FRUS：19781230美國太平洋司令部致電國務院和白宮 雲程翻譯

FRUS：19781230美國太平洋司令部致電國務院和白宮    雲程翻譯

【Comment】

感謝「路過的路人A」大大提供網址。

I have not read the any texts referring to the “Government of the Republic of China, GRC, become the Governing Authority of Taiwan.” 

However, the fact that the mission has pointed out Taiwan and unofficial instrumentality among others for several times might suggest the same comment of “路過的路人A”.

The officials of Taiwan side’s “emphasizing their overriding concern with their legal status under U.S. law” can be read in this diplomatic telegram for several times.

How could it be possible just for the shift of the diplomatic tie led to the issue of Taiwan’s “legal status under U.S. law”?

And I do not know why the telegram stressed the date of February 28 or March 1^st.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977–1980, VOLUME XIII, CHINA美國的外交關係，1977-1980，第十三卷，中國

183. Telegram From the U.S. Pacific Command to the Department of State and the White House

Honolulu, December 30, 1978, 0014Z

State for Secretary and Holbrooke from Christopher. White House for Brzezinski.

Subject: Report to the President on Mission to Taiwan.

183. 從美國太平洋司令部到國務院和白宮的電報

檀香山，1978年12月30日，0014Z

國務卿克里斯托福和郝爾布魯克國家。 白宮的布里辛斯基。雲程翻譯

主旨：向總統匯報有關台灣使節團。

I. Overview.  概述雲程翻譯

On December 28 and 29, I met pursuant to your instructions with President Chiang Ching-Kuo and other officials of the Taiwan Government to discuss the new arrangements which the United States is prepared to create for maintaining cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.  I had two meetings with President Chiang and we had three plenary sessions in which their side was led by the Foreign Minister, the Vice Foreign Minister, and the Chief of their General Staff.  Despite the disturbances which marred our arrival in Taipei, we were able to proceed with our discussions in a serious and business-like atmosphere.  At the same time, the tense mood in Taipei and the apprehension which the Taiwan authorities feel for their future gave their presentations an intensity and occasional bitterness that kept the tone from being friendly.

12月28日和29日，我按照你的指示會見了蔣經國總統和台灣政府的其他官員，討論了美國為維護與台灣人民文化，商業和其他非正式關係所做的新安排。我和蔣總統有兩次會面，我們有三次全體會議，他們的一方由外交部長，外交部副部長和參謀總長領導。儘管我們抵達台北時受到了干擾，但我們仍然能夠在嚴肅和正式的氛圍中進行討論。同時，台北的緊張情緒和台灣當局對未來感到的憂慮，讓他們的簡報演講帶來了強烈的，偶爾的苦澀，使得氣氛不再友好。

The Taiwan officials were pre-occupied during the discussions with one point: Taiwan’s legal status under U.S. law.  They used this point as a surrogate for rearguing our basic recognition decision and repeatedly asked us to reconsider our position.  I explained that our position could not be changed.雲程翻譯

台灣官員在討論的預設立場為：台灣在美國法律下的法律地位。他們利用這一點，來代替我們所基本認可的決定，並反覆要求我們重新考慮我們的立場。我解釋說，我們的立場無法改變。雲程翻譯

Nevertheless, they repeatedly urged us to recognize “the Republic of China as de jure, entitled to exercise governing authority in respect of the territories presently under its control.”  In this way, they argued, they could continue to have government-to-government relations with the United States.  They said repeatedly, with great emphasis and feeling, that they cannot accept relations with the United States on other than a government-to-government basis and that they considered this a matter of “life and death” importance.  At my second meeting with President Chiang, he put forward “five principles” which stressed this point, along with emphasizing the lack of prior consultation and the need for explicit security guarantees.

然而，他們一再敦促我們承認「中華民國是合法的，故有權對目前在其控制下的領土行使管轄權。」從而，他們認為，這樣他們可以繼續擁與美國保持政府對政府的關係。他們一再強烈強調和情緒，除了政府對政府的之外，他們不能接受其他與美國的關係安排，他們認為這是一個「攸關生死」的重要問題。在我與蔣總統的第二次會面中，他提出了強調這一點的「五項原則」，並同時強調：（斷交）無事先協商，和明文的安全保障的必要性。雲程翻譯

The Taiwan officials stressed that the ROC’s extensive foreign exchange and other assets in the United States would be placed in serious jeopardy by our refusal to recognize Taiwan.  They gave particular emphasis to the unpredictability of what United States courts will decide when issues concerning the ROC’s properties or other assets are brought before them.  They asked what our position would be with respect to such properties and assets.  I explained that this was a complex legal question to which there was no simple answer.  Rather, courts would consider a variety of factors, including, for example, the nature and history of the assets, and whether they had been generated by the people of Taiwan.  I said we would be studying carefully the legal status of such properties and assets and that our position with respect to any given assets would depend upon the applicable legal considerations.  I stated, however, that in any litigation, we would certify that we recognize the PRC as the Government of China.雲程翻譯

台灣官員強調，由於我們拒絕承認台灣，中華民國在美國的廣泛外匯和其他資產，將處於嚴重風險中。他們特別強調，美國法院在審理有關中華民國的財產或其他資產的問題，他們的判決的不可預測性。他們詢問，我們對這些財產和資產的立場。我解釋說，這是一個複雜的法律問題，所以沒有簡單的答案。相反的，法院會考慮各種因素，包括資產的性質和歷史，以及它們是否由台灣人所產生。我說，我們會仔細研究這些財產和資產的法律地位，我們對任何特定資產的立場，將取決於所適用的法律因素。但是，我聲明，在任何訴訟中，我們都會確認，我們承認中華人民共和國是中國政府。

I believe the Taiwan officials were so adamant on the question of Taiwan’s legal status because they believe they have a chance of gaining congressional acceptance of their position, or some variant of it.  They may characterize their position for Congress as nothing more than an appeal to us to recognize the ROC for what it is: a legally constituted government exercising sovereignty over Taiwan.  They seem to think that such a formulation has an inherent reasonableness which will find appeal on the Hill.雲程翻譯

我相信台灣官員在台灣的法律地位問題上是非常堅定，因為他們相信，他們有機會獲得（美國）國會接受他們的立場，即便有某些變形。他們可能將他們對國會的立場描述為，只是呼籲我們承認中華民國的本質：一個合法組建的政府對台灣行使主權。他們似乎認為，這樣的表述具有先天合理性，可以在國會山莊上找到同伴。

The principal value of our mission lay in giving us an opportunity to explain and clarify our position, to underscore the firmness of it, and to allow the Taiwan officials to complain and blow off steam.

我們代表團的主要價值在於，讓我們有機會解釋和澄清我們的立場，強調它的堅定性，並允許台灣官員抱怨和吹噓。

[Page 682] [第682頁]

No communiqué or joint press statement was issued.雲程翻譯In view of the tenor of the discussions and the tense conditions on Taiwan, it was not feasible at this time to ask President Chiang to issue the kind of positive unilateral statement which you had suggested.  He is beleaguered, but he was cordial to me personally, and it may be possible to get something from him later on when his friendship for the United States and his self-interest overcome his present emotions.

沒有發表公報或聯合新聞聲明。鑑於討論的進程和台灣的緊張狀況，現在要求蔣總統發表，你所建議的那種積極的單方面聲明是不可行的。他深受困擾，但他對我個人很親切，以後當他對美國的友誼和他的自身利益克服了他現在的情感時，也許有可能從他身上得到一些東西。

II. Our Four Principal Objectives.雲程翻譯我們的四個原則目標

You instructed me to seek Taiwan’s agreement to four principal points.  The first point was that all treaties and agreements in force between us shall remain in effect after January 1, 1979, with each side retaining such rights of abrogation or termination as are provided in the treaties and agreements themselves or inherently in international law and practice.  I was able to gain Taiwan’s agreement on this point.  The Taiwan officials sought to use our discussion of this point as a vehicle for emphasizing their overriding concern with their legal status under U.S. law.  For example, they argued that since the treaties and agreements exist between the U.S. and the ROC, their continuation necessarily implies our continued recognition of the ROC as a government.  We explained that this was not the case and that it is possible to have a treaty or agreement with an unofficial entity.  With respect to abrogation and termination rights, the Taiwan officials expressed particular concern about those treaties and agreements with provisions which allow for abrogation or termination on short notice and asked that we consider waiving those provisions in such instances.  We said we would look at the treaties and agreements on a case by case basis.雲程翻譯

你指示我尋求台灣同意四個要點。第一點是，我們之間已生效的所有條約和協定在1979年1月1日之後仍然有效，各方保留條約和協定本身，或國際法和慣例中規定的廢除或終止的權利。在這一點上，我能夠獲得台灣的一致意見。台灣官員試圖利用我們對這一點的討論，作為強調他們對美國法律下的法律地位的最重要關注的工具。例如，他們認為，由於美國和中華民國之間存在條約和協議，它們的繼續必然意味著我們繼續承認中華民國是政府。我們解釋說情況並非如此，並且可以與非官方實體簽訂條約或協議。關於廢除和終止權利，台灣官員對這些條約和協議表示特別關注，條款允許在短時間內廢除或終止，並要求我們考慮在這種情況下放棄這些條款。我們說，我們將根據具體情況，個案審查條約和協議。

Second, I was instructed to seek Taiwan’s agreement that the staffs of our respective Embassies and their associated instrumentalities, Consulates and Consulates General, may continue to function after January 1, 1979 and until February 28, 1979 in order to provide accustomed services, including consular services.雲程翻譯I was also able to gain Taiwan’s agreement on this point.  Again, they sought to use discussion of this issue as a vehicle for pressing their position on Taiwan’s legal status.  They asked whether the fact that the staffs of the Embassies and other entities would function for an additional two month period did not in fact mean that during that period the ROC would continue to be recognized by the United States.  We responded that was not the case and that the respective Embassies would be operating during that period on an unofficial basis.

其次，我被指示尋求台灣同意：我們各自大使館的工作人員及其相關機構，領事館和總領事館，可能在1979年1月1日之後，和1979年2月28日之後繼續運作，以便提供包括領事館在內的例常性服務。在這一點上，我也能夠獲得台灣的同意。他們再次試圖將對這一問題的討論，作為推動其對台灣法律地位立場的工具。他們詢問大使館和其他實體的工作人員，是否會再運作兩個月的事實，實際上並不意味著在此期間中華民國將繼續得到美國的承認。我們的答覆並非如此，相關大使館將在此期間以非官方的基礎運作。雲程翻譯

Third, I was instructed to seek Taiwan’s agreement that each side will establish and put into operation by not later than February 28, 1979, a new instrumentality created under its domestic laws which would neither have the character of, nor be considered as, official governmental organizations.  I was not able to gain Taiwan’s agreement on [Page 683] this point.  As explained above, the Taiwan officials refused to accept the proposition that we should conduct our relations in the future on an unofficial basis.  We explained that we would nevertheless be proceeding to establish such an instrumentality and that we saw no legal obstacles to conducting relations through such unofficial means.  Repeatedly, I stressed that such instrumentalities would enable our two peoples to maintain the essential elements of our existing relationships.雲程翻譯

第三，我被指示尋求台灣同意，各方將在1979年2月28日之前建立並投入運作，根據其國內法設立的新機構既不具有政府性質，也不被視為官方政府組織。我無法在這一點上獲得台灣的協議。如上所述，台灣官員拒絕接受我們今後應該在非官方的基礎上開展關係的主張。我們解釋說，我們將繼續建立這樣一種機構，我們認為透過這種非正式手段進行雙方關係沒有任何法律障礙。我一再強調，此機構將使我們兩國人民能夠維持現有關係的基本要素。

Fourth, you instructed me to seek Taiwan’s agreement that the two sides should meet at a time to be mutually agreed upon to work out the necessary detailed arrangements.  I was able to gain Taiwan’s agreement to do this.  The Taiwan officials did request that the participants in such discussions not be characterized as a “working group,” to which I assented.  They hoped that such discussions will go on in both Taipei and Washington; I stressed Washington.

第四，你指示我尋求台灣同意雙方應在雙方同意的時候達成協議，以制訂必要的詳細安排。我能夠獲得台灣同意這樣做。台灣官員確實要求這些討論的參與者不要被稱為「工作組」，我贊同這一點。他們希望在台北和華盛頓進行這樣的討論；我向華盛頓強調。

III. Points of Information. 資訊要點

As instructed, I set forth for the Taiwan officials our position on several particular matters.  First, I informed them that agreements which depend upon or are linked to the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) will also end or lose effect with the MDT and that the United States will provide a list of the agreements which we believe fall into this category.  While they strenuously objected to our having moved to terminate the MDT, they did not dwell upon the fact that we will also be terminating the agreements which depend upon or are linked to the MDT.

按照指示，我向台灣官員闡述了我們在幾個特定問題上的立場。首先，我告訴他們，依賴或與〈共同防禦條約〉（MDT）相關的協議，也將與MDT一起結束或失效，美國將提供我們認為屬於此類別的協議清單。雖然他們極力反對我們已經決定終止MDT，但他們並未詳細說明，我們也將終止依賴MDT或與MDT相關的協議。

Second, I informed the Taiwan officials that items of military equipment already committed will be delivered on schedule, including spare parts and other follow-on items, such as ammunition.  I stated further that we will not make any new commitments until the end of 1979, but will consider at a later time requests for sales in 1980 and subsequent years.  The Taiwan officials took great interest in these points and asked that the appropriate military officials in my delegation meet with their military officials to discuss in greater detail the “pipeline” items Taiwan will be receiving.  Such an informational meeting was held between the military officials, and it proceeded in a business-like manner.  At the same time, however, the Taiwan officials expressed concern about the military threat they believe the PRC poses against them.  They took the position that our de-recognition of the ROC creates an entirely new situation that requires the United States, if it is truly interested in Taiwan’s welfare, to make large new commitments of weaponry to Taiwan.  For example, the Chief of their General Staff argued that Taiwan will have a more pressing need than ever before for an advanced follow-on aircraft, such as the F–16 or F–18.  He also asked that the United States bring Taiwan “under the U.S. nuclear umbrella,” by giving written assurance that in the event the PRC threatens Taiwan with nuclear weapons, the United States will come to Taiwan’s defense. [Page 684]  In addition, he asked for a written arrangement which would serve in lieu of the MDT and assure Taiwan that we would help defend it from attack.

其次，我告知台灣官員，已經承諾的軍事裝備項目將如期交付，包括備件和其他後續物品，如彈藥。我進一步指出，我們不會在1979年底之前作出任何新的承諾，但會在稍後考慮1980年及以後年份的銷售要求。台灣官員對這些問題非常感興趣，並要求我國代表團的相關軍官與軍方官員會面，更詳細地討論台灣將接收的「管道」項目。這種資訊交換會議是在軍方官員之間舉行的，它以近乎正式的方式進行。然而，與此同時，台灣官員對他們認為中國對他們構成的軍事威脅表示擔憂。他們採取的立場是，我們對中華民國的認可創造了一種全新的局面，要求美國，如果真的對台灣的福利感興趣，就要向台灣做出大量新的武器承諾。例如，他們的參謀總長認為，對於先進的後續飛機，如F-16或F-18，台灣將比以往任何時候都更迫切需要。他還要求美國把台灣「置於美國的核保護傘下」，作出書面保證，如果中華人民共和國威脅台灣擁有核武器，美國將會來防衛台灣。[Page 684]此外，他要求作出代替MDT的書面安排，並向台灣保證，我們會幫助它免受攻擊。

In response, I stressed our intention to continue to make certain defensive weapons available to Taiwan and the lengths to which we had gone in our negotiations with the PRC to preserve that position.  On the broader point, I said I did not see the need or possibility of such written assurances under current conditions. (We will undoubtedly be faced with such request or initiatives from the Congress.)

作為回應，我強調我們打算繼續向台灣提供某些防禦性武器，以及我們與中華人民共和國談判，以維持這一立場之期限。從更廣泛的角度來看，我說，在目前情況下，我沒有看到這種書面保證的必要性或可能性。（毫無疑問，我們將面臨國會提出的此類要求或倡議。）

Third, as instructed, I drew attention to the recent statements by Taiwan’s Premier Y.S. Sun with regard to plans to develop long-range missiles.  I reminded the officials of Taiwan’s obligations and assurances with respect to the non-development of nuclear weapons.  I was told that Premier Sun’s statement concerning the missiles really should have referred to missiles with a “longer-range” than artillery. It was explained that the range of the missiles in question would be 100 kilometers.  With respect to the non-development of nuclear weapons, I was assured that Taiwan had no such intention and would fully live up to its obligations in this area and to the public and private assurances we have been given by President Chiang.

第三，按照指示，我提請注意台灣行政院長孫運璿最近發表計劃發展遠程導彈的聲明。我提醒官員，台灣有關不發展核武器的義務和保證。有人告訴我，孫院長關於導彈的聲明，確實應該提到的射程比「火砲」更長。據解釋，這些導彈的射程為100公里。關於不發展核武器，我得到保證，台灣沒有這樣的意圖，並將完全履行其在這一領域的義務，以及蔣總統給予的公開和私人保證。

Fourth, I informed the Taiwan officials that we would be submitting appropriate legislation confirming the continuing eligibility of the people of Taiwan for such programs and benefits as are accorded generally by domestic United States law to foreign countries and nationals.  I said we hoped Taiwan will take similar action to the extent required by its domestic legislation.  The Taiwan officials were interested in this point and asked a number of clarifying questions, but their principal response was to press again their argument on the legal status of Taiwan.  They were non-committal on whether they will need to enact any legislation of their own.

第四，我告訴台灣官員，我們將提交適當的法律，確認台灣人民繼續有資格獲得美國國內法對外國和其國民普遍給予的計劃和福利。我說我們希望台灣在其國內立法要求的範圍內採取類似的行動。台灣官員對這一點感興趣，並提出了一些澄清問題，但他們的主要回應是，再次提出他們關於台灣法律地位的論點。他們不承諾是否需要制訂自己的立法。

Fifth, CINCPAC Admiral Weisner and I conveyed the information you requested concerning the disposition of our military forces, facilities, and War Reserve Materiel on Taiwan. In response, the Taiwan officials again stressed great concern for the period after December 31st, 1979, and reiterated their view that some substitute, written arrangement ought to be made in lieu of the MDT.雲程翻譯

第五，太平洋司令部司令海軍上將魏斯納和我，轉達了你所要求的關於我們在台灣部署軍隊，設施和戰爭物資的資料。對此，台灣官員再次強烈關注1979年12月31日之後的時期，並重申他們認為應該採取一些替代性的書面安排來取代〈共同防禦條約〉。雲程翻譯

Sixth, I told the Taiwan officials that we would like to discuss continued leasing of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group compound as the site of the new offices to be maintained by U.S. in Taipei.  They implied they would be prepared to discuss this matter with us sympathetically.

第六，我告訴台灣官員，我們想討論繼續租賃美軍顧問團大樓，作為美國駐台北新辦事處的地點。他們暗示他們會準備好與我們具有同理心的地討論這個問題。

Seventh, as for the ROC’s real property in the U.S., I noted that in any litigation concerning it, we would certify to the court that we recognize the PRC as the Government of China.

第七，關於中華民國在美國的不動產，我注意到在任何有關它的訴訟中，我們會向法院確認，我們承認中華人民共和國是中國政府。

雲程翻譯

[Page 685]

Eighth, because, as pointed out above, the Taiwan officials were unprepared to discuss the establishment of unofficial instrumentalities for conducting our relations in the future, there was no occasion for a detailed discussion of the reciprocal granting on an administrative basis of certain privileges and immunities to the new offices to be established on each other’s territory.  I did flag the point for future discussion.

第八，因為正如上文所指出的那樣，台灣官員沒有準備好討論在未來建立非官方的機構以進行我們的關係，沒有機會詳細討論，在行政基礎上相互授予某些特權和豁免權的問題。在彼此領土上建立的新辦事處。我確實標記了未來討論的重點。

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IV. Optional Points.IV。方案要點

Of the five points you authorized me to make as necessary in the course of my discussions, I did not raise the first three because there was no need to do so.

在你討論的過程中，你授權我在必要時提出的五點中，我沒有提出前三個，因為沒有必要這樣做。

We did inform the Taiwan officials that during 1979, CINCPAC will be authorized to establish a small, U.S.-manned planning group in Honolulu for Taiwan defense matters and that liaison with the Taiwan military will be maintained through the non-governmental personnel of our unofficial organization in Taiwan.  The Taiwan officials were, to a degree, reassured by the former point, although they again expressed concern for what would occur after December 31, 1979.  On the latter point, they urged that military to military contacts should be conducted by active duty U.S. officers.  We explained that the United States would not be in a position to use active duty officers, but that the individuals who were handling such matters for our unofficial organization would be qualified.

我們確實告知台灣官員，在1979年，太平洋司令部司令將被授權在檀香山建立一個小型的美國人規劃小組，負責台灣防務事務，並將通過我們非官方組織的非政府人員維持與台灣軍方的聯絡。在台灣，台灣官員在某種程度上對前一點表示放心，儘管他們再次對1979年12月31日之後會發生的事情表示擔憂。在後一點上，他們敦促軍事與軍事接觸應由現役美國軍官進行。我們解釋說，美國不能使用現役軍官，但是為我們的非官方組織處理此類事務的人員是合格的。

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I also made the point that in acknowledging the PRC position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China; the United States had not gone beyond the position it asserted in the Shanghai Communiqué.  I found the continuity of our position over the last six years to be a useful point in rebutting the Taiwan officials’ argument that the United States should now suddenly take the position that the ROC is the de jure government of Taiwan.

我還指出，在認知中華人民共和國的立場，只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分上；美國沒有超越它在〈上海公報〉中所宣稱的立場。我發現，過去六年來我們立場的連續性是一個有用的觀點，可以反駁台灣官員的論點，即美國現在突然採取的立場，是中華民國是台灣法律上的政府。

V. Security of Americans on Taiwan.雲程翻譯在台灣美國人的安全

After the disturbances that occurred on our arrival, President Chiang gave assurances that full provision would be made for the safety of me and my delegation.  These assurances were fulfilled, and we were able to conduct our talks and depart Taipei without further incident, although this was accomplished only through the use of very heavy security precautions.  Throughout our time in Taipei sporadic demonstrations took place. In addition, there was a recurrent and disturbing implication in some of the remarks made to us by President Chiang and his colleagues that there might be further substantial protests directed at Americans on Taiwan and that the authorities might have difficulty keeping the situation under control.  While these are difficult matters to judge, I am concerned about the possible developments [Page 686] in this area, especially on January 1, when a massive, perhaps 100,000 person demonstration is scheduled to be held one block from the American Embassy.  Similar concerns were expressed by our Embassy personnel and private Americans on Taiwan.  I will be talking on the telephone today with Cy Vance about steps that might be taken to ameliorate the problem.

在我們抵達後發生的騷亂之後，蔣總統保證將為我和我國代表團的安全做好充分準備。這些保證得以實現，我們能夠進行會談並在沒有進一步事故的情況下離開台北，儘管這只是通過使用非常重的安全預防措施來實現的。我們在台北的整個時期都發生了零星的示威遊行。此外，蔣總統及其同事向我們提出的一些言論反覆出現令人不安的暗示，台灣可能會有針對美國人的進一步大規模抗議活動，當局可能難以控制局勢。雖然這些都是難以判斷的事情，但我擔心這個領域可能會發展，尤其是在1月1日，當時計劃在美國大使館一個街區舉行一場大規模的10萬人示威活動。我們的大使館工作人員和台灣民眾也表達了類似的擔憂。我今天將與Cy Vance通電話，討論可能採取的改善問題的步驟。

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VI. Conclusion. VI、結論

The Taiwan authorities have undergone a major shock and are still seeking to adjust to the new realities.  They are deeply concerned about the military threat posed by the PRC in the absence of the MDT and about the status of their property, particularly their financial assets, situated in the United States.  In a sense, they are continuing to deny to themselves the fact that we have recognized the PRC and that our decision is irreversible.  I believe they may maintain this illusion so long as they perceive any hope, through congressional and public pressure, of forcing us to modify our position.  Short of that they may hope to maneuver us into making seemingly minor adjustments in our policy which could damage our relations with the PRC.

台灣當局經歷了重大衝擊，仍在尋求適應新的現實。他們對中華人民共和國在沒有〈共同防禦條約〉的情況下構成的軍事威脅，以及他們的財產狀況，尤其是位於美國的金融資產的狀況深表關切。從某種意義上說，他們繼續否認我們已承認中華人民共和國的事實，而且我們的決定是不可逆轉的。我相信只要他們通過國會和公眾的壓力，感受到強迫我們改變立場的希望，他們就可以保持這種錯覺。除此之外，他們可能希望操縱我們對我們的政策進行看似微小的調整，這可能會損害我們與中國的關係。

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Thus I expect the next two months will remain an unsettled period in our relations with the authorities on Taiwan. So long as they are looking for help from Congress, they will probably be reluctant to establish any kind of unofficial instrumentality.  However, assuming we suffer no major reverses on the Hill, I would expect that as March 1st approaches, the Taiwan authorities would take a more flexible and forthcoming position with respect to the establishment of an unofficial instrumentality.

因此，我預計未來兩個月我們與台灣當局的關係仍將是一個不穩定的時期。只要他們尋求國會的幫助，他們可能不願意建立任何非正式的機構。然而，假設我們在國會山莊沒有遭遇重大逆轉，我預計隨著3月1日逼近，台灣當局將在建立非官方機構方面採取更靈活和即將到來的立場。

As stated above, the meetings in Taiwan provided a good start in this direction, by enabling us to confirm and clarify our basic position and allowing the Taiwan officials an opportunity to vent their emotions.

如上所述，在台灣進行的會議為這方向提供了良好的開端，使我們能夠確認和澄清我們的基本立場，讓台灣官員有機會發洩自己的情緒。雲程翻譯

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Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 10, China (PRC): Reaction to Normalization, 12/22–28/78. Secret; Sensitive; Specat Exclusive; Nodis.↩

See Document 181 for Christopher’s instructions.↩

Christopher provided accounts of his meetings with Jiang in telegram 8747 from Taipei, December 28, and telegram 8803 from Taipei, December 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2126 and P840153–2099)↩

Admiral Weisner, who accompanied Christopher, described the disturbances: “upon arrival in Taipei our motorcade en route from the Taipei airport passed through crowds of several thousand young people who were not adequately controlled. They did significant damage to the vehicles, but fortunately none of the occupants were seriously hurt. However, there was reason to believe that the demonstration was either deliberately orchestrated or at least sanctioned by the ROC Government. But because it was not adequately controlled it became seriously out of hand, and as a result, consideration was given to having the mission depart Taiwan immediately. After some deliberation, and conversation with Washington, the decision, as you know, was made to stay and proceed with the talks. I believe it was a good decision. The talks were important on both sides, and in my view, were necessary at this time.” (Telegram from Weisner to Rogers, December 30; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–81–0202, China (Nats) 092)↩

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d183