When China Rules the Web--Technology in Service of the State By Adam Segal＠Foreign Affairs 當中國主宰網路 翻譯：Taimocracy

當中國主宰網路

When China Rules the Web--Technology in Service of the State By Adam Segal @Foreign Affairs  2018 09/10

For almost five decades, the United States has guided the growth of the Internet.  From its origins as a small Pentagon program to its status as a global platform that connects more than half of the world’s population and tens of billions of devices, the Internet has long been an American project.  Yet today, the United States has ceded leadership in cyberspace to China.  Chinese President Xi Jinping has outlined his plans to turn China into a “cyber-superpower.” Already, more people in China have access to the Internet than in any other country, but Xi has grander plans.  Through domestic regulations, technological innovation, and foreign policy, China aims to build an “impregnable” cyberdefense system, give itself a greater voice in Internet governance, foster more world-class companies, and lead the globe in advanced technologies.

近五十年來，美國一直在引導網路的發展。 從五角大樓的小型計劃到其作為連接世界一半以上人口和數百億設備的全球平台的地位，網路長期以來一直是美國的專屬領域。然而今天，美國已經將網路領域的領導權交給了中國。中國國家主席習近平已經提出了將中國變成「網路超級大國」的計劃。中國已經有更多的人能夠上網，但習近平有更宏偉的計劃。透過國內法規，技術創新和外交政策，中國旨在建立一個「堅不可摧」的網路防禦體系，在網路治理方面發揮更大的作用，培養更多的世界級公司，引領全球先進技術。

China’s continued rise as a cyber-superpower is not guaranteed.  Top-down, state-led efforts at innovation in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, robotics, and other ambitious technologies may well fail.  Chinese technology companies will face economic and political pressures as they globalize.  Chinese citizens, although they appear to have little expectation of privacy from their government, may demand more from private firms.  The United States may reenergize its own digital diplomacy, and the U.S. economy may rediscover the dynamism that allowed it create so much of the modern world’s technology. 

中國作為網路超級大國的持續崛起並不必然實現。自上而下，國家主導的人工智慧，量子計算，機器人技術和其他雄心勃勃的技術創新的努力也可能會失敗。中國科技公司在全球化時，將面臨經濟和政治壓力。儘管中國公民似乎對政府隱私的期望很低，但他們可能會向私營企業提出更多要求。美國可能重新啟動自己的網數據外交，美國經濟可能會重新釋出它創造現代世界技術的活力。

But given China’s size and technological sophistication, Beijing has a good chance of succeeding—thereby remaking cyberspace in its own image.  If this happens, the Internet will be less global and less open.  A major part of it will run Chinese applications over Chinese-made hardware.  And Beijing will reap the economic, diplomatic, national security, and intelligence benefits that once flowed to Washington.

然而，鑑於中國的規模和技術水平，北京很有可能取得成功 - 從而以自己的形象重塑網路空間。如果發生這種情況，網路將不那麼全球化，也不那麼開放。其中很大一部分將執行中國應用程式而不是中國製造的硬體。北京將獲取流往華盛頓的經濟，外交，國家安全和情報利益。

XI’S VISION  習近平的願景

Almost from the moment he took power in 2012, Xi made it clear just how big a role the Internet played in his vision for China.  After years of inertia, during which cyber-policy was fragmented among a wide array of government departments, Xi announced that he would chair a so-called central leading group on Internet security and informatization and drive policy from the top.  He established a new agency, the Cyberspace Administration of China, and gave it responsibility for controlling online content, bolstering cybersecurity, and developing the digital economy. 

中國作為網路超級大國的持續崛起並不能保證必然實現。自上而下，幾乎從2012年掌權的那一刻起，習近平就明確了網路在他對中國的看法中扮演的角色。經過多年的持續努力，在此期間，網路政策在眾多政府部門中分散，習近平宣布他將主持一個所謂的網路安全和資訊化中央領導小組，並從高層推動政策。他建立了一個新的機構 - 中國網路空間管理局，並負責控制線上路內容，加強網路安全和發展網數據經濟。

Cyberpower sits at the intersection of four Chinese national priorities.  First, Chinese leaders want to ensure a harmonious Internet.  That means one that guides public opinion, supports good governance, and fosters economic growth but also is tightly controlled so as to stymie political mobilization and prevent the flow of information that could undermine the regime. 

「網路實力」位於中國四個國家優先事項的交叉點上。首先，中國領導人希望確保和諧的網路。這意味著指導公眾輿論，支持善良治理和促進經濟增長，但也受到嚴格控制，以阻止政治動員，防止可能破壞政權的資訊流動。

Second, China wants to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers of digital and communications equipment.  It hopes to eventually lead the world in advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and robotics.  As Xi warned in May, “Initiatives of innovation and development must be securely kept in our own hands.”

其次，中國希望減少對國外網路數據和通信設備供應商的依賴。它希望最終在人工智慧，量子計算和機器人等先進技術方面領先世界。習近平在5月份警告說，「創新和發展的舉措必須牢牢掌握在自己手中。」

Almost from the moment he took power, Xi made it clear just how big a role the Internet played in his vision for China.

幾乎從他上台的那一刻起，習近平就明確表達了在他對中國願景中網路中扮演的角色。

Third, Chinese policymakers, like their counterparts around the world, are increasingly wary of the risk of cyberattacks on governmental and private networks that could disrupt critical services, hurt economic growth, and even cause physical destruction.  Accordingly, the People’s Liberation Army has announced plans to speed up the development of its cyber-forces and beef up China’s network defenses.  This focus on cybersecurity overlaps with China’s techno-nationalism: Chinese policymakers believe they have to reduce China’s dependence on U.S. technology companies to ensure its national security, a belief that was strengthened in 2013, when Edward Snowden, a former contractor with the U.S. National Security Agency, revealed that U.S. intelligence services had accessed the data of millions of people that was held and transmitted by U.S. companies. 

第三，中國政策制定者和世界各地的政策制定者一樣，越來越擔心政府和私人網路遭受網路攻擊的風險可能會破壞關鍵服務，損害經濟增長，甚至造成物質破壞。因此，人民解放軍已宣布計劃加快其網路力量的發展，並加強中國的網路防禦。這種對網路安全的關注與中國的技術民族主義重疊：中國政策制定者認為，他們必須減少中國對美國科技公司的依賴，以確保其國家安全，這一信念在2013年加強，當時美國國家安全局前承包商愛德華•史諾登（Edward Snowden）該機構透露，美國情報部門已經取得美國公司所持有和傳輸的數百萬人的資料。

Finally, China has promoted “cyber-sovereignty” as an organizing principle of Internet governance, in direct opposition to U.S. support for a global, open Internet.  In Xi’s words, cyber-sovereignty represents “the right of individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyber development, model of cyber regulation and Internet public policies, and participate in international cyberspace governance on an equal footing.” China envisions a world of national Internets, with government control justified by the sovereign rights of states.  It also wants to weaken the bottom-up, private-sector-led model of Internet governance championed by the United States and its allies, a model Beijing sees as dominated by Western technology companies and civil society organizations.  Chinese policymakers believe they would have a larger say in regulating information technology and defining the global rules for cyberspace if the UN played a larger role in Internet governance.  All four of Beijing’s priorities require China to act aggressively to shape cyberspace at home and on the global stage. 

最後，中國將「網路主權」作為網路治理的組織原則，直接反對美國對全球開放網路的支持。習近平所說，網路主權代表著「個別國家有權獨立選擇自己的網路發展道路，網路監管模式和網路公共政策，並在平等的基礎上參與國際網路空間治理。」中國設想了一個國家網路，政府控制的國家主權權利。它還希望削弱由美國及其盟友支持的自下而上的私營部門主導的網路治理模式，這是北京認為由西方科技公司和民間社會組織主導的模式。中國政策制定者認為，如果聯合國在網路治理中發揮更大作用，他們將在監管資訊技術和確定網路空間全球規則方面擁有更大的發言權。北京的所有四個優先事項都要求中國採取積極行動，在國內和全球舞台上塑造網路空間。

THE END OF THE OPEN INTERNET  開放網路的結束

The Xi era will be remembered for putting an end to the West’s naive optimism about the liberalizing potential of the Internet.  Over the last five years, Beijing has significantly tightened controls on websites and social media.  In March 2017, for example, the government told Tencent, the second largest of China’s digital giants, and other Chinese technology companies to shut down websites they hosted that included discussions on history, international affairs, and the military.  A few months later, Tencent, the search company Baidu, and the microblogging site Weibo were fined for hosting banned content in the run-up to the 19th Party Congress.  Officials ordered telecommunications companies to block virtual private networks (VPNs), which are widely used by Chinese businesses, entrepreneurs, and academics to circumvent government censors.  Even Western companies complied: Apple removed VPNs from the Chinese version of its App Store.  Beijing also announced new regulations further limiting online anonymity and making the organizers of online forums personally accountable for the contributions of their members.

習近平時代將被懷記住，因為它結束了西方對網路自由化潛力的天真樂觀主義。在過去的五年中，北京顯著加強了對網站和社交媒體的控制。例如，2017年3月，政府告訴中國第二大網數據巨頭騰訊和其他中國科技公司關閉他們主持的網站，包括歷史，國際事務和軍方的討論。幾個月後，騰訊，搜索公司百度和微博網站—微博因在第十九屆黨全代會期間舉辦禁止內容而被罰款。官員們命令電信公司阻止虛擬專用網路（VPN），這些網路被中國企業，企業家和學者廣泛用於規避政府審查。甚至西方公司都遵守：Apple從其App Store的中文版中刪除了VPN。北京還宣布了新的法規，進一步限制線上匿名，並使線上論壇的組織者個人對其成員的貢獻負責。

Chinese censors are now skilled at controlling conversations on social media.  In 2017, as the dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo became increasingly ill, censors revealed that they could delete his image from chats.  In an even more Orwellian move, authorities have rolled out a sophisticated surveillance system based on a vast array of cameras and sensors, aided by facial and voice recognition software and artificial intelligence.  The tool has been deployed most extensively in Xinjiang Province, in an effort to track the Muslim Uighur population there, but the government is working to scale it up nationwide.

中國審查員現在擅長控制社交媒體上的對話。2017年，隨著異議人士和諾貝爾和平獎獲得者劉曉波病情越來越嚴重，審查人員透露他們可以從聊天中刪除他的形象。在更多歐威爾式的行動中，當局推出了基於大量相機和監視器的複雜監控系統，輔以臉部和語音識別軟體以及人工智慧。該工具已在新疆省最廣泛部署，以追踪那裡的穆斯林維吾爾族人口，但政府正在努力在全國範圍內擴大規模。

In addition to employing censorship and surveillance, China has also created an interlocking framework of laws, regulations, and standards to increase cybersecurity and safeguard data in governmental and private systems.  The government has enacted measures to protect important Internet infrastructure, it has mandated security reviews for network products and services, and it has required companies to store data within China, where the government will face few obstacles to accessing it.  Beijing has also introduced new regulations concerning how government agencies respond to cybersecurity incidents, how and when the government discloses software vulnerabilities to the private sector, and how ministries and private companies share information about threats. 

除了採用審查和監督外，中國還建立了一個法律，法規和標準的相互箝制的框架，以增加網路安全並保護政府和私人系統中的數據。政府已經制定了保護重要網路基礎設施的措施，它已經強制要求對網路產品和服務進行安全審查，並要求公司在中國境內存儲數據，政府在存取數據上很少有障礙。北京還引入了新的規定，涉及政府機構如何應對網路安全事件，政府如何以及何時向私營部門披露軟件漏洞，以及各部會和私營公司如何分享有關威脅的資訊。

Different agencies and local governments could interpret and implement these policies in different ways, but at the least, the regulations will raise the cost and complexity of doing business in China for both domestic and foreign technology companies.  Draft regulations published in July 2017 were particularly broad, defining “critical information infrastructure” to cover not only traditional categories such as communications, financial, and energy networks but also the news media, health-care companies, and cloud-computing providers.  Baidu, Tencent, and Weibo have already been fined for violating the new cybersecurity laws.  Foreign companies worry that an expansive interpretation of the requirements for inspections of equipment and storing data within China will raise costs and could allow the Chinese government to steal their intellectual property.

不同的機構和地方政府可以透過不同的方式解釋和實施這些政策，但至少，這些法規將提高國內外科技公司在中國開展業務的成本和複雜性。2017年7月發布的法規草案特別廣泛定義了「關鍵資訊基礎設施」，不僅涵蓋傳統類別，如通信，金融和能源網路，還涵蓋新聞媒體，醫療保健公司和雲計算提供商。百度，騰訊和微博，因違反新的網路安全法而被罰款。外國公司擔心，對中國設備檢查和存儲數據的要求進行廣泛的解釋會增加成本，並可能使中國政府竊取其知識產權。

MADE IN CHINA  中國製造

Chinese policymakers believe that to be truly secure, China must achieve technological self-sufficiency.  Small wonder, then, that support for science and technology is front and center in the country’s most recent five-year plan, which began in 2016.  China’s investment in research and development has grown by an average of 20 percent a year since 1999.  It now stands at approximately $233 billion, or 20 percent of total world R & D spending.  More students graduate with science and engineering degrees in China than anywhere else in the world, and in 2018, China overtook the United States in terms of the total number of scientific publications.  Western scientists have long ignored Chinese research, but they are now citing a growing number of Chinese publications.

中國決策者認為，要真正做到安全，中國必須實現技術自給自足。因此，奇怪的是，對科學和技術的支持是該國最近五年計劃的前端和中心，該計劃始於2016年。自1999年以來，中國在研發方面的投資平均每年增長20％。現在約為2,330億美元，佔世界研發總支出的20％。中國的科學和工程學位畢業生比世界上任何其他地方都多，2018年，中國在科學出版物總數方面超過了美國。西方科學家長期以來一直忽視中國的研究，但他們現在引用了越來越多的中國出版物。

Three technologies will matter most for China’s ability to shape the future of cyberspace: semiconductors, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence.  For years, Beijing has tried and failed to build an indigenous industry producing semiconductors, that is, the integrated circuits (or microchips) found in nearly every technological device.  In 2016, China imported $228 billion worth of integrated circuits—more than it spent on imported oil—accounting for over 90 percent of its consumption, according to the consultancy McKinsey.  The risk of relying on U.S. suppliers was brought home this April, when the Trump administration sanctioned ZTE, the world’s fourth-largest maker of telecommunications gear.  ZTE relies on U.S.-made components, including microchips to power its wireless stations.  When the sanctions cut the company off from its supplies, it ceased major operations.  In June, Trump reversed course on the sanctions, but the move did little to assuage Chinese concerns about dependence on foreign suppliers.  Soon after the sanctions were announced, Xi called on a gathering of the country’s top scientists to make breakthroughs on core technologies.

對於中國塑造網路空間未來的能力，有三項技術將至關重要：半導體，量子計算和人工智慧。多年來，北京一直試圖建立一個生產半導體的本土工業，即幾乎所有技術設備中都存在的積體電路（或微晶片）。據麥肯錫顧問公司稱，2016年，中國進口了價值2280億美元的積體電路 - 超過其在進口石油上的支出 - 佔其消費量的90％以上。今年4月，當川普政府制裁全球第四大電信設備製造商中興通訊時，依賴美國供應商的風險被證實。中興通訊依靠美國製造的零組件，包括為其無線充電的微晶片。當制裁使公司停止供應時，它停止了主要業務。6月，川普改變了對制裁的態度，但此舉並沒有緩解中國對依賴外國供應商的擔憂。制裁宣布後不久，習近平呼籲該國頂級科學家聚集在一起，對核心技術進行突破。

China is striving to define international standards for the next wave of innovation

中國正在努力為下一波創新界定國際標準

In 2015, China issued guidelines that aim to get Chinese firms to produce 70 percent of the microchips used by Chinese industry by 2025.  Since then, the government has subsidized domestic and foreign companies that move their operations to China and encouraged domestic consumers to buy from only Chinese suppliers.  The government has committed $150 billion over the next decade to improve China’s ability to design and manufacture advanced microprocessors.  China has also acquired technologies abroad.  According to the Rhodium Group, a research firm, from 2013 to 2016, Chinese companies made 27 attempted bids for U.S. semiconductor companies worth more than $37 billion in total, compared with six deals worth $214 million from 2000 to 2013.  Yet these attempts have run into problems: many of the high-profile bids, including a $1.3 billion offer for Lattice Semiconductor and a $2.4 billion deal for Fairchild Semiconductor, were blocked by the U.S. government on national security grounds.

2015年，中國發布了讓中國企業到2025年生產中國工業使用的微晶片70％的指導方針。從那時起，政府補貼了將國內廠商與外國企業將業務轉移到中國，並鼓勵國內消費者只購買中國供應商的產品。政府在未來十年承諾投入1500億美元，以提高中國設計和製造先進微處理器的能力。中國也在國外獲得了技術。據研究公司Rhodium Group稱，從2013年到2016年，中國公司對美國半導體公司進行了27次招標，總價值超過370億美元，而2000年至2013年期間有6筆交易價值2.14億美元。但這些嘗試已經開始問題：許多引人注目的競標，包括13億美元的萊迪思半導體報價和24億美元的飛兆半導體交易，都被美國政府以國家安全為由阻止。

Then there is quantum computing, which uses the laws of quantum mechanics—essentially the ability of quantum bits, or “qubits,” to perform several calculations at the same time—to solve certain problems that ordinary computers cannot.  Advances in this area could allow Chinese intelligence services to create highly secure encrypted communications channels and break most conventional encryption.  High-speed quantum computers could also have major economic benefits, remaking manufacturing, data analytics, and the process of developing drugs.  In 2016, China launched the world’s first satellite that can communicate using channels secured by quantum cryptography and constructed the world’s longest quantum communications cable, connecting Beijing and Shanghai.  It’s not clear how much China spends on quantum computing, but the sums are certainly substantial.  It is spending $1 billion alone on one quantum computing laboratory.

然後是量子計算，它使用量子力學的定律 - 本質上是量子比特或「量子數位」的能力，以同時執行多個計算 - 以解決普通計算機無法解決的某些問題。該領域的進步可以使中國情報部門創建高度安全的加密通信管道，並打破大多數傳統加密技術。高速量子計算機也可以具有重大的經濟效益，重塑製造，數據分析和開發藥物的過程。2016年，中國發射了世界上第一顆以量子加密技術進行通信的衛星，並構建了連接北京和上海的世界上最長的量子通信電纜。目前尚不清楚中國在量子計算上花了多少錢，但總和絕對是實質性的。它僅在一個量子計算實驗室花費了10億美元。

More than its investments in semiconductor research and quantum computing, it is China’s ambitious plans in artificial intelligence that have caused the most unease in the West.  At an artificial intelligence summit last year, Eric Schmidt, the former chair of Google, said of the Chinese, “By 2020, they will have caught up.  By 2025, they will be better than us.  And by 2030, they will dominate the industries of AI.” China is racing to harness artificial intelligence for military uses, including autonomous drone swarms, software that can defend itself against cyberattacks, and programs that mine social media to predict political movements.

除了對半導體研究和量子計算的投資外，中國雄心勃勃的人工智慧計劃引起了西方人的最大不安。在去年舉行的人工智慧峰會上，谷歌前主席埃里克施密特對中國人說：「到2020年，他們將迎頭趕上。到2025年，他們將比我們更好。到2030年，他們將主宰人工智慧行業。」中國正在競相利用人工智慧進行軍事用途，包括自主無人機群，能夠抵禦網路攻擊的軟體，以及利用社交媒體預測政治運動的計劃。

In 2017, the Chinese government outlined its road map for turning itself into the “world’s primary AI innovation center” by 2030.  The plan is more a wish list than a concrete strategy, but it does provide direction to central ministries and local governments on how to invest to achieve breakthroughs by highlighting specific fields for research and development.  The government has singled out Baidu, Tencent, the e-commerce giant Alibaba, and the voice recognition software company iFLYTEK as national champions in AI, identifying these companies as the first group to develop systems that can drive autonomous cars, diagnose diseases, act as intelligent voice assistants, and manage smart cities, that is, urban spaces that use a wide variety of sensors to collect data on how people live and then analyze that data to reduce cities’ environmental impact, spur economic development, and improve people’s quality of life.

2017年，中國政府概述了其到2030年成為「世界主要人工智慧創新中心」的路線圖。該計劃更像是一個願望清單而非具體戰略，但它確實為中央部會和地方政府提供，如何指導透過突出研究和開發的特定領域來投資以實現突破。政府已經將百度，騰訊，電子商務巨頭阿里巴巴和語音識別軟體公司iFLYTEK列為人工智慧的全國冠軍，將這些公司確定為第一批開發自動駕駛汽車，診斷疾病的系統，智慧語音助手，管理智慧城市，即利用各種傳感器收集人們生活方式數據的城市空間，然後分析數據，減少城市的環境影響，刺激經濟發展，提高人們的生活質量。

China is also striving to define international standards for the next wave of innovation, especially in fifth-generation mobile network technology, or 5G, which will offer much faster Internet speeds to mobile users and enable new uses for Internet-connected devices.  To many Chinese leaders, China’s current place in the global division of labor looks like a trap: foreign firms reap high profits from the intellectual property they own, and Chinese companies survive on the thin margins they make by manufacturing and assembling physical products.  If China can control technology standards, it will ensure that its firms receive royalties and licensing profits as others develop products that plug into Chinese-owned platforms. 

中國還在努力為下一波創新定義國際標準，特別是第五代移動網路技術，即5G，它將為移動用戶提供更快的網路速度，並為網路連接設備提供新的用途。對於許多中國領導人來說，中國目前在全球勞動分工中的地位看起來像是一個陷阱：外國公司從他們所擁有的知識產權中獲取高額利潤，而中國公司則透過製造和組裝實物產品而獲得的利潤微薄。如果中國能夠控制技術標準，它將確保其公司獲得特許權使用費和許可利潤，因為其他公司開發的產品可以插入中國平台。

Over the last decade, Beijing has increased the skill, sophistication, and size of the delegations it sends to standards organizations.  China was essentially absent for the discussions about third- and fourth-generation mobile network technologies, but things have changed.  In 2016, Huawei, China’s largest telecommunications company, sent twice as many representatives as any other company to the meeting in Vienna that defined the specifications for the coming fifth generation of mobile networks. 

在過去十年中，北京增加了它向標準組織提交的代表團的技能，複雜程度和規模。中國基本上沒有參與有關第三代和第四代移動網路技術的討論，但情況發生了變化。2016年，中國最大的電信公司華為向維也納會議提交了兩倍於其他公司的代表，為即將到來的第五代移動網路制定了規範。

GOVERNING THE INTERNET  治理網路

Under Xi, China has also tried to shape the international institutions and norms that govern cyberspace.  For much of the last decade, Chinese hackers de facto set those norms by engaging in massive cyber-espionage campaigns designed to steal military, political, and, worst of all in the eyes of the United States, industrial secrets.  The Obama administration pressed Beijing on the subject, publicly attributing attacks on U.S. companies to state-backed hackers and threatening to sanction senior officials.  In 2015, the two sides agreed that neither would support digital theft for commercial advantage.  China went on to sign similar agreements with Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom.  There was a marked downturn in activity in the wake of these agreements, but the decline seems to have been as much a result of a reorganization within the Chinese military as of U.S. diplomatic efforts.  Now that the People’s Liberation Army has consolidated control over its cyber-forces, industrial espionage has shifted to more sophisticated hackers in China’s intelligence agencies. 

在習近平的領導下，中國也試圖塑造管理網路空間的國際機構和規範。在過去十年的大部分時間裡，中國駭客透過參與大規模的網路間諜活動，事實上設定了這些規範，旨在竊取軍事，政治，以及最糟糕的美國眼中的工業機密。歐巴馬政府向北京施加壓力，公開將對美國公司的攻擊歸咎於國家支持的駭客，並威脅要制裁高級官員。2015年，雙方同意不支持網數據盜竊以獲取商業優勢。中國與澳大利亞，加拿大，德國和英國簽署了類似的協議。在這些協議之後，活動明顯減少，但這種下降似乎與中國軍隊在美國外交努力中的重組一樣多。現在人民解放軍已經鞏固了對其網路力量的控制，工業間諜已經轉移到中國情報機構中更為成熟的駭客身上。

China’s more visible efforts at writing the rules of the road for cyberspace have centered on the UN.  Washington and its allies have promoted a distributed model of Internet governance that involves technical bodies, the private sector, civil society, and governments, whereas Beijing prefers a state-centric vision.  In 2017, for example, China called for “a multilateral approach to governing cyberspace, with the United Nations taking a leading role in building international consensus on rules.” Beijing believes a multilateral approach located at the UN has two immediate benefits.  It would prioritize the interests of governments over those of technology companies and civil society groups.  And it would allow China to mobilize the votes of developing countries, many of which would also like to control the Internet and the free flow of information.

中國在制訂網路空間道路規則方面做出的更為明顯的努力集中在聯合國。華盛頓及其盟國推動了一種分佈式的網路治理模式，涉及技術機構，私營部門，民間社會和政府，而北京更喜歡以國家為中心的願景。例如，2017年，中國呼籲「採取多邊方式管理網路空間，聯合國在建立國際規則共識方面發揮主導作用。」北京方面認為，聯合國的多邊方案有兩個直接的好處。它將優先考慮政府的利益，而不是技術公司和民間社會團體的利益。它將允許中國動員發展中國家的選票，其中許多國家也希望控制網路和資訊的自由流動。

Beijing has resisted U.S. efforts to apply international law, especially the laws of armed conflict, to cyberspace.  A forum at the UN known as the Group of Governmental Experts has identified some rules of behavior for states in a series of meetings and reports from 2004 to 2017.  Although in the 2013 report, Chinese diplomats accepted that international law and the UN Charter apply to cyberspace, and in 2015, they agreed to four norms of state behavior, they dragged their feet on discussions of exactly how neutrality, proportionality, the right of self-defense, and other concepts from international law might be applied to conflict in cyberspace.  They argued instead that discussing international law would lead to the militarization of cyberspace.  Chinese diplomats, along with their Russian counterparts, stressed the need for the peaceful settlement of disputes.In 2017, the participating countries in the Group of Governmental Experts failed to issue a follow-on report in part because China and Russia opposed language endorsing the right of self-defense.

北京一直抵制美國將國際法，特別是武裝衝突法應用於網路空間的努力。聯合國一個名為政府專家組的論壇在2004年至2017年的一系列會議和報告中確定了各州的一些行為準則。儘管在2013年的報告中，中國外交官承認國際法和〈聯合國憲章〉適用於網路空間，並在2015年，他們同意國家行為的四個規範，他們拖延討論中立性，相稱性，自衛權和國際法其他概念可能如何適用於網路空間的衝突。他們反而認為，討論國際法會導致網路空間的軍事化。中國外交官及其俄羅斯外交官強調和平解決爭端的必要性。2017年，政府專家組的參與國未能發布後續報告，部分原因是中國和俄羅斯反對支持自衛權利。

In addition to working through the UN, Chinese policymakers have created their own venue to showcase their vision for the Internet and strengthen their voice in its governance: the World Internet Conference, held annually in Wuzhen.  In 2017, Tim Cook and Sundar Pichai, the chief executives of Apple and Google, respectively, attended for the first time.  Cook, a vocal defender of privacy and free speech at home, stated that Apple shared China’s vision for “developing a digital economy for openness and shared benefits.” By echoing Chinese officials’ language on openness despite the tight controls on the Internet in China, Cook was signaling Apple’s willingness to play by Beijing’s rules. 

除了在聯合國工作之外，中國決策者還創建了自己的場所，以展示他們對網路的願景，並加強他們在治理方面的發言權：每年在烏鎮舉行的世界網路大會。2017年，蘋果和谷歌首席執行官蒂姆庫克和桑達皮採分別首次參加。庫克是家庭隱私和言論自由的聲音捍衛者，他表示，蘋果公司贊同中國「開放網數據經濟以實現開放和共享利益」的願景。儘管中國對網路實施嚴格控制，但中國官員的語言仍然是開放性的，庫克表示蘋果願意遵守北京的規則。

Beijing is likely to have its biggest impact on global Internet governance through its trade and investment policies, especially as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, a massive effort to build infrastructure connecting China to the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and Europe.  Along with the more than $50 billion that has flowed into railways, roads, pipelines, ports, mines, and utilities along the route, officials have stressed the need for Chinese companies to build a “digital Silk Road”: fiber-optic cables, mobile networks, satellite relay stations, data centers, and smart cities. 

北京可能透過其貿易和投資政策對全球網路治理產生最大影響，特別是作為「一帶一路」計劃的一部分，這是建設連接中國與印度洋，波斯灣和歐洲的基礎設施的巨大努力。隨著沿途鐵路，公路，管道，港口，礦山和公用事業的500多億美元，官員們強調中國公司需要建立「網數據絲綢之路」：光纖電纜，行動電話網路，衛星中繼站，數據中心和智慧城市。

Much of the activity along the nascent digital Silk Road has come from technology companies and industry alliances, not the Chinese government.  Alibaba has framed its expansion into Southeast Asia as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.  It has acquired the Pakistani e-commerce company Daraz and launched a digital free-trade zone with the support of the Malaysian and Thai governments, which will ease customs checks, provide logistical support for companies, and promote exports from small and medium-sized companies in Malaysia and Thailand to China.  ZTE now operates in over 50 of the 64 countries on the route of the Belt and Road Initiative.  As well as laying fiber-optic cables and setting up mobile networks, the company has been providing surveillance, mapping, cloud storage, and data analysis services to cities in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Laos, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Turkey.

新興網數據絲綢之路的大部分活動，來自科技公司和行業聯盟，而不是中國政府。作為「一帶一路」計劃的一部分，阿里巴巴已將其擴展到東南亞。它已經收購了巴基斯坦電子商務公司Daraz並在馬來西亞和泰國政府的支持下建立了網數據自由貿易區，這將減輕海關檢查，為公司提供後勤支持，並促進中小企業的出口在馬來西亞和泰國到中國。中興通訊現在在「一帶一路」倡議的64個國家中的50多個國家開展業務。除了鋪設光纖電纜和建立移動網路外，該公司還一直為衣索比亞，尼日，寮國，斯里蘭卡，蘇丹和土耳其的城市提供監控，測繪，雲端存儲和數據分析服務。

The Chinese government hopes that these enterprises will give it political influence throughout the region.  But private firms are focused on profit, and Beijing has not always succeeded in converting business relationships into political heft, even when the projects have involved state-run enterprises, since these firms also often pursue commercial interests that conflict with diplomatic goals.  In the short term, however, the presence of Chinese engineers, managers, and diplomats will reinforce a tendency among developing countries, especially those with authoritarian governments, to embrace China’s closed conception of the Internet. 

中國政府希望這些企業能夠在整個地區發揮政治影響力。但是，私營企業專注於利潤，即使項目涉及國有企業，北京並不總能成功地將商業關係轉化為政治關係，因為這些企業往往追求與外交目標相衝突的商業利益。然而，在短期內，中國工程師，管理人員和外交官的存在將加強發展中國家，特別是那些擁有威權政府的國家，採取中國對網路的封閉概念。

THE FUTURE IS CHINESE  未來屬於中國的

Beijing’s vision of the Internet is ascendant.  According to the think tank Freedom House, Internet freedom—how easily people can access the Internet and use it to speak their minds—has declined for the last seven years.  More countries are pushing companies to store data on their citizens within their borders (which companies resist because doing so raises costs and reduces their ability to protect the privacy of their users) and to allow the government to carry out security reviews of their network equipment.  Each country pursues these policies in support of its own ends, but they all can turn to China for material, technical, and political support. 

北京的網路願景正在上升。根據智庫自由之家的說法，網路自由 - 人們如何輕鬆地存取網路並用它來說出自己的想法 - 在過去的七年中已經有所下降。越來越多的國家正在推動公司在其境內存儲公民數據（公司拒絕這樣做會因為這樣做會增加成本並降低其保護用戶隱私的能力），並允許政府對其網路設備進行安全審查。每個國家都奉行這些政策以支持其自身目標，但他們都可以向中國尋求物質，技術和政治支持。

The United States’ position at the center of the global Internet brought it major economic, military, and intelligence benefits.  U.S. companies developed the routers and servers that carry the world’s data, the phones and personal computers that people use to communicate, and the software that serves as a gateway to the Internet.  In a similar way, the Chinese Communist Party sees technology companies as a source of economic dynamism and soft power.  And so it is increasing its political control over Chinese technology giants.  As those companies come to supply more of the world’s digital infrastructure, China’s spy services will be tempted to collect data from them.

美國在全球網路中心的地位為其帶來了重大的經濟，軍事和情報優勢。美國公司開發了攜帶世界數據的路由器和服務器，人們用來通信的電話和個人計算機，以及作為網路門戶的軟體。同樣，中國共產黨將科技公司視為經濟活力和軟實力的源泉。因此，它正在加強對中國科技巨頭的政治控制。隨著這些公司開始供應更多的全球網數據基礎設施，中國的間諜服務將很容易收集數據。

Chinese technology companies have several advantages: access to a lot of data with few restrictions on how they can use it, talented workers, and government support.  But the country’s legacy of central planning may lead companies to overinvest, build redundant operations, and stifle their employees’ creativity.  And Chinese technology firms have become the targets of political pressure in Australia, the United States, and Europe.  The Australian government is considering banning Huawei from supplying equipment for Australia’s fifth-generation mobile networks.  Washington is working to limit Chinese investment in U.S. technology companies and has made it more difficult for Chinese telecommunications firms to do business in the United States: it has blocked China Mobile’s application to provide telecommunications services in the United States, banned the sale of Huawei and ZTE smartphones on U.S. military bases, and sought to prohibit U.S. telecommunications companies from spending critical infrastructure funds on equipment and services from China.

中國的科技公司有幾個優勢：獲取大量數據，對如何使用它們，有才能的工人和政府支持幾乎沒有限制。但該國的中央計劃遺產可能導致公司過度投資，建立多餘的業務，並扼殺員工的創造力。中國的科技公司已經成為澳大利亞，美國和歐洲政治壓力的目標。澳大利亞政府正在考慮禁止華為為澳大利亞的第五代移動網路提供設備。華盛頓正在努力限制中國對美國科技公司的投資，並使中國電信公司在美國開展業務變得更加困難：它阻止了中國移動在美國提供電信服務的申請，禁止出售華為和中興通訊在美國軍事基地使用智慧手機，並試圖禁止美國電信公司將重要基礎設施資金用於中國的設備和服務。

Yet none of these challenges is likely to deal a fatal blow to China’s digital ambitions.  The country is too large, too powerful, and too sophisticated.  To prepare for greater Chinese control over the Internet, the United States should work with its allies and trading partners to pressure Beijing to open up the Chinese market to foreign companies, curb its preferential treatment of Chinese firms, and better protect foreign companies’ intellectual property.  U.S. policymakers should shift from simply defending the bottom-up, private-sector-led model of Internet governance to offering a positive vision that provides developing countries with realistic alternatives to working solely through the UN.  Washington should talk to Beijing directly about norms of state behavior in cyberspace.  The two countries should work together on setting global standards for government purchases of technology, determining how companies should secure their supply chains against cyberattacks, and planning government inspections of critical communications equipment.  Yet these efforts will only shape trends, not reverse them.  Whatever Washington does, the future of cyberspace will be much less American and much more Chinese.

然而，這些挑戰中沒有一個可能對中國的網數據野心造成致命打擊。這個國家太大，太強大，太複雜。為了讓中國更好地控制網路，美國應該與盟國和貿易夥伴合作，向北京施加壓力，向外國公司開放中國市場，遏制對中國企業的優惠待遇，更好地保護外國公司的知識產權。美國政策制定者，應該從簡單地捍衛自下而上的私營部門主導的網路治理模式，轉向提供一個積極的願景，為發展中國家提供僅透過聯合國工作的現實替代方案。華盛頓應該直接與北京談論網路空間中國家行為的規範。兩國應共同努力制訂政府採購技術的全球標準，確定公司應如何保護其供應鏈免受網路攻擊，以及規劃政府對關鍵通信設備的檢查。然而，這些努力只能塑造趨勢，而不是逆轉趨勢。無論華盛頓做什麼，網路空間的未來將遠不如美國人和更多的中國人。