【Comment】
中國因為自知U形線不合乎國際法,索性造島並以島嶼為基礎建立軍事存在,更保留未來建立ADIZ了控制實力。
對此,我們不禁要問幾個國王新衣的問題:
島嶼建造到一半,中國能停嗎?答案是:不能。
島嶼造完了,空著嗎?答案是:當然要利用,特別是軍事利用。
它會再繼續造島嗎?答案是:會的,這是中國的跳島戰略,沙土長城。
那就挑戰美國的核心利益——公海的航行自由。
作者想定危險劇情:
1. 跳島戰略:美軍被攻擊,受損。ASEAN捲入,中國增兵、增艦。
2. 尬機或開火:中國宣布ADIZ,中國民族主義沸騰,美中誰都下不了台。
3. 潛艇誤撞或開火:「畫面」較為安靜,可以管理,但人命損失大。PLAN也會跨越第一島鏈威脅美軍。
作者說:中國造島行為,讓美國的航行自由主張看起來是在干預中國內政。
作者說:風險可否管理端賴習近平是否採取鷹派外交。實際上,中國國內政治壓力又影響其外交選擇。
作者說:北京,是否輕忽其行為的風險?甚至毫無所知,直到事情無法挽回?
3 Ways China and the U.S. Could
Go to War in the South China Sea○Robert Farley at National Interest
(2015.06.06)
Neither China nor the United States want war, at least not in the near
future. China’s military buildup notwithstanding, the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its components are not ready to fight the
United States. The U.S., for its part, would surely prefer to
avoid the chaos and uncertainty that any military conflict with China would
create.
Nevertheless, both China and the United States are making commitments in
the South China Sea that each may find difficult to back away from. Over
the past two weeks, these commitments have generated a
war of words that analysts of the relationship have found troubling. The
key problems focus on China’s efforts to expand (or create) islands in the
Spratlys, which could theoretically provide the
basis for claims to territorial waters.
The insistence of the United
States on freedom of navigation could bring these tensions to a boil. Here
are three ways in which tensions in the South China Sea might lead to conflict.
Island Hopping in the SCS
Over the past several months, China has stepped up construction of what
observers are calling “The Great Wall of Sand.”
This “great wall” involves expanding a group
of islands in the Spratly chain so that they can
support airstrips, weapons, and other permanent installations. It appears that Beijing is committed to defending these
new islands as an integral parts of Chinese territory, a position that the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea does not support. Washington has other ideas, and has maintained
that it will carry out freedom-of-navigation patrols in areas that China claims
as territorial waters.
The prospects for conflict are clear.
If U.S. ships or aircraft enter waters that China claims, then Chinese
sailors, soldiers, and pilots need to take great care about how they respond. A militarized response could quickly lead to escalation,
especially if American forces suffer any kind of serious damage. It’s
also easy to imagine scenarios in which island-building leads China to become
embroiled against an ASEAN state. In such a case, a freedom-of-navigation patrol
could put China in an awkward position relative to the third party.
Excitable Fighter Jocks
China and the United States have already come close to conflict over
aircraft collisions. When a P-3 Orion
collided a PLAN J-8 interceptor in 2001, it led to weeks of recriminations and
negotiation before the crew of the P-3 was returned to the United States, and
the plane was returned… in a box.
It’s easy to imagine an even more serious confrontation in the SCS. Another accidental collision would be bad
enough, but if a scenario developed similar to that of the downing of KAL 007,
with a Chinese fighter jock actually opening fire on an American plane, the
situation could get ugly very quickly. And if an American pilot fired upon a Chinese
plane, the reaction of the Chinese public could become too much for Beijing to
reasonably handle.
If China decides to go ahead and declare an ADIZ over the
South China Sea, matters could become
even more complicated. The United States made an elaborate display of
ignoring China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea, but China
has greater interests and a greater presence in the South China Sea. Another declaration would almost certainly
incur a similar reaction from the United States, putting
American and Chinese planes into close proximity.
Submarine Misunderstanding
In the Cold War, the Soviet Union and NATO suffered innumerable
submarine “near misses,” as boats hunted each other, and occasionally bumped
each other, in the Atlantic, the Arctic, and the North Sea. The
dynamics of U.S.-Chinese sub interaction hasn’t yet played out in quite the
same way, in part because China has yet to
establish a sustained SSBN patrol, and I part because Chinese boats do
not range as far as their Soviet counterparts.
But as the submarine force of the
PLAN becomes more adventurous, submarine incidents
may increase.
Many analysts are arguing that the PLAN
needs to push its submarines past the first island chain in order to
seriously threaten U.S. access to China’s littoral. Preparing for this would require increasing the tempo of
the PLAN’s submarine operations, which would more often put China’s
boats in proximity with Japanese and American subs. To be
sure, Chinese submarines are loud enough that U.S. oats should have plenty of time to get out of
their way, but the same could be said of Soviet boats for much of the Cold War.
If a major submarine incident happened
between the United States and China, the nature of the medium might offer some
hope for de-escalation (we often don’t hear about these accidents until much
later). But such an incident would also
put more lives and property at stake than a fighter collision.
Concluding Thoughts
Accidental war is rare, but not impossible. Common
to all of these scenarios is the potential that Chinese (or less likely,
American) public opinion might become so inflamed as to box in policymakers. If Xi Jinping,
who has made assertive foreign policy a cornerstone of his administration,
feels that he cannot back down and survive politically, then things could get
unpredictable very quickly.
As Denny Roy has argued, China is playing offense in the South China Sea. By establishing
facts on the ground (indeed, establishing “ground”), it is creating a situation in which normal U.S. behavior
looks like destabilizing intervention.
What’s less than clear is that Beijing fully
understands the risks of this strategy, or the dangers of pushing the United
States Navy on freedom of navigation, one of the long-term core interests of
the United States. And given that governments
sometimes don’t even understand that they’re playing a dangerous game until
they find themselves in the middle of it, a great deal of caution is warranted.
Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of
Diplomacy and International Commerce. His
work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money, Information
Dissemination and The Diplomat. Follow
him on Twitter:@drfarls [22].
教菲律賓, 越南, 馬來西亞造島, 把中國的島圍一圍, 玩零和遊戲.
回覆刪除大家都來造島, 都沾不到便宜, 是不是就平衡了?
然後秩序大亂??
刪除這是「負責任」者,所不應做,或至少不應該先做的。
有沒有網友認為習就是演戲給中國人看的?而戲裡的每一個角色,也許除了菲律賓,都樂意配合因為大家都想強化軍隊?而除了外交戲碼他其實也沒啥劇本好演了。
回覆刪除阿發
這看法,說得通。
刪除不過,造島所引起的麻煩,是確實存在的。
很難搞!
問題是~~~如何收拾??
回覆刪除1.中國停止不蓋..?
2.美國嘴砲喊喊就算了?
3.中美武裝衝突?
耐人尋味.....
如何收拾,是關鍵。
刪除還分表裡兩種,外交與國安官員要傷腦筋了
如何說服群眾,是一難題。
既然是強國了,如何又「不強」呢?
米國可以幫助菲律賓和越南增強防務爭取一些時間等待中國內部變化以外交介入(並期待中國缺錢養䕶,南中國海風浪自然消解掉這些人工島)。再不行,驅使越南代理(台日菲暗助)向中國開火打個不輸不贏可以各自表述(中國的二次懲越?)的局部衝突,破壞人工島上的設施,俄羅斯印尼米國再居中外交斡旋,繼續非武力的口水戰。
刪除