Will China ‘weaponize’ social media?….Kent Harrington@The Japan Times 20180206 Taimocracy翻譯

【Comment】

A friend of mine told me the old comment, date on February 6, 2018.

This is not a comment aiming at Psychological Warfare.  It was an comprehensive observation what China is doing to alter world’s view on China on one hand, while she is stealing the high technology on the other hand and doing unfair trade.

Will China ‘weaponize’ social media?….Kent Harrington@The Japan Times 20180206  Taimocracy翻譯

ATLANTA – Ever since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, with its revelations about Russian meddling, European officials have been on the lookout for similar attacks.  But Europeans aren’t the only ones paying attention.  So, too, are China’s leaders, who are considering what they might learn from the Kremlin’s successes.

亞特蘭大—自2016年美國總統大選以來，由於揭露俄羅斯的干預，歐洲官員一直在尋找類似的攻擊。但歐洲人並不是唯一關注此事的人。中國的領導人也是如此，他們正在考慮從克里林姆林宮的成功中學到什麼。

For Chinese President Xi Jinping, maintaining domestic stability is a top priority, a point underscored by China’s annual budget for internal security.  At well over $100 billion, the official number is low.  Like defense outlays, the real number is much higher, owing to hidden spending, including on research and development.

對於中國國家主席習近平來說，維護國內穩定是當務之急，中國內部安全年度預算強調了這一點。超過1000億美元，官方數字很低。與防禦支出一樣，由於隱性支出，包括研究和開發，實際數字要高得多。

For example, China is exploring how artificial intelligence and big data can be used to monitor everything from social media to credit-card spending, and it plans to assign all citizens a social-reliability rating to weed out potential troublemakers.  The regime’s Orwellian strategy is focused squarely on social media and controlling not just what is said, but also how information flows into and around the country.

例如，中國正在探索如何利用人工智能和大數據監控從社交媒體到信用卡支出的所有內容，並計劃為所有公民分配社會可靠性評級，以淘汰潛在的麻煩製造者。該政權的歐威爾戰略主要集中在社交媒體上，不僅控制所說的內容，還控制訊息如何流入全國各地。

Moreover, the authorities are bringing technology companies into line with tough new laws and cyber-security investigations.  For Xi, the ease with which the Kremlin has manipulated Facebook and Twitter demonstrates the need for a tighter grip on China’s own social-media platforms.  The Chinese government is now requesting seats on the boards of companies such as WeChat, Weibo and Tencent, and demanding access to their users’ personal data.

此外，當局正在整合科技公司與嚴格的新法律和網路安全調查。對習近平而言，克里林姆林宮操縱Facebook和Twitter的難易程度表明，需要更加嚴格控制中國自己的社交媒體平台。中國政府現在要求微信，微博和騰訊等公司的董事會席位，並要求訪問其用戶的個人數據。

Chinese cyber spies are also studying Russia’s success.  To be sure, Chinese hackers do not lack technical savvy.  They have launched cyberattacks against U.S.  presidential campaigns, expatriate Tibetan movements and Uighur activists.  They have burrowed into Western think tanks and universities that study China.  They have even hacked into Western news outlets that published embarrassing stories about Chinese leaders’ wealth.  Still, the Chinese may have something to learn from Russia’s well-choreographed online army of trolls and bots.

中國的網路間諜也在研究俄羅斯的成功案例。可以肯定的是，中國駭客並不缺乏技術頭腦。他們發動了針對美國總統競選，外籍西藏運動和維吾爾活動家的網路攻擊。他們已經深入西方智庫和研究中國的大學。他們甚至侵入了西方新聞媒體，這些新聞媒體發佈中國領導人財富的尷尬故事。儘管如此，中國人還是可以從俄羅斯精心設計的巨魔和機器人網軍中學到一些東西。

Similarly, strategists at the People’s Liberation Army are likely poring over the Kremlin’s handiwork to inform their own cyber-war tactics.  Chinese strategic thinking about “political warfare” holds that an adversary’s political, social and economic institutions — particularly the media — should be targeted before a shooting war ever begins.  To that end, Russia’s diffusion of bogus news and conspiracy theories through its state-funded media outlets RT and Sputnik could prove instructive.

同樣，人民解放軍的戰略家們可能會仔細研究克里林姆林宮的手工作業，以告知他們自己的網路戰爭策略。中國關於“政治戰爭”的戰略思想認為，在開戰之前，對手的政治，社會和經濟制度 - 特別是媒體 - 應該成為目標。為此，俄羅斯透過其國家資助的媒體機構RT和Sputnik傳播假新聞和陰謀理論可能具有指導意義。

In addition to expanding China’s cyber capabilities, Xi has also been developing China’s soft power through economic, social, cultural and media initiatives.  And although he has not yet coupled these programs with China’s clandestine forces to launch the kind of audacious attack that roiled the 2016 presidential election, he clearly is establishing the means to do so.  Recently, it was revealed that China has been conducting wide-ranging influence operations in Australia, using official campus organizations to monitor Chinese college students, business associations to tout Chinese interests and diplomats to police local Chinese-language media.  Late last year, an Australian senator was forced to resign over his alleged ties to a Chinese billionaire.

除了擴大中國的網路能力，習近平還透過經濟，社會，文化和媒體倡議發展中國的軟實力。雖然他還沒有將這些計劃與中國的秘密勢力結合起來，發動了一場激起2016年總統大選的大膽攻擊，但他顯然正在建立這樣做的手段。最近，據透露，中國一直在澳大利亞開展廣泛的影響力行動，利用官方校園組織監督中國大學生，商業協會，以兜售中國利益，以及外交官，以警察當地的中文媒體。去年年底，一名澳大利亞參議員因涉嫌與中國億萬富翁的關係被迫辭職。

China is also expanding its global media presence.  By some estimates, the government is sinking some $7 billion into new media and broadcast outlets abroad every year.  Its official news agency, Xinhua, has more than 170 bureaus around the world and publishes in eight languages.  China Central Television (CCTV) has more than 70 foreign bureaus and broadcasts to 171 countries in six languages.  China Radio International is the world’s second-largest radio broadcaster after the BBC, broadcasting in 64 languages from 32 foreign bureaus to 90 radio stations worldwide.

中國也在擴大其全球媒體業務。根據一些估計，政府每年都會向國外新媒體和廣播機構投入約70億美元。其官方通訊社新華社在全球擁有170多個分社，並以八種語言出版。中央電視台（CCTV）以六種語言向171個國家提供了70多個外國局和廣播。中國國際廣播電台是繼英國廣播公司之後的世界第二大無線電廣播公司，以32種語言從全球32個外國局到90個廣播電台進行廣播。

None of these organizations has yet to distinguish itself as a go-to international news source.  But they have become a significant source of information for people in underserved regions such as the Middle East and Africa, where they purvey China’s views and are building sympathetic audiences.

這些組織中尚未使自己成為國際新聞來源。但它們已經成為中東和非洲等服務欠缺地區人們的重要訊息來源，在這些地區，他們提供了中國的觀點，並正在建立親中的觀眾。

At the same time, China is purchasing “native advertising” in Australian, American and European newspapers.  This allows China to place officially authored content about controversial issues — such as its militarized island-building in the South China Sea — next to those publications’ editorial offerings.

同時，中國正在澳大利亞，美國和歐洲的報紙上購買「本地廣告」。這使得中國可以在這些出版物的編輯產品旁邊放置關於有爭議問題的正式撰寫的內容 - 例如在南中國海的軍事化島嶼建設。

Xi is also playing the long game, by approving investments in movies and other forms of mass entertainment to influence how global popular culture treats all things Chinese.  Despite the Chinese government’s recent clampdown on outbound capital flows, Chinese companies are still adding to their major stakes in Hollywood properties.  The Chinese conglomerate Dalien Wanda alone has some $10 billion in entertainment assets in the United States, Europe and Australia.  And other Chinese internet and financial giants such as Alibaba, Tencent and Hony Capital, as well as state-owned companies such as the China Film Group, have invested tens of billions of dollars in U.S. film ventures.

習近平還透過批准投資電影和其他形式的大眾娛樂，來影響全球流行文化對中國的態度。儘管中國政府最近打壓資本流出，但中國企業仍在增加其在好萊塢房地產的主要股份。僅中國企業集團大連萬達就在美國，歐洲和澳大利亞擁有約100億美元的娛樂資產。其他中國互聯網和金融巨頭，如阿里巴巴，騰訊和弘毅投資，以及中國電影集團等國有企業，已在美國電影企業投資數百億美元。

With these financial stakes, the Chinese government has leverage that goes beyond old-fashioned censorship.  Hollywood studio bosses with an eye on China’s massive domestic market will be tempted to kowtow to the government’s “creative” requests when it comes to scripts, casting decisions and so forth.  At $8.6 billion in 2017, Chinese box-office receipts are second only to North America’s.  Yet China allows only 38 foreign films into the country each year, inducing filmmakers to bend over backward to please the censors.

有了這些金融股權，中國政府的槓桿作用超越了老式的審查制度。看好中國龐大的國內市場的好萊塢工作室老闆，在涉及劇本，決策等方面時，會傾向於向政府的「創造性」請求叩頭。2017年的中國票房收入為86億美元，僅次於北美。然而，中國每年只允許38部外國電影進入該國，誘使電影製作人向後彎腰以取悅審查。

Of course, Hollywood executives aren’t the only Westerners helping Xi’s realize his agenda.  Between Apple’s recent decision to relinquish its Chinese user data storage to a Chinese partner and Google’s announcement that it will site a new AI research center in China, U.S. technology giants are not just making deals to benefit their “stakeholders.”  They are also handing Xi and his cyber operatives proprietary technologies and know-how, and even potential access to U.S. targets.

當然，好萊塢高管並不是唯一幫助習近平實現其議程的西方人。蘋果公司最近決定放棄其與中國合作夥伴關於中國用戶數據存儲，但谷歌宣布將在中國建立一個新的人智慧研究中心。美國科技巨頭不僅僅是為了讓他們的「利益相關者」受益。他們也在向習近平及他的網路繳出技術和秘訣，甚至可能入侵美國的目標的技術。

This raises an obvious question: If Russia could roil a U.S.  presidential election without such intimate business relationships, what will China be able to do in the years ahead? To think that China’s only interest is making money, one Hollywood executive recently acknowledged, would be “very naive and dangerous” indeed.

這提出了一個顯而易見的問題：如果俄羅斯能夠在沒有這種親密關係的情況下煽動美國總統大選，那麼未來幾年中國將會做些什麼呢？一位好萊塢高管最近承認，認為中國唯一的利益是賺錢，確實會「非常天真和危險」。

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/02/06/commentary/world-commentary/will-china-weaponize-social-media/#.W8Qh9mgzZnI

Kent Harrington, a former senior CIA analyst and director of public affairs, served as national intelligence officer for East Asia and chief of station in Asia.  © Project Syndicate, 2018