1977.06.24〈國務卿范錫致卡特總統備忘錄〉 Taimocracy翻譯

【Comment】

感謝網友「路過的路人A」報知。

但是，2017年新的〈台灣旅行法〉大幅開放美國官員與台灣的交往。

顯然，情勢已經大幅改變。

茲翻譯如下：

Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, July 24, 1977

1977.06.24〈國務卿范錫致卡特總統備忘錄〉

SUBJECT

The Consequences and Likelihood of Taiwan Independence

This memorandum responds to your question on the subject.

Consequences of Taiwan Independence

主旨

台獨的後果與可能性

這份備忘錄回應了你關於「台獨的後果」這問題。

The People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China share the basic principle that Taiwan is a province of China.  Taiwan independence as viewed from both Peking and Taipei would entail changing Taiwan’s juridical status into a sovereign entity no longer acknowledging ties to China.

中華人民共和國和中華民國分享了台灣是中國一省的基本原則。從北京和台北看台灣獨立，雙方都將把改變台灣法律地位改，視為不再與中國聯繫的主權實體。

Taiwan’s declaration of independence would be a serious blow to our China policy.  Although the PRC is realistic about actual re-unification, international acceptance of the principle of one China of which Taiwan is a part has been a cardinal PRC foreign policy goal since its founding.  Our Shanghai Communiqué acknowledgment of this principle was an essential element in getting normalization under way, and Peking’s belief that we will remain a major influence on Taiwan’s future contributes to its interest in its relationship with us.

台灣的獨立宣言將嚴重打擊我們的中國政策。雖然中華人民共和國對實際統一是很現實的，但國際上接受一個中國原則，台灣是其一部份，是中華人民共和國成立以來的主要外交政策目標。我們的〈上海公報〉認知這一原則，是正常化進程中的一個要點，且北京堅信我們將繼續對台灣的未來產生重大影響，有助於其在美中關係之利益。

Peking would hold us responsible for a declaration of independence regardless of the facts.  It would insist that we not recognize Taiwan’s changed status.  Peking’s reaction would go beyond Sino-US relations.  It would pressure others to cut economic and any other relations they have with Taiwan, particularly troublesome for Japan.  It might undertake threatening military moves—the offshore islands are a convenient hostage for this—or declare a naval blockade of the island.

無論事實如何，北京認為我們應對獨立宣言負責。它堅持我們不得承認台灣地位的變化。北京的反應將超越中美關係。它會切斷經濟及與其他國家和台灣間之關係，特別是對造成日本麻煩。它可能會採取威脅性的軍事行動 - 離岸島嶼是現成的人質，或宣布對台灣進行海軍封鎖。

Likelihood of Such Action  這種行為的可能性

A ROC declaration of independence in the near term is not likely.  At a minimum, Taipei will want to see how normalization is further played out before even contemplating such a drastic move.  We are fairly optimistic that this undesirable scenario will not develop if, as planned, we take into account Taiwan’s requirements in carrying out normalization.  Moreover, the ROC leadership is cautious and prudent, traits particularly noticeable in Premier Chiang Ching-kuo.  The ROC realizes that in declaring independence it would face a provoked and determined PRC without assurance of support from the US.  As long as the leadership is left with some hope for the future, it will seek to preserve as many elements of the status quo as possible.  Its inclination toward prudence would be reinforced by the absence of any meaningful domestic pressures for independence and by the Premier’s reluctance to abandon his father’s (Chiang Kai-shek) legacy of one China.

近期中華民國獨立宣言不大可能。在採取如此激烈的舉動前，台北至少要考慮正常化要如何進一步發展。假使我們考慮到台灣實施正常化的條件，這種不良的情況將不致發展，我們對此相當樂觀。此外，中華民國領導層非常謹慎與慎重，此點蔣經國院長特別醒目。中華民國意識到，在宣布獨立時，它將在無美國支持下面對挑釁和堅決的中華人民共和國。只要領導曾對未來有些許希望，就會盡可能多地維持現狀。由於國內缺乏任何有意義的獨立壓力，和院長不願放棄他父親（蔣介石）一個中國的遺產，蔣經國的審慎傾向將得到加強。

We cannot completely rule out the possibility of the ROC’s declaring Taiwan independent.  Desperation engendered by the feeling that we were completely abandoning Taiwan in proceeding with normalization might provoke such a course.  However, as long as we continue by words and deeds to avoid such an impression, the ROC’s reaction to completion of normalization is likely to be confined to a formula designed to comfort Taiwan’s public by reference to its continued firm control of Taiwan while avoiding raising Taiwan’s status in a manner which might create problems with the US or PRC.

我們不能完全排除中華民國宣布台獨的可能性。對「我們在正常化中完全放棄台灣」之絕望感，可能鼓動這一過程。但，只要我們繼續避免用言行去造成這樣的印象，中華民國對完成正常化的反應，可能侷限於：透過持續其對台灣牢牢之控制，以安撫台灣公眾的方案中，從而能避免在美國與中華人民共和國間，台灣地位可能引發問題。

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 74, Agency: Box 3.  Secret; Nodis.  A handwritten “C” at the top of the page indicates Carter saw the memorandum.  Above that, someone wrote, “Obviously, no action.”

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d37