓制得更深,以為沒事,反彈爆發的力量會更慘烈。
其實去年的中美貿易戰產業轉移、非洲豬瘟、香港反送中、台灣總統選舉,已經讓不少人移來移去尋找安居之所,很多台灣人回國投票、年輕人回鄉投票。但很多以為還可以的,就會等到今年這波更大的武漢肺炎(還有更大的嗎?),來體會因果業力的必然。如果閃不掉,就請接受你的天命挑戰與使命,努力開創未來的可能吧。
人人都想平安,但人人也都想尋找獲勝的機會,當世界翻轉的時候,是某些人的災難,也會是某些人巨大的冒險舞臺。1990年代初土天海合摩羯中對沖木星巨蟹,1996天海合摩羯尾,這些30歲以下的年輕人,會怎樣改變這個世界?香港反送中,台灣總統選舉都已經改變了,那中國年輕人會怎樣應對這些摩羯的掌權老人、老結構呢?
3月的火星摩羯、土星入水瓶四分天王、整年的木冥合,9~10月日火衝天秤/白羊準十字、年底的木土合水瓶四分天王,都還要順著因果,演下去。1月的土冥精準合相,是前面的大戲落幕,後面要上場的,又是另外一齣幾十年的大戲,新的戰鬥真的馬上就開始了。
●●●●●●●●●
中國的土冥合是現形了啊,香港人的口罩,換中國人戴上,而且這次沒有禁蒙面法了喔。
2018年底,土星進入摩羯,中國用網軍讓韓國瑜當選高雄市長,台灣民主接受土冥摩羯的真實考驗。2019年,土星在摩羯中段,中國先推一國兩制台灣方案,接著主導香港送中條例,香港人驚天一起的用口罩對抗中國與香港特區政府,隱藏自己的面貌,承受港警成千上萬的催淚彈。而非洲豬瘟讓中國人沒豬肉好吃,老天示警無人應。11月香港區議會選舉,香港人用最後僅剩一點點的民主選票,回擊中國的土冥霸權。同時,中國武漢肺炎開始蔓延,柯文哲口中素質比台灣更好的中國官員,讓SARS陰影再度壟罩全世界。
2020年初,台灣總統大選,台灣人奮鬥一年,驚心動魄的用選票回應土冥合相的考卷,以817萬票回擊中國跟KMT韓國瑜的土冥控制,30年民主過關蛻變。美中貿易戰簽了第一階段協議,中國低頭求和,以為安然無恙,隨即武漢肺炎如SARS一樣遮掩不住,往全國與全世界擴散,武漢變成拉昆市大封鎖,中國政府變成雨傘公司,習近平與共產黨為自己打了T病毒。
過去香港人用口罩、選票對抗中國,台灣人用選票對抗中國。現在換中國人自己要戴上口罩,不是為了抗議人臉辨識、不是為了反對中國政府的極權統治,而是面對死神使者武漢新型冠狀病毒的威脅,但,這真的只是病毒的問題嗎?中國人在土冥面前,還得要付出多少代價?
4月木冥合相,6月木冥合相,11月木冥合相,12月木土合水瓶,中國的業力大結算,誰能逃出?誰又得犧牲?土冥之前,土冥之後,木冥之間,因果業力齊聚,能救一人是一人,天作孽尤可為,人作孽不可活,木土冥之前眾生平等。