川普的外交政策比實際上更好 by Robert D. Blackwill....Taimocracy摘譯

川普的外交政策比實際上更好Robert D. Blackwill

Trump’s Foreign Policies Are Better Than They Seem by Robert D. Blackwill

Council Special Report No. 84

April 2019

CHINA

U.S. foreign policies toward another nation rarely succeed if policymakers do not conduct careful studies of that country’s national security goals and strategies. Careless or inadequate analysis can have damaging or even catastrophic consequences.  British governments misunderstood Adolf Hitler’s intentions in the 1930s. The Johnson administration in the 1960s was blind to North Vietnam’s determination, staying power, and refusal to give up any of its strategic objectives. Before the 2003 invasion, the George W. Bush team knew too little about the dysfunctional political and ethnic dynamics of Iraq, and ignored Baghdad’s indispensable role in balancing Tehran.  History is filled with such miscalculations, going back to the Romans, the Greeks, the Egyptians, the Chinese, and earlier.

如果政策制定者不認真研究他國的國家安全目標和戰略進行，美國對此國的外交政策就很難成功。粗心或不充分的分析，可能會產生破壞性甚至是災難性的後果。英國政府在20世紀30年代誤解了阿道夫希特勒的意圖。20世紀60年代的詹森政府對北越的決心，持久力以及拒絕放棄任何戰略目標視而不見。在2003年入侵之前，喬治·W·布希團隊，對伊拉克的政治和種族動態失調所知甚少，並且忽視了巴格達在平衡德黑蘭方面不可或缺的作用。回溯羅馬人，希臘人，埃及人，中國人和更早的人，歷史充滿了這樣的錯誤估計，。

Long before Trump took office, successive U.S. administrations pursued approaches to China that misread Beijing’s strategic intentions.  A 1997 statement issued at the Bill Clinton-Jiang Zemin summit observed that “while China and the United States have areas of both agreement and disagreement, they have a significant common interest and a firm common will to seize opportunities and meet challenges cooperatively, with candor and a determination to achieve concrete progress,” and that “the two Presidents are determined to build toward a constructive strategic partnership between China and the United States through increasing cooperation to meet international challenges and promote peace and development in the world.”

早在川普上任之前，美國歷屆政府就一直採取對中國的態度，誤解了北京的戰略意圖。1997年在比爾柯林頓 - 江澤民峰會上發表的一份聲明指出，「雖然中國和美國都有協議和分歧的領域，但他們有共同的利益和堅定的共同意願，可以合作地抓住機遇和迎接挑戰，坦誠相待並且決心取得具體進展，」並且「兩位總統決心通過加強合作迎接國際挑戰，促進世界和平與發展，建立中美建設性戰略夥伴關係。」

At a 2001 joint press conference with Jiang Zemin, George W. Bush said that “today’s meetings convinced me that we can build on our common interests. . . . We seek a relationship that is candid, constructive, and cooperative.”

在2001年與江澤民舉行的聯合記者招待會上，喬治·W·布希說：「今天的會議使我確信我們可以建立在共同利益基礎之上…我們尋求坦誠，建設性和合作的關係。」

In a joint press conference with Xi Jinping in 2015, Barack Obama noted that “as a result of our efforts, our two nations are working together more closely across a broader range of critical issues—and our cooperation is delivering results, for both our nations and the world.”

在2015年與習近平舉行的聯合記者招待會上，巴拉克·歐巴馬指出，「由於我們的努力，我們兩國正在更廣泛的關鍵問題上更緊密地合作 - 我們的合作正在為我們兩國帶來成果和世界。」

While these presidents were making such optimistic statements over a nearly twenty-year period, China implemented a grand strategy designed to undermine U.S.-Asian alliances, which has accelerated under Xi Jinping； used geoeconomic tools to coerce its neighbors and others, including most recently through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)； violated international commercial practices, including by committing massive theft of U.S. intellectual property； manipulated its currency for trade benefits； threatened Taiwan； built up its military forces to push the United States beyond Japan and the Philippines； constructed and militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea, in violation of international law； systemically and brutally violated the human rights of its own people； and patiently and incrementally built its power and influence with the strategic goal of replacing the United States as the primary power in Asia.

雖然這些總統在近二十年的時間裡發表如此樂觀的聲明，但中國實施了一項旨在破壞美亞聯盟的大戰略，而習近平加速這種聯盟；使用地緣經濟工具強迫鄰國和其他人，包括最近通過「一帶一路倡議」（BRI）；違反國際商業慣例，包括大規模盜竊美國知識產權；操縱其貨幣以獲得貿易利益；威脅台灣；建立軍隊，將美國推向日本和菲律賓之外；在南中國海建造和軍事化的人工島嶼，違反國際法；系統地和殘酷地侵犯了本國人民的人權；並以耐心和漸進的方式建立其權力和影響力，以取代美國成為亞洲主要力量的戰略目標。；

As former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew put it, China has “a culture 4,000 years old with 1.3 billion people, many of great talent. . . . How could they not aspire to be number 1 in Asia, and in time the world?”  Not recognizing the clarity of Lee’s conclusion, successive administrations spoke routinely about their “engage and hedge” strategy against Chinese misbehavior, long after Beijing had seriously misbehaved and when that hedging should have changed into something much stronger and more decisive to counter China’s threats to U.S. vital national interests.

正如前新加坡總理李光耀所說，中國擁有「一個擁有13億人口，擁有13億人口，擁有眾多優秀人才的文化」…他們怎麼可能不渴望成為亞洲第一和世界時代的第一名呢？」不理解李的結論是否明確，在北京嚴重行為不端之後很久，歷屆政府都經常談論他們針對中國不端行為的「參與和對沖」策略。當這種對沖應該變成更強大，更具決定性的東西，來對抗中國對美國重大國家利益的威脅。

These American misunderstandings of China’s objectives over nearly two decades rank as one of the three most damaging U.S. foreign policy errors since the end of World War II, along with the 1965 military escalation in Vietnam and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  Indeed, this prolonged failure in China policy could turn out to be the biggest U.S. policy deficiency in the past seven decades, given the accumulating dangerous strategic consequences of the rise of Chinese power for world order as well as for the United States and its allies and friends.

這些美國對近二十年來中國目標的誤解，是二戰結束以來美國三次最具破壞性的外交政策失誤之一，以及1965年越南軍事升級和2003年入侵伊拉克。的確，對中國政策的長期失敗，基於在中國崛起所累積對世界秩序及對美國、盟友與朋友所產生戰略的危險後果，這會變成美國有過去70年以來最大的政策失誤。

It was not inevitable that the U.S.-China relationship would evolve into its current adversarial standoff. If Washington, through careful and consistent diplomacy in coordination with its Asian allies, had routinely contested Beijing’s aggressive policies much earlier, China, then weaker, could have pulled back and a rough equilibrium could have been established and maintained, with major areas of cooperation.

美中關係並非不可避免地演變成目前的敵對對峙。如果華盛頓通過與其亞洲盟國協調一致的認真和一貫的外交，早已經常對北京的侵略政策提出異議，那麼中國可能已經退縮，可能已經在主要的合作領域建立並保持一個粗略的均衡。

And if Beijing instead had continued on that confrontational path, the United States would have been in a stronger position to respond than it is at present. But the Chinese leadership, faced with successively acquiescent U.S. administrations that miscalculated China’s strategic intentions, went on pushing until it finally provoked a Thermidorean reaction from the United States.

如果北京繼續走這條對抗的道路，那麼美國的反應能力將比目前更強。但是，中國領導層錯誤估計中國戰略意圖的美國政府，他們繼續推動，直到它最終引起了美國對他的反應。

President Trump got off to a terrible start in managing the U.S.- China relationship by withdrawing from the TPP on January 23, 2017.

川普總統於2017年1月23日退出TPP，在管理美中關係方面取得了可怕的開端。

The twelve-nation agreement (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States) would have reduced tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S. exports to Asian markets.  The TPP was the most important U.S. geoeconomic response to the increasingly coercive weight of the Chinese economy in Asia. It offered Asian nations trade alternatives to their dependence on China, which often brought with it Chinese geopolitical pressure. President Trump killed it with no serious analysis of the TPP’s significant geoeconomic and geopolitical benefits for the United States.

十二國協議（澳大利亞，文萊，加拿大，智利，日本，馬來西亞，墨西哥，新西蘭，秘魯，新加坡，越南和美國）將減少美國對亞洲市場出口的關稅和非關稅壁壘。TPP是美國對亞洲中國經濟日益強制性影響的最重要的地緣經濟反應。它為亞洲國家提供了依賴中國的貿易替代品，這往往帶來中國的地緣政治壓力。川普總統在沒有認真分析TPP對美國的重大地緣經濟和地緣政治利益的情況下，便將其毀壞。

To its credit, however, the Trump administration has since adopted a much more clear-eyed approach regarding China that breaks with many of the errors of the past. The administration did an about-face after exiting the TPP that was reflected in its December 2017 National Security Strategy.  That document stressed that “China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda,” and that China is expanding its influence in Africa, Europe, South Asia, and the Western Hemisphere while stealing “hundreds of billions” of dollars’ worth of American intellectual property.

然而，值得讚揚的是，川普政府對中國採取了一種更為明確的態度，打破了過去的許多錯誤。在退出TPP之後，政府在2017年12月的國家安全戰略中反映了這一點。該文件強調「中國正在利用經濟誘惑和懲罰，影響行動，並暗示將導致軍事威脅，以說服其他國家注意其政治和安全議程」，並且中國正在擴大其在非洲，歐洲，南亞和西半球的影響力，同時竊取了『價值數千億美元』的美國智慧財產權。

Similarly, the January 2018 National Defense Strategy judged that “China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea.”

同樣，2018年1月出版的〈國防戰略〉判定「中國是一個戰略競爭者，利用掠奪性經濟學恐嚇鄰國，同時使南海軍事化。」

And on October 4, 2018, Vice President Mike Pence delivered the toughest speech on U.S.-China relations by a U.S. administration in fifty years, stressing that China now spends as much on its military as the rest of Asia combined, and Beijing has prioritized capabilities to erode America’s military advantages on land, at sea, in the air, and in space.  China wants nothing less than to push the United States of America from the Western Pacific and attempt to prevent us from coming to the aid of our allies.

而在2018年10月4日，美國政府副總統邁克彭斯發表了關於美中關係半世紀以來最嚴厲的演講，強調中國現在在軍事上花費的金額，與亞洲其他國家的總和相當，而北京則優先考慮能力侵蝕美國在陸地，海上，空中和太空中的軍事優勢。中國希望將美利堅合眾國從西太平洋推開，並試圖阻止我們援助我們的盟國。

The administration also recognizes that Beijing’s efforts to develop emerging technologies could put the United States at a competitive disadvantage.  On February 11, 2019, President Trump signed the American AI Initiative executive order, which is designed to “promote sustained investment in AI [artificial intelligence] R&D in collaboration with industry, academia, international partners and allies, and other non-Federal entities,” to “reduce barriers to the use of AI technologies to promote their innovative application,” and to “train the next generation of American AI researchers and users through apprenticeships; skills programs; and education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.”

政府還認識到，北京發展新興技術的努力，可能會使美國處於競爭劣勢。2019年2月11日，川普總統簽署了美國AI倡議行政命令，旨在「與行業，學術界，國際合作夥伴和盟國以及其他非聯邦實體合作，促進對人工智能研發的持續投資，「減少使用人工智能技術的障礙，以促進他們的創新應用，並通過學徒培訓培養下一代美國人工智能研究人員和用戶；技能課程；和科學，技術，工程和數學教育。」

At the same time, the administration backed up its rhetoric with action, although Trump is more narrowly focused on trade and it is unclear how much he has internalized his administration’s broader containment policy regarding China. The president publicly and loudly confronted Beijing and its long-standing unfair trade practices. Most notably, the administration imposed tariffs on $250 billion in Chinese imports to the United States with the goal of forcing China to open market access to U.S. firms, ending forced technology transfers to Chinese firms, and curbing subsidies to state-owned industries.

與此同時，儘管川普對貿易的關注更為狹隘，但尚不清楚他對政府更廣泛的遏制政策的內化程度。總統公開並大聲地對抗北京及其長期不公平的貿易行為。最值得注意的是，政府對中國進口到美國的2500億美元徵收關稅，其目的是迫使中國向美國公司開放市場准入，結束向中國企業強制轉讓技術，以及限制對國有企業的補貼。

The United States threatened to raise rates on March 2, 2019, if no deal was reached, but later extended the deadline after reporting it was making “substantial progress” in trade negotiations.40 Despite having such a fundamental misunderstanding of the dynamics of international commerce and the role of trade deficits and tariffs, as highlighted below, Trump has succeeded in cleverly pressing China.

如果沒有達成協議，美國威脅要在2019年3月2日提高利率，但後來在報告它在貿易談判中取得「實質性進展」之後，延長了截止日期。儘管對國際商業的動態有如此根本的誤解，以及下文強調的貿易赤字和關稅的作用，川普已成功地巧妙地向中國施加壓力。

The president’s confrontational trade policy could lead to a significant deal.  How negotiations will turn out is unclear at this writing, but press reports indicate that Trump could receive serious trade concessions from the Chinese government that his immediate predecessors sought but could not get through diplomatic entreaties.

總統的對抗性貿易政策，可能導致重大協議。在撰寫本文時，談判將如何形成尚不清楚，但新聞報導表明，川普可能會得到中國政府的嚴肅貿易讓步，他的前任尋求但無法通過外交手段達成。

(Making progress on China’s theft of U.S. intellectual property is a much harder problem.43) It remains possible that Beijing will yet again not make good on its commitments, but Trump and his often-criticized trade strategy could have broken through Beijing’s heretofore impenetrable shield regarding its trade misconduct.

（在中國竊取美國智慧財產權方面取得進展是一個更難的問題）北京仍有可能再次無法履行其承諾，但川普及其經常受到批評的貿易戰略，可能突破了北京迄今為止，關於其貿易不端行為，難以逾越的障礙。

The Trump administration has taken further actions against individual Chinese firms, though these have been inconsistent.  Based on charges that Chinese telecom firm Huawei had evaded sanctions against Iran and on fears that its entry into 5G networks could allow China to gain even greater access to commercial secrets and classified government information, the United States persuaded Canadian police to arrest Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou, formally charged the company with fraud, and pressured allies to not allow Huawei to work on 5G networks within their borders.  The United States reportedly intends to follow up with an executive order preventing Chinese firms from building new networks in the United States.45 Chinese telecom firm ZTE also violated Iran sanctions, but the president lifted an existing U.S. ban on doing business with the company as part of an effort to open up market access in China.

川普政府已經採取進一步行動打擊中國企業，儘管這些措施不一致。根據中國電信公司華為避免對伊朗實施制裁的指控，以及由於擔心其進入5G網路，可能讓中國獲得更多商業機密和政府信息分類，美國說服加拿大警方逮捕首席財務官孟晚舟，正式對該公司進行欺詐指控，並迫使盟友不允許華為在其境內開展5G網路。據報導，美國打算採取行政命令，阻止中國公司在美國建立新網路。中國電信公司中興通訊，也違反了伊朗的制裁措施，但總統解除了美國現有禁止與該公司開展業務的禁令，作為開拓中國市場准入的一部分。

On balance, however, the president has placed more economic pressure on Beijing to change its trade practices than did any of his predecessors since China began its remarkable economic growth in the 1990s.  This is all to the good.

然而，總體來說，自從中國在20世紀90年代開始顯著的經濟增長以來，總統給北京施加了更多的經濟壓力，來改變其貿易做法。這一切朝向好的面向。

Sometimes continuing policies initiated by President Obama, the Trump administration has similarly worked to push back against China’s growing influence on regional security in Asia and has sought to improve the United States’ ability to project power into the region.

有時候，歐巴馬總統發起的持續政策，川普政府也同樣努力抵制中國對亞洲地區安全日益增長的影響，並試圖提高美國向該地區投入武力的能力。

The number of deployable U.S. Navy ships across the entire fleet has increased from 273 in December 2016, right before President Trump took office, to 287 in January 2019.47 In the South China Sea, which China claims as its territory in violation of international law, the navy has conducted at least ten freedom of navigation operations during the Trump administration. By February 2019, these amounted to more than twice as many as the Obama administration conducted in its eight years.  (The Chinese government has stated that it believes these operations “infringed upon Chinese sovereignty, and undermined the peace, security, and order of the relevant waters.”49) The Trump administration remains determined to keep a strong U.S. presence in contested spaces in the western Pacific.

整個美國海軍艦隊中可部署的船艦數量，從2016年12月的273艘，就在2019年1月川普總統上台之前，增加到的287艘。在中國違反國際法稱為領土的南中國海，川普政府期間，海軍至少進行了十次航行自由任務。到2019年2月，這些數字是歐巴馬政府八年來的兩倍多。（中國政府表示，它認為這些行動「侵犯了中國的主權，破壞了相關水域的和平，安全和秩序。」）川普政府仍然決心，在西太平洋有爭議的空間中，美國保持強大的存在。

These efforts to strengthen the U.S. military’s deployments in Asia are not limited to the U.S. Navy. Noting the importance of combat aircraft for missions over large distances in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has prioritized placing the most advanced warplanes in forward positions, including the F-35 and the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol plane and many unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in addition to its already deployed long-range bombers.50 The Pentagon is funding the research and development of UAVs and other unmanned systems, along with long-range anti-ship missiles, to compensate for surface ships’ increasing vulnerability to anti-access/area denial tools like land-based missile attacks.

這些加強美軍在亞洲部署的努力，並不僅限於美國海軍。美國印度洋太平洋司令部（INDOPACOM）注意到，作戰飛機在西太平洋和印度洋的遠距離任務中的重要性，優先考慮將最先進的戰機置於前沿位置，包括F-35和P-8 Poseidon海上飛機巡邏機和許多無人機（UAV），以及已部署的遠程轟炸機。五角大樓正在資助無人機，和其他無人系統的研究和開發，以及遠程反艦導彈，以彌補對於水面艦艇越來越容易受到陸基導彈攻擊等，反介入/區域拒絕工具的攻擊。

INDOPACOM has also sought to make its supply networks and bases more resilient, in response to China’s greater capability to deliver concentrated attacks against specific targets using long-range missiles. The defense posture realignment initiative, begun during the Obama administration and continuing today, has involved new construction to relocate some bases that were previously concentrated in Guam and Okinawa to new areas around the Pacific Rim, in addition to reinforcing the construction of existing facilities. In the same vein, INDOPACOM has started efforts to “disaggregate” its supply stockpiles and to improve its ability to communicate with regional allies in the event of a conflict.

印太司令部還尋求使其後勤體系和基地更具彈性，以應對中國使用遠程導彈對特定目標進行集中攻擊的更大能力。在歐巴馬政府期間和今天，繼續開展的防禦態勢調整計劃，包括新建築，將先前集中在關島和沖繩的一些基地，遷移到環太平洋地區的新區域。此外，還加強了現有設施的建設。同樣，印太司令部已開始努力「分置」其後勤庫存，並在發生衝突時，提高其與區域盟友溝通的能力。

Despite the president’s erratic stances on trade, the Trump administration has maintained robust relationships at multiple levels with Japan and other traditional regional partners. INDOPACOM has carried out increased military exercises with the Japan Self-Defense Forces, including the annual Keen Sword air and sea exercise, which involved fifty-seven thousand troops in 2018.53 In December 2018, Tokyo announced plans to spend $10 billion on 147 F-35 jets, making it the largest non-U.S. buyer of the aircraft.54 Japan has also provided essential support for U.S. efforts to disperse U.S. bases across its territories.

儘管總統對貿易的態度不穩定，但川普政府仍與日本和其他傳統的區域合作夥伴，保持著多層次的穩固關係。印太司令部日本自衛隊進行了更多的軍事演習，包括每年的Keen Sword空中和海上演習，2018年涉及57萬人。538年12月，東京宣布計劃在147架F-35戰鬥機上花費100億美元，使其成為該飛機最大的非美國買家。日本也為美國在其領土上，分散美國基地的努力提供了必要的支持。

And the United States and Australia conducted their largest exercise ever, with thirty-three thousand total personnel taking part in Talisman Saber 2017.

美國和澳大利亞進行了有史以來規模最大的演習，共有三萬三千人參加2017年的Talisman Sabre。

U.S. support for militaries in the Asia-Pacific does not apply only to treaty allies. The Trump administration has worked to make India a more prominent part of its regional strategy (discussed below). After changing the name of U.S. Pacific Command to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018, the United States is now planning its first tri-service exercise with the Indian military.56 In addition to maintaining the Obama administration’s Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (renaming

it the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative), which was designed to improve the capacity of U.S. allies and partners to respond to regional threats, the Trump administration provided an additional $300 million to countries in Southeast Asia for improving communications systems and patrol capabilities around the Bay of Bengal, the South China Sea, and many Pacific islands.

美國對亞太地區軍隊的支持不僅適用於條約盟國。川普政府致力於使印度成為其區域戰略中更為突出的一部分（下文討論）。美國太平洋司令部於2018年5月更名為美國印度太平洋司令部後，美國正計劃與印度軍方進行首次三軍演出。除了維持歐巴馬政府的「東南亞海上安全倡議」（更名）

「印度太平洋海上安全倡議」（旨在提高美國盟友和合作夥伴應對地區威脅的能力），川普政府向東南亞國家、孟加拉灣、南中國海和許多太平洋島嶼，提供了3億美元用於改善通信系統和巡邏能力。

The administration has also taken steps to craft and implement a geoeconomic response to China’s BRI to provide an alternative to, as Vice President Pence put it, “a constricting belt [and] a one-way road.”

美國政府還採取措施，制定和實施對中國「一帶一路倡議」的地緣經濟，以便像彭斯副總統所說的那樣，提供一種替代方案，「一精簡帶[和]一單行道」

China uses the debts that BRI recipients incur to take possession of strategic assets such as ports and energy infrastructure across Asia and beyond.

中國使用「一帶一路倡議」透過接受者所承擔的債務，來佔有亞洲及其他地區的港口和能源基礎設施等戰略資產。

Even though more and more countries have recognized Beijing’s partly malign intentions with the initiative, some still accept the funding, and the size of China’s efforts has far exceeded offerings from other sources.60 Washington has begun some of its own development programs across the region, including $25 million for telecommunications projects, $50 million for energy infrastructure, and $30 million for a new Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network to coordinate funding, although these are pitifully small numbers compared to BRI； estimates of its size range from $25 billion to $300 billion.

雖然越來越多的國家已經認識到北京方面的部分惡意，但有些國家仍然接受這筆資金，中國的努力規模遠遠超過了其他來源的產品。華盛頓已開始在該地區開展一些自己的發展計劃，包括用於電信項目的2500萬美元，用於能源基礎設施的5000萬美元，以及用於協調資金的新基礎設施交易和援助網路的3000萬美元，儘管與「一帶一路倡議」相比這些數字可憐的少；估計其規模從250億美元到3000億美元不等。

The United States’ Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) already has $3.9 billion invested in the Indo-Pacific, and its successor organization, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, will have more than double OPIC’s lending authority, creating more openings for new projects.62 The administration also announced that it would work with Australia and Japan to provide increased alternatives to Chinese investment.63 But Washington will have to promote massive amounts of additional private investment if it hopes to successfully counter Beijing’s efforts to use geoeconomic coercion to achieve its regional and global geopolitical goals.

美國的「海外私人投資公司」（OPIC），已經在印度太平洋地區投資了39億美元，其後繼組織「美國國際開發金融公司」將擁有超過一倍的OPIC貸款授權，為新項目創造更多空缺。政府還宣布將與澳大利亞和日本合作，為中國投資提供更多的替代方案。但如果華盛頓希望成功應對北京利用地緣經濟強制實現其區域性的努力，華盛頓將不得不推動大量額外的私人投資，以達成全球地緣政治目標。

This is where the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP especially hurts.

這是美國退出TPP特別受害之處。

Even as it implements these policies to deal with the threatening aspects of the rise of Chinese power, the Trump administration has failed to construct a plausible path of classic diplomacy with Beijing that would ameliorate the growing tension between the two countries.

川普政府即使在實施這些政策來應對中國政權崛起的威脅方面，也未能與北京建立一條合理的經典外交途徑，以改善兩國之間日益緊張的局勢。

A supreme effort by both sides is necessary to avoid a situation of permanent confrontation, which could eventually lead to war, in particular over the issue of Taiwan, where tensions between Beijing and Taipei are on the rise.

雙方的最大努力是必要的，以避免永久性對抗的局面，最終可能導致戰爭，特別是在台灣問題上，北京和台北之間的緊張局勢正在上升。

Instead of seeking a sustained strategic dialogue with Beijing, the Trump team publicly issues policy ultimatums to China.67 Given Beijing’s increasing power and influence and the effects of nineteenth-century imperial treaty ports on Chinese psychology, Trump’s approach of forswearing traditional diplomatic instruments is unlikely to succeed, even if it could yield some benefits in the trade domain.

川普不是向北京尋求持久的戰略對話，反之，他公開向中國發出政策最後通牒。鑑於北京日益強大的力量和影響，以及19世紀帝國主義條約口岸對中國心理學的影響，川普不太可能採用傳統外交手段，即使它可以在貿易領域產生一些好處。

If Washington and Beijing do not stop the downward spiral in the bilateral relationship and lurch into prolonged intense confrontation or even conflict, the American and Chinese people would be the first to pay the price of this policy failure.

如果華盛頓和北京不能阻止雙邊關係的惡性循環，並陷入長期的激烈對抗甚至衝突，美國和中國人民將是第一個為此政策失敗付出代價的人。

Most of the rest of the world would soon join the suffering. Consequences would emerge for the United States’ and China’s formidable domestic challenges and national economies. Effects on the global economy would be devastating. Tension would dramatically increase throughout Asia, since no country in that vast region wants to have to choose between the United States and China.69 The effect on potential U.S.-China collaboration on climate change and other issues of global governance would be corrosive.

世界其他大多數國家很快就會加入苦難。美國和中國可怕的國內挑戰，和國家經濟將產生後果。對全球經濟的影響將是毀滅性的。整個亞洲的緊張局勢將急劇增加，因為在這個廣大地區沒有一個國家想要在美國和中國之間選邊站。對中美在氣候變化和其他全球治理問題上的潛在合作的影響，將被侵蝕。

Attempts to deal with the nuclear weapons program of North Korea and potentially that of Iran would fall apart.

試圖處理朝鮮和可能的伊朗核武器計劃將會破裂。

Well-intentioned civil servants will not have the political steam to get this U.S.-China bilateral train moving in the right direction.  Both Washington and Beijing will make their positions clear in public pronouncements, but the serious differences between the two sides are unlikely to narrow.  Therefore, talks should be modeled after Henry Kissinger’s private discussions with Zhou Enlai in the early 1970s.  As Kissinger notes in his book On China, from 1972 onward, “What we encountered was a diplomatic style closer to traditional Chinese diplomacy than to the pedantic formulations to which we had become accustomed during our negotiations with other Communist states.”

善意的公務員不會有政治動力，讓這條中美雙邊列車朝著正確的方向前進。華盛頓和北京都將在公開聲明中表明立場，但雙方間的嚴重分歧不大可能縮小。因此，談判應該仿照亨利季辛吉在20世紀70年代早期與周恩來的私下討論那樣。正如季辛吉在《論中國》所言，從1972年以來「我們所遇到的，是一種更接近中國傳統外交的外交風格，而不是我們在與其他共產主義國家談判時，已經習以為常的迂腐形式。」

In a restricted government-to-government format well away from the public eye, U.S. and Chinese leaders should, first, candidly address how the application of their countries’ perceived national interests can be circumscribed and restrained to avoid U.S.-China confrontation.

在一種遠離公眾視線，受限制的政府對政府形式中，首先美國和中國領導人應坦誠地解決如何限制其國家利益的應用，以避免美中對抗。

Without this sustained strategic dialogue to discuss what sorts of restraint are required from each side, the future relationship between the United States and China looks exceedingly bleak.  Although such extended exchanges at high levels between Washington and Beijing will not end the strategic competition between the two, which will last for decades, they could help avoid worst-case outcomes.  At this writing, many doubt that either side at present is capable of mounting a serious strategic dialogue, but what is the alternative to giving it a try?  In any case, no such discussion is in the offing from either capital, and the president and his team bear some responsibility for that.

如果沒有這種持續的戰略對話，來討論各方需要什麼樣的克制，美國和中國之間的未來關係看起來非常暗淡。雖然華盛頓和北京之間這種將持續數十年的高層次擴大交流，不會結束兩者之間的戰略競爭，但它們可以幫助避免最壞情況的結果。在撰寫本文時，許多人懷疑目前任何一方都能夠進行嚴肅的戰略對話，但嘗試嘗試的替代方案是什麼？無論如何，沒有任何這樣的討論可以從任何一個資本中解脫出來，而總統和他的團隊對此負有一定的責任。

However, for an intensified high-level bilateral dialogue between Washington and Beijing to be fruitful, the United States should first clearly establish that it is enhancing its military, diplomatic, and economic power projection into Asia, intensifying interaction with allies and friends, and helping build up their military strength—not just making speeches about competition.  This is especially true regarding Japan, the most important U.S. ally in Asia and the world.  Nothing less will convince Beijing that it has reasons, based on its national interests, to negotiate seriously with the United States.  This will take some time, for Beijing will wait to see if Washington becomes distracted and diverts its attention to other lesser issues in the daily headlines, as is its wont.

但是，為了加強華盛頓與北京之間的高層次雙邊對話富有成果，美國應首先明確表明它正在加強對亞洲的軍事，外交和經濟力量投入，加強與盟友和朋友的互動，並幫助增強軍事實力 - 不僅僅是在競爭中發表演講。對於日本這個亞洲和世界上最重要的美國盟友來說尤其如此。至關重要的是，北京方面會相信，它有理由根據國家利益與美國進行認真談判。這將需要一些時間，因為北京將等待看看華盛頓是否會分散注意力，並將其注意力轉移到日常頭條新聞中的其他較小問題上，就像它通常那樣。

The United States has just entered the fourth phase of its relationship with China since the end of World War II.  n phase one, the United States sought and failed to prevent Mao Zedong from taking power, which produced a long period of antagonistic interaction.  Phase two saw Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger open up the relationship to better meet the global Soviet threat and, they thought, to help end the Vietnam War.  In phase three, Washington sought to bring Beijing ever more into the international system, hoping it would eventually become a “responsible stakeholder” and accede to U.S.-fashioned rules of the international order.

自第二次世界大戰結束以來，美國剛剛進入與中國關係的第四階段。在第一階段，美國尋求並且未能阻止毛澤東掌權，這產生了長期的敵對互動。第二階段，理查德尼克森和亨利季辛吉開啟了這種關係，以更好地應付蘇聯對全球的威脅，他們認為，這將有助於結束越南戰爭。在第三階段，華盛頓試圖將北京更多地納入國際體系，希望它最終成為「負責任的利益相關者」，並加入美國國際秩序規則。

Phase four has just begun, with the United States fully digesting the threatening implications of the rise of Chinese power and taking initial actions to deal with it effectively.  It remains to be seen whether the Trump administration and its successors are up to the task of addressing this enormous Chinese challenge in the decades ahead.

第四階段剛剛開始，美國完全消化了中國政權崛起的威脅影響，並採取初步行動有效地應對中國政權。川普政府及其繼任者是否能夠應對未來幾十年中國面臨的巨大挑戰，還有待觀察。

President Trump and his colleagues do not yet have an enduring and encompassing grand strategy to do so.

川普總統和他的同事們，還沒有一個持久而包容的大戰略來做此事。

All the same, overall the president deserves a high grade for his policies on China. His administration has taken the lead in awakening the United States to the growing threat that China poses to U.S. vital national interests and democratic values.  Regarding the latter and in the context of Xi Jinping’s internal crackdown, George Soros stressed at the January 2019 Davos conference, “China isn’t the only authoritarian regime in the world, but it’s undoubtedly the wealthiest, strongest and most developed in machine learning and artificial intelligence. This makes Xi Jinping the most dangerous opponent of those who believe in the concept of open society.”73 Without the Trump administration’s persistent political push regarding the increasing dangers of Chinese power, America could well have continued sleepwalking while Beijing decisively drew large parts of Asia into its orbit and away from the United States.

儘管如此，總統總統的中國政策應該得到高分。他的政府率先喚醒了美國對中國對美國重要國家利益和民主價值觀的日益增長的威脅。關於後者以及在習近平內部鎮壓的背景下，喬治·索羅斯在2019年1月的達沃斯會議上強調，「中國不是世界上唯一的獨裁政權，但無疑是機器學習中最富有，最強大，最發達的政權。人工智能使得習近平成為那些相信開放社會概念的人最危險的反對者。」如果沒有川普政府對中國權力日益增加的危險的持續政治推動，美國很可能繼續夢遊，而北京則決定性地吸引亞洲大部分地區 進入它的軌道並遠離美國。

Now the challenge for the president and his successors is to persuade Beijing, through enhanced U.S. power projection, more able alliances, and adroit diplomacy, that the United States will grow ever stronger in Asia and, with its allies and friends, will robustly confront destabilizing Chinese actions. If Xi Jinping and his colleagues could be brought to such a conclusion, Washington and Beijing could then work to create and sustain a new and stable balance of power in Asia and to avoid the catastrophic outcomes that a permanent confrontation between the United States and China is likely to bring. This is the profound diplomatic challenge for the leaderships of both countries over the decades ahead.

現在，總統及其繼任者面臨的挑戰是說服北京，通過加強美國力量投射，更有能力的聯盟和熟練的外交，美國將在亞洲變得更加強大，並與其盟友和朋友一起，將強有力地面對中國的行動破壞穩定的局面。如果習近平和他的同事能夠得出這樣的結論，那麼華盛頓和北京就可以努力在亞洲創造和維持一種新的穩定的力量平衡，並避免美國與中國之間長期對抗可能會帶來的災難性後果。這是兩國領導人未來幾十年的深刻外交挑戰。

Trump Grade on China Policy: B+