20190124索羅斯在世界經濟論壇演講(Remarks delivered at the World Economic Forum) Taimocracy翻譯

【Comment】

Although George Soros cautiously distinct the Chinese people from totalitarian rulers in Beijing in his remark at Davos on January 24th, 2019, as the U.S. Vice President Mike Pence did in his remark on October 4th, 2018, the former still had a major contradictory viewpoint. 

Notes that Soros recognized that “there was no tradition of voting in China…  Their thinking remained hierarchical and carried a built-in respect for high office,” and that “pin our hopes on the Chinese people, and especially on the business community and a political elite willing to uphold the Confucian tradition” at the same time. 

How could it be possible for Soros to distinct the CPC’s feature from the Chinese culture, for it is the Confucian tradition that has been striving to reshape the world in Chinese way and the Chinese Culture is a collective work by all Chinese people?

Remarks delivered at the World Economic Forum    George Soros at Davos, Switzerland, January 24, 2019    20190124索羅斯在世界經濟論壇演講Taimocracy翻譯。

Good evening and thank you all for coming.

各位晚安，歡迎。

I want to use my time tonight to warn the world about an unprecedented danger that’s threatening the very survival of open societies.

我想利用我今晚的時間來警告全世界前所未有的危險，這種危險威脅著開放社會的生存。

Last year when I stood before you I spent most of my time analyzing the nefarious role of the IT monopolies.  This is what I said: 「An alliance is emerging between authoritarian states and the large data rich IT monopolies that bring together nascent systems of corporate surveillance with an already developing system of state sponsored surveillance.  This may well result in a web of totalitarian control the likes of which not even George Orwell could have imagined.「

去年，當我站在你面前時，我花了大部分時間來分析IT壟斷的邪惡角色。這就是我所說的：「專制國家和大數據豐富的IT壟斷企業之間正在形成一種聯盟，它將新興的企業監督系統與已經發展起來的國家資助監督系統結合在一起。這很可能導致一個極權主義控制的網絡，甚至連喬治奧威爾都無法想像的那樣。」

Tonight I want to call attention to the mortal danger facing open societies from the instruments of control that machine learning and artificial intelligence can put in the hands of repressive regimes.  I’ll focus on China, where Xi Jin-ping wants a one-party state to reign supreme.

今晚，我想提請各位注意開放社會面臨的致命危險，即機器學習和人工智慧可以掌握在專制政權手中的控製手段。我將關注中國，習近平希望一黨專制的國家。

A lot of things have happened since last year and I’ve learned a lot about the shape that totalitarian control is going to take in China.

自去年以來發生了很多事情，我已經了解了很多關於極權主義控制將在中國採取的形式。

All the rapidly expanding information available about a person is going to be consolidated in a centralized database to create a “social credit system.”  Based on that data, people will be evaluated by algorithms that will determine whether they pose a threat to the one-party state.  People will then be treated accordingly.

所有關於一個人的快速擴展資訊將被整合到一個中央數據庫中，以創建一個「社會信用系統「。根據這些數據，人們將通過算法進行評估，這些算法將決定他們是否對一個人構成威脅 - 黨的國家。然後人們將得到相應的待遇。

The social credit system is not yet fully operational, but it’s clear where it’s heading.  It will subordinate the fate of the individual to the interests of the one-party state in ways unprecedented in history.

社會信用體系尚未全面運作，但很清楚它的發展方向。它將以歷史上前所未有的方式將個人的命運從屬於一黨專制國家的利益。

I find the social credit system frightening and abhorrent.  Unfortunately, some Chinese find it rather attractive because it provides information and services that aren’t currently available and can also protect law-abiding citizens against enemies of the state.

我發現社會信用體系令人恐懼和令人憎惡。不幸的是，一些中國人覺得它很有吸引力，因為它提供了目前無法獲得的資訊和服務，也可以保護守法公民免受國家敵人的侵害。

China isn’t the only authoritarian regime in the world, but it’s undoubtedly the wealthiest, strongest and most developed in machine learning and artificial intelligence. This makes Xi Jin-ping the most dangerous opponent of those who believe in the concept of open society.  But Xi isn’t alone.  Authoritarian regimes are proliferating all over the world and if they succeed, they will become totalitarian.

中國不是世界上唯一的獨裁政權，但它無疑是機器學習和人工智慧方面最富有，最強大和最發達的政權。這使習近平成為那些相信開放社會概念的人最危險的對手。但習近平並不孤單。威權政權正在全世界擴散，如果它們成功，它們將成為極權主義。

As the founder of the Open Society Foundations, I’ve devoted my life to fighting totalizing, extremist ideologies, which falsely claim that the ends justify the means.  I believe that the desire of people for freedom can’t be repressed forever.  But I also recognize that open societies are profoundly endangered at present.

作為開放社會基金會的創始人，我畢生致力於打擊極端主義的極端主義意識形態，這種意識形態錯誤地宣稱其結果證明了手段的合理性。我相信人民對自由的渴望不能永遠受到壓制。但我也認識到，開放社會目前受到嚴重威脅。

What I find particularly disturbing is that the instruments of control developed by artificial intelligence give an inherent advantage to authoritarian regimes over open societies.  For them, instruments of control provide a useful tool; for open societies, they pose a mortal threat.

我發現特別令人不安的是，人工智慧開發的控制工具，為專制政權提供了一個固有的優勢，而不是開放的社會。對他們來說，控制工具提供了有用的工具;對於開放的社會來說，它們構成了致命的威脅。

I use “open society” as shorthand for a society in which the rule of law prevails as opposed to rule by a single individual and where the role of the state is to protect human rights and individual freedom.  In my personal view, an open society should pay special attention to those who suffer from discrimination or social exclusion and those who can’t defend themselves.

我用「開放社會」作為一個法治社會的速記，而不是一個人的統治，而國家的角色是保護人權和個人自由。在我個人看來，一個開放的社會應該特別關注那些遭受歧視或社會排斥的人以及那些無法自衛的人。

By contrast, authoritarian regimes use whatever instruments of control they possess to maintain themselves in power at the expense of those whom they exploit and suppress.

相比之下，專制政權使用他們擁有的任何控製手段來維持自己的權力，而犧牲他們利用和壓制的人。

How can open societies be protected if these new technologies give authoritarian regimes a built-in advantage?  That’s the question that preoccupies me.  And it should also preoccupy all those who prefer to live in an open society.

如果這些新技術為專制政權提供內在優勢，那麼開放社會如何得到保護？這是我最關心的問題。它也應該吸引所有喜歡生活在開放社會中的人。

Open societies need to regulate companies that produce instruments of control, while authoritarian regimes can declare them “national champions.”  That’s what has enabled some Chinese state-owned companies to catch up with and even surpass the multinational giants.

開放社會需要規範生產控制工具的公司，而專制政權可以宣稱它們是「國家冠軍」。這使得一些中國國有企業能夠趕上甚至超越跨國巨頭。

This, of course, isn’t the only problem that should concern us today.  For instance, man-made climate change threatens the very survival of our civilization.  But the structural disadvantage that confronts open societies is a problem which has preoccupied me and I’d like to share with you my ideas on how to deal with it.

當然，這不是我們今天應該關注的唯一問題。例如，人為的氣候變化威脅著我們文明的生存。但是，開放社會所面臨的結構性劣勢，是一個令我全神貫注的問題，我想與你分享我對如何處理它的想法。

My deep concern for this issue arises out of my personal history.  I was born in Hungary in 1930 and I’m Jewish.  I was 13 years old when the Nazis occupied Hungary and started deporting Jews to extermination camps.

我對這個問題的深切關注源於我的個人歷史。我1930年出生在匈牙利，我是猶太人。當納粹佔領匈牙利並開始將猶太人驅逐到滅絕營時，我才13歲。

I was very fortunate because my father understood the nature of the Nazi regime and arranged false identity papers and hiding places for all members of his family, and for a number of other Jews as well. Most of us survived.

我非常幸運，因為我的父親了解納粹政權的性質，並為他的所有家庭成員以及其他一些猶太人安排了假身份證件和藏身之處。我們大多數人倖免於難。

The year 1944 was the formative experience of my life.  I learned at an early age how important it is what kind of political regime prevails.  When the Nazi regime was replaced by Soviet occupation I left Hungary as soon as I could and found refuge in England.

1944年是我生命的成長經歷。我從小就了解到什麼樣的政治制度占主導地位是多麼重要。當納粹政權被蘇聯佔領所取代時，我盡快離開匈牙利並在英格蘭避難。

At the London School of Economics I developed my conceptual framework under the influence of my mentor, Karl Popper.  That framework proved to be unexpectedly useful when I found myself a job in the financial markets.  The framework had nothing to do with finance, but it is based on critical thinking.  This allowed me to analyze the deficiencies of the prevailing theories guiding institutional investors.  I became a successful hedge fund manager and I prided myself on being the best paid critic in the world.

在倫敦經濟學院，我在我的導師卡爾波普爾的影響下開發了我的概念框架。當我發現自己在金融市場工作時，該框架被證明是出乎意料的有用。該框架與金融無關，但它基於批判性思維。這使我能夠分析指導機構投資者的流行理論的不足之處。我成為了一名成功的對沖基金經理，我為成為世界上收入最高的評論家而感到自豪。

Running a hedge fund was very stressful.  When I had made more money than I needed for myself or my family, I underwent a kind of midlife crisis.  Why should I kill myself to make more money?  I reflected long and hard on what I really cared about and in 1979 I set up the Open Society Fund.  I defined its objectives as helping to open up closed societies, reducing the deficiencies of open societies and promoting critical thinking.

經營一家對沖基金壓力很大。當我為自己或家人賺到的錢多於我需要的時候，我經歷了一種中年危機。我為什麼要自殺才賺更多錢？我對我真正關心的事情進行了長時間的努力反思，1979年我成立了開放社會基金會。我將其目標定義為幫助開放封閉社會，減少開放社會的不足並促進批判性思維。

My first efforts were directed at undermining the apartheid system in South Africa.  Then I turned my attention to opening up the Soviet system.  I set up a joint venture with the Hungarian Academy of Science, which was under Communist control, but its representatives secretly sympathized with my efforts.  This arrangement succeeded beyond my wildest dreams.  I got hooked on what I like to call “olitical philanthropy.” That was in 1984.

我的第一項努力是為了破壞南非的種族隔離制度。然後我把注意力轉向開放蘇維埃制度。我與匈牙利科學院成立了一家合資企業，由共產黨控制，但其代表暗中同情我的努力。這種安排超越了我最瘋狂的夢想。我迷上了我所謂的「政治慈善事業」。那是在1984年。

In the years that followed, I tried to replicate my success in Hungary and in other Communist countries.  I did rather well in the Soviet empire, including the Soviet Union itself, but in China it was a different story.

在接下來的幾年裡，我試圖在匈牙利和其他共產主義國家複製我的成功經驗。我在蘇聯帝國中表現得相當不錯，包括蘇聯本身，但在中國這是一個不同的故事。

My first effort in China looked rather promising.  It involved an exchange of visits between Hungarian economists who were greatly admired in the Communist world, and a team from a newly established Chinese think tank which was eager to learn from the Hungarians.

我在中國的第一次努力看起來很有希望。它涉及在共產主義世界中備受欽佩的匈牙利經濟學家和一個渴望向匈牙利人學習的新成立的中國智庫的團隊之間的互訪。

Based on that initial success, I proposed to Chen Yizi, the leader of the think tank, to replicate the Hungarian model in China.  Chen obtained the support of Premier Zhao Ziyang and his reform-minded policy secretary Bao Tong.

基於最初的成功，我向智庫的領導者Chen Yizi提議在中國複製匈牙利模式。陳先生得到了趙紫陽總理及其改革思想政策局局長鮑彤的支持。

A joint venture called the China Fund was inaugurated in October 1986.  It was an institution unlike any other in China.  On paper, it had complete autonomy.

一家名為中國基金的合資企業於1986年10月成立。這是一個與中國不同的機構。從理論上講，它具有完全的自主權。

Bao Tong was its champion.  But the opponents of radical reforms, who were numerous, banded together to attack him.  They claimed that I was a CIA agent and asked the internal security agency to investigate. To protect himself, Zhao Ziyang replaced Chen Yizi with a high-ranking official in the external security police.  The two organizations were co-equal and they couldn’t interfere in each other’s affairs.

寶彤是其冠軍。但激進改革的反對者，他們眾多，聯合起來攻擊他。他們聲稱我是中央情報局特工，並要求內部安全機構進行調查。為了保護自己，趙紫陽用外部安全警察的一名高級官員取代了Chen Yizi。這兩個組織是平等的，他們不能干涉彼此的事務。

I approved this change because I was annoyed with Chen Yizi for awarding too many grants to members of his own institute and I was unaware of the political infighting behind the scenes.  But applicants to the China Fund soon noticed that the organization had come under the control of the political police and started to stay away.  Nobody had the courage to explain to me the reason for it.

我批准了這個改變，因為我對Chen Yizi因為給自己研究所的成員過多的補助而感到火大，我不知道幕後的政治內鬥。但中國基金的申請人很快注意到，該組織已經受到政治警察的控制，並開始遠離。沒有人有勇氣向我解釋它的原因。

Eventually, a Chinese grantee visited me in New York and told me, at considerable risk to himself.  Soon thereafter, Zhao Ziyang was removed from power and I used that excuse to close the foundation.  This happened just before the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 and it left a “black spot” on the record of the people associated with the foundation.  They went to great length to clear their names and eventually they succeeded.

最後，一位中國的受助者在紐約拜訪了我並告訴我，他自己面臨相當大的風險。此後不久，趙紫陽被取消了權力，我利用這個藉口關閉了基金會。這發生在1989年天安門廣場大屠殺之前，與基金會相關人員在記錄上留下「污點」。他們竭盡全力清除自己的名字，最終成功了。

In retrospect, it’s clear that I made a mistake in trying to establish a foundation which operated in ways that were alien to people in China.  At that time, giving a grant created a sense of mutual obligation between the donor and recipient and obliged both of them to remain loyal to each other forever.

回想起來，很明顯我在試圖建立一個以與中國人不同的方式運作的基金會時犯了一個錯誤。那時，贈予贈款會在捐贈者和接受者之間產生相互義務感，並迫使他們兩人永遠保持忠誠。

So much for history.  Let me now turn to the events that occurred in the last year, some of which surprised me.

故事太多了。現在讓我談談去年發生的事件，其中一些令我感到驚訝。

When I first started going to China, I met many people in positions of power who were fervent believers in the principles of open society.  In their youth they had been deported to the countryside to be re-educated, often suffering hardships far greater than mine in Hungary.  But they survived and we had much in common.  We had all been on the receiving end of a dictatorship.

當我第一次去中國時，我遇到了很多掌權者，他們熱衷於信奉開放社會的原則。在他們年輕時，他們被驅逐到農村接受再教育，經常遭受比匈牙利更大的艱辛。但他們活了下來，我們有很多共同點。我們都是獨裁政權的受害者。

They were eager to learn about Karl Popper’s thoughts on the open society.  While they found the concept very appealing, their interpretation remained somewhat different from mine.  They were familiar with Confucian tradition, but there was no tradition of voting in China.  Their thinking remained hierarchical and carried a built-in respect for high office.  I, on the other hand I was more egalitarian and wanted everyone to have a vote.

他們渴望了解卡爾波普爾對開放社會的看法。雖然他們發現這個概念非常吸引人，但他們的解釋與我的解釋有所不同。他們熟悉儒家傳統，但在中國沒有投票的傳統。他們的思想仍然是等級制的，對高級職位有著內在的尊重。另一方面，我更平等，希望每個人都有投票權。

So, I wasn’t surprised when Xi Jin-ping ran into serious opposition at home; but I was surprised by the form it took.  At last summer’s leadership convocation at the seaside resort of Beidaihe, Xi Jin-ping was apparently taken down a peg or two.  Although there was no official communiqué, rumor had it that the convocation disapproved of the abolition of term limits and the cult of personality that Xi had built around himself.

所以，當習近平在國內遭遇嚴重反對時，我並不感到驚訝;但我對它的形式感到驚訝。去年夏天在北戴河海濱度假勝地舉行的領導集會上，習近平顯然已經取消了一兩個。雖然沒有官方公報，但有傳言說，這次集會不贊成取消任期限制，和習近平圍繞自己建立的人​​格崇拜。

It’s important to realize that such criticisms were only a warning to Xi about his excesses, but did not reverse the lifting of the two-term limit.  Moreover, “The Thought of Xi Jin-ping ,” which he promoted as his distillation of Communist theory was elevated to the same level as the “Thought of Chairman Mao.”  So Xi remains the supreme leader, possibly for lifetime.  The ultimate outcome of the current political infighting remains unresolved.

重要的是要意識到這種批評只是對習近平過度行為的警告，但沒有扭轉解除兩屆任期的限制。而且，他提倡的「習近平思想」，他提升為共產主義理論的昇華，被提升到與「毛主席思想」相同的水平。因此，習近平仍然是最高領導者，可能是終生的。當前政治內鬥的最終結果仍未得到解決。

I’ve been concentrating on China, but open societies have many more enemies, Putin’s Russia foremost among them.  And the most dangerous scenario is when these enemies conspire with, and learn from, each other on how to better oppress their people.

我一直專注於中國，但開放的社會有更多的敵人，普京的俄羅斯是其中最重要的。而最危險的情況是，當這些敵人共謀並相互學習如何更進一步地壓迫他們的人民。

The question poses itself, what can we do to stop them?

問題出現了，我們可以做些什麼來制止它們呢？

The first step is to recognize the danger.  That’s why I’m speaking out tonight. But now comes the difficult part.  Those of us who want to preserve the open society must work together and form an effective alliance.  We have a task that can’t be left to governments.

第一步是認識到危險。這就是為什麼我今晚要說出來的原因。但現在來了困難的部分。我們這些想要維護開放社會的人必須共同努力，形成有效的聯盟。我們的任務不能留給政府。

History has shown that even governments that want to protect individual freedom have many other interests and they also give precedence to the freedom of their own citizens over the freedom of the individual as a general principle.

歷史表明，即使是希望保護個人自由的政府，也有許多其他利益，並且它們也優先考慮本國公民的自由，而不是個人自由作為一般原則。

My Open Society Foundations are dedicated to protecting human rights, especially for those who don’t have a government defending them.  When we started four decades ago there were many governments which supported our efforts but their ranks have thinned out.  The US and Europe were our strongest allies, but now they’re preoccupied with their own problems.

我的開放社會基金會致力於保護人權，特別是那些沒有政府捍衛人權的人。當我們四十年前開始時，有許多政府支持我們的努力，但他們的隊伍已經變薄了。美國和歐洲是我們最強大的盟友，但現在他們全神貫注於自己的問題。

Therefore, I want to focus on what I consider the most important question for open societies: what will happen in China?

因此，我想把重點放在我認為對開放社會最重要的問題上：中國會發生什麼？

The question can be answered only by the Chinese people.  All we can do is to draw a sharp distinction between them and Xi Jin-ping .  Since Xi has declared his hostility to open society, the Chinese people remain our main source of hope.

這個問題只能由中國人來回答。我們所能做的就是將它們與習近平區分開來。由於習近平宣稱他對開放社會的敵意，中國人民仍然是我們的主要希望之源。

And there are, in fact, grounds for hope.  As some China experts have explained to me, there is a Confucian tradition, according to which advisors of the emperor are expected to speak out when they strongly disagree with one of his actions or decrees, even if that it may result in exile or execution.

事實上，有希望的理由。正如一些中國專家向我解釋的那樣，有一儒家傳統，根據該傳統，當皇帝的顧問強烈不同意他的一項行為或法令時，他們應該大聲說出來，即使它可能導致流亡或被處決。

This came as a great relief to me when I had been on the verge of despair.  The committed defenders of open society in China, who are around my age, have mostly retired and their places have been taken by younger people who are dependent on Xi Jin-ping for promotion.  But a new political elite has emerged that is willing to uphold the Confucian tradition.  This means that Xi will continue to have a political opposition at home.

當我處於絕望的邊緣時，這對我來說是一種極大的安慰。在我這個年齡段，中國開放社會的忠誠捍衛者大多退休，他們的地方被依賴習近平晉升的年輕人所佔據。但是出現了一個願意堅持儒家傳統的新政治精英。這意味著習近平將繼續在國內擁有政治反對派。

Xi presents China as a role model for other countries to emulate, but he’s facing criticism not only at home but also abroad.  His Belt and Road Initiative has been in operation long enough to reveal its deficiencies.

習近平將中國視為其他國家效仿的榜樣，但他不僅在國內而且在國外都面臨著批評。他的「一帶一路」倡議已經運作一段長時間，足以揭示其缺失。

It was designed to promote the interests of China, not the interests of the recipient countries; its ambitious infrastructure projects were mainly financed by loans, not by grants, and foreign officials were often bribed to accept them.  Many of these projects proved to be uneconomic.

它旨在促進中國的利益，而不是受援國的利益；其雄心勃勃的基礎設施項目，主要由貸款提供資金，而不是通過贈款，外國官員經常受到賄賂接受。許多這些項目被證明是不經濟的。

The iconic case is in Sri Lanka. China built a port that serves its strategic interests. It failed to attract sufficient commercial traffic to service the debt and enabled China to take possession of the port. There are several similar cases elsewhere and they’re causing widespread resentment.

指標性案件在斯里蘭卡。中國建立了一個服務於其戰略利益的港口。它未能吸引足夠的商業流量來償還債務，使中國能夠佔有港口。在其他地方，還有幾個類似案例，引起了廣泛的不滿。

Malaysia is leading the pushback.  The previous government headed by Najib Razak sold out to China but in May 2018 Razak was voted out of office by a coalition led by Mahathir Mohamed.  Mahathir immediately stopped several big infrastructure projects and is currently negotiating with China how much compensation Malaysia will still have to pay.

馬來西亞正在引導抵抗力。以前由納吉布拉扎克率領的政府出賣給中國，但在2018年5月，拉扎克被爾穆罕默德馬哈蒂領導的聯盟投票否決。馬哈蒂立即停止了幾個大型基礎設施項目，目前正在與中國談判馬來西亞仍將需要支付多少賠償金。

The situation is not as clear-cut in Pakistan, which has been the largest recipient of Chinese investments.  The Pakistani army is fully beholden to China but the position of Imran Khan who became prime minister last August is more ambivalent.  At the beginning of 2018, China and Pakistan announced grandiose plans in military cooperation.  By the end of the year, Pakistan was in a deep financial crisis.  But one thing became evident: China intends to use the Belt and Road Initiative for military purposes as well.

巴基斯坦的情況並不明朗，巴基斯坦是中國投資的最大接受國。巴基斯坦軍隊對中國感激不盡，但去年8月成為總理的伊姆蘭汗的立場更加矛盾。2018年初，中國和巴基斯坦宣布了軍事合作的宏偉計劃。到今年年底，巴基斯坦陷入了嚴重的金融危機。但有一點顯而易見：中國打算將「一帶一路」倡議用於軍事目的。

All these setbacks have forced Xi Jin-ping to modify his attitude toward the Belt and Road Initiative. In September, he announced that “vanity projects” will be shunned in favor of more carefully conceived initiatives and in October, the People’s Daily warned that projects should serve the interests of the recipient countries.

所有這些挫折迫使習近平改變他對「一帶一路」倡議的態度。9月，他宣布將避免「虛榮項目」，轉而採取更為精心設想的舉措。10月，〈人民日報〉警告：項目應符合受援國的利益。

Customers are now forewarned and several of them, ranging from Sierra Leone to Ecuador, are questioning or renegotiating projects.

接受國現在已被預先警告，其中一部份，從獅子山到厄瓜多爾，都正在質疑或重啟談判項目。

Most importantly, the US government has now identified China as a “strategic rival.” President Trump is notoriously unpredictable, but this decision was the result of a carefully prepared plan.  Since then, the idiosyncratic behavior of Trump has been largely superseded by a China policy adopted by the agencies of the administration and overseen by Asian affairs advisor of the National Security Council Matt Pottinger and others.  The policy was outlined in a seminal speech by Vice President Mike Pence on October 4th.

最重要的是，美國政府現在已將中國視為「戰略對手」。眾所周知，川普總統是難以預測，這一決定是經過精心準備的計劃的結果。從那時起，川普的特殊行為在很大程度上被政府機構採取的中國政策所取代，並由國家安全委員會亞洲事務顧問馬特波廷格等人監督。10月4日，副總統邁克·彭斯演講中概述了這項政策。

Even so, declaring China a strategic rival is too simplistic.  China is an important global actor.  An effective policy towards China can’t be reduced to a slogan.

即便如此，宣布中國成為戰略對手也過於簡單化。中國是一個重要的全球演員。對中國的有效政策不能簡化為口號。

It needs to be far more sophisticated, detailed and practical; and it must include an American economic response to the Belt and Road Initiative. The Pottinger plan doesn’t answer the question whether its ultimate goal is to level the playing field or to disengage from China altogether.

它需要更加複雜，細緻和實用;它必須包括美國對「一帶一路「倡議的經濟回應。 Pottinger計劃沒有回答這個問題，即它的最終目標是公平競爭還是完全脫離中國。

Xi Jin-ping fully understood the threat that the new US policy posed for his leadership. He gambled on a personal meeting with President Trump at the G20 meeting in Buenos Aires.  In the meantime, the danger of global trade war escalated and the stock market embarked on a serious sell-off in December.  This created problems for Trump who had concentrated all his efforts on the 2018 midterm elections.  When Trump and Xi met, both sides were eager for a deal.  No wonder that they reached one, but it’s very inconclusive: a ninety-day truce.

習近平完全理解美國新政策對他領導的威脅。他在布宜諾斯艾利斯舉行的G20會議上與川普總統進行了個人會談。與此同時，全球貿易戰的危險升級，股市在12月開始嚴重拋售，給川普造成了問題，川普全心致力於2018年的中期選舉。當川普和習近平見面時，雙方都渴望達成協議。難怪他們達成了一個，但這是非常不確定的：一個九十天的休戰。

In the meantime, there are clear indications that a broad based economic decline is in the making in China, which is affecting the rest of the world.  A global slowdown is the last thing the market wants to see.

同時，有明顯的跡象表明，中國正在形成廣泛的經濟衰退，這正在影響世界其他地區。全球經濟趨緩是市場最不希望看到的。

The unspoken social contract in China is built on steadily rising living standards.  If the decline in the Chinese economy and stock market is severe enough, this social contract may be undermined and even the business community may turn against Xi Jin-ping.  Such a downturn could also sound the death knell of the Belt and Road Initiative, because Xi may run out of resources to continue financing so many lossmaking investments.

中國未言說的社會契約，建立在穩步提高的生活水平基礎上。如果中國經濟和股市的下跌足夠嚴重，這種社會契約可能會受到破壞，甚至商界也可能會反對習近平。這種低迷也可能聽起來是「一帶一路」倡議的喪鐘，因為習近平可能會耗盡資源繼續為這麼多虧損投資提供融資。

On the question of global internet governance, there’s an undeclared struggle between the West and China.  China wants to dictate rules and procedures that govern the digital economy by dominating the developing world with its new platforms and technologies.  This is a threat to the freedom of the Internet and indirectly open society itself.

在全球網路治理問題上，西方與中國之間存在著不公正的鬥爭。中國希望通過其新的平台和技術主導發展中國家來規定管理數位經濟的規則和程序。這是對網路自由和間接開放社會本身的威脅。

Last year I still believed that China ought to be more deeply embedded in the institutions of global governance, but since then Xi Jin-ping’s behavior has changed my opinion.  My present view is that instead of waging a trade war with practically the whole world, the US should focus on China.  Instead of letting ZTE and Huawei off lightly, it needs to crack down on them.  If these companies came to dominate the 5G market, they would present an unacceptable security risk for the rest of the world.

去年我仍然認為中國應該更深入地融入全球治理機構，但從那時起，習近平的行為改變了我的觀點。我現在的觀點是，美國不應該與全世界發動貿易戰，而應該關注中國。它不是讓中興通訊和華為輕視，而是需要打擊它們。如果這些公司主導5G市場，它們將給世界其他地區帶來不可接受的安全風險。

Regrettably, President Trump seems to be following a different course: make concessions to China and declare victory while renewing his attacks on US allies.  This is liable to undermine the US policy objective of curbing China’s abuses and excesses.

令人遺憾的是，川普總統似乎正在採取不同的做法：向中國做出讓步並宣布勝利，同時重申對美國盟友的襲擊。這可能會破壞美國遏制中國濫用和過度行為的政策目標。

To conclude, let me summarize the message I’m delivering tonight.  My key point is that the combination of repressive regimes with IT monopolies endows those regimes with a built-in advantage over open societies.  The instruments of control are useful tools in the hands of authoritarian regimes, but they pose a mortal threat to open societies.

最後，讓我總結一下我今晚要傳達的資訊。我的關鍵點是，專制政權與資訊技術壟斷相結合，賦予這些政權在開放社會中具有內在優勢。控製手段是專制政權手中的有用工具，但它們對開放社會構成致命威脅。

China is not the only authoritarian regime in the world but it is the wealthiest, strongest and technologically most advanced.  This makes Xi Jin-ping the most dangerous opponent of open societies.  That’s why it’s so important to distinguish Xi Jin-ping’s policies from the aspirations of the Chinese people.  The social credit system, if it became operational, would give Xi total control over the people.  Since Xi is the most dangerous enemy of the open society, we must pin our hopes on the Chinese people, and especially on the business community and a political elite willing to uphold the Confucian tradition.

中國不是世界上唯一的獨裁政權，但它是最富有，最強大，技術最先進的政權。這使習近平成為開放社會最危險的對手。這就是為什麼將習近平的政策與中國人民的願望區分開來是如此重要。如果社會信用體系開始運作，它將使Xi完全控制人民。由於習近平是開放社會最危險的敵人，我們必須寄希望於中國人民，特別是工商界和願意堅持儒家傳統的政治精英。

This doesn’t mean that those of us who believe in the open society should remain passive.  The reality is that we are in a Cold War that threatens to turn into a hot one. On the other hand, if Xi and Trump were no longer in power, an opportunity would present itself to develop greater cooperation between the two cyber-superpowers.

這並不意味著我們這些相信開放社會的人應該保持被動。現實情況是，我們處於冷戰期，可能會變成一場炙手可熱的戰爭。另一方面，如果習近平和川普不再掌權，那麼兩個網絡超級大國之間將有機會發展更大的合作。

It is possible to dream of something similar to the United Nations Treaty that arose out of the Second World War.  This would be the appropriate ending to the current cycle of conflict between the US and China.  It would reestablish international cooperation and allow open societies to flourish.  That sums up my message.

可以夢想類似於第二次世界大戰期間產生的聯合國條約。這將是當前美中衝突循環的適當結局。它將重新建立國際合作，並使開放社會蓬勃發展。這總結了我的資訊。