《2014年中國軍事及安全之發展》——第五章：中國針對台灣所進行的軍事現代化 SW翻譯 / 雲程校對

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光第一句話，就證實（支持）了小英的「海峽兩岸不止國共關係」的正確性，因為美國也是海峽的當事者。
小英更應該在訪美時向國會、國務院、國防部時不斷提及此正式報告中的第一句話。以證明自己的立場是接近美日安保。

《2014年中國軍事及安全之發展》

(美國國防部於2015年提交國會之年度報告)

第五章：中國針對台灣所進行的軍事現代化

Taimocracy翻譯校對

    台灣海峽的安全，主要是中國大陸、台灣、美國之間雙方及三方動態互動的作用。中國的對台戰略，向來受台灣政局及其與中國交往態度的影響，而目前中國認為台灣在這兩方面的發展很正面。然而，中國的整體戰略仍持續採取勸說及脅迫並進，阻嚇或抑制台灣內部的台獨政治傾向。至於擴展兩岸經貿及民間接觸，雙方頗有進展。

    中國高層在2012年馬英九連任台灣總統之後，對兩岸互動公開表示肯定，但中國對台軍事態度仍未見重大的改變跡象。人民解放軍已經發展並佈署軍事力量，用以脅迫台灣，或在必要時進犯台灣。這些軍力提升，對台灣的安全構成重大挑戰。台灣的安全向來仰仗：解放軍無法跨越100海浬寬的台灣海峽投射軍力；天然的海島防禦優勢；武裝軍隊的科技優勢；以及美國干預的可能性。

【中國的台海策略】

    中國顯然準備要推遲武力的使用，只要它認為統一仍是可能實現的遠程目標，而衝突則得不償失。中國辯稱，可信的武力威脅是維持政治進展的必要條件，並防止台灣走向法理獨立。數十年來，中國拒絕放棄使用武力解決台灣問題，雖然它同時也宣稱渴望在一國兩制原則之下達成和平統一。

    一直以來，隨著島上對自身政治地位的聲明、解放軍能力的改變、以及中國如何看待台灣與他國的關係，大陸發展出它威脅使用武力的各種情境。這些情境，亦即所謂的“紅線”，包括：

Ø   正式的台獨聲明；

Ø   不明確的台獨動作；

Ø   台灣內部動亂；

Ø   台灣取得核武器；

Ø   無限期地推遲兩岸統一的對話；

Ø   外國干預台灣內政; 以及

Ø   外國軍隊進駐台灣。

    2005年3月「反分裂國家法」第8條寫道，中國可能會使用「非和平手段」，如果「分裂勢力...... 導致台灣從中國分裂出去的事實」、「發生將會導致台灣從中國分裂出去的重大事變」、或者「和平統一的可能性完全喪失」。這些「紅線」的模糊，為中國保留了靈活度。

【中國對台行為】

    解放軍有能力對台灣進行日益精良的軍事行動。中國可能先謹慎的釋放準備要動武的信號，接著刻意集結軍力，以欺敵戰略牟求最快速度的交涉。另一種選擇是，放棄公開、大規模的準備行動，在其他國家做出反應之前奇襲，迫使達成軍事和/或政治解決。如果無法速戰速決，中國將尋求：

Ø   阻止美國可能的干預;

Ø   若無法阻止，則推遲其干預，並以不對稱、有限、快速戰爭的方式求取勝利；以及，

Ø   使戰爭僵滯，並在曠日費時的折衝之後達成政治協定。

    海上隔離或封鎖：除了直接的軍事接觸，解放軍的著作敘述了可能的替代解決方案----空中封鎖、導彈攻擊、埋設地雷，以迫使對方屈服。中國可能宣布駛往台灣的船隻必須在大陸港口先行接受檢查和/或轉運。中國也可能宣布在港口附近演習或導彈射擊而封鎖該區域，實際上等於關閉港口並阻止商船進入。人民解放軍在1995-96年的導彈射擊及實彈演習中就已經採取了這個方法。然而，中國可能會低估此舉造成的風險。任何限制往返台灣的海運的企圖，將引發同等強度的國際壓力，並升高軍事衝突。

    有限戰爭或脅迫手段：中國可能會利用各種破壞性、懲罰性、或致命性的軍事行動，對台灣發動有限戰爭，並可能結合公開或秘密的經濟與政治活動。此類戰爭可能包括破壞電腦網絡，或者對台灣的政治、軍事、經濟基礎設施作有限的強力攻擊，目的在引發台灣人的恐懼，並瓦解民眾對台灣領導者的信心。同樣地，解放軍特種作戰部隊也有可能滲入台灣，襲擊基礎設施或領導者。

    空中及導彈戰爭：中國可能利用導彈攻擊與精確射擊對付台灣的空防系統，包括空軍基地、雷達站、導彈、太空資產、與通訊設施。以此瓦解台灣的防衛，使台灣的領導失效，或者擊垮台灣人民的決心。

    兩棲入侵：不同的兩棲入侵操作概念，出現在公開可取得的中國著作中，其中最有名的「聯合海島登陸戰」預想了複雜的整套操作。這套操作仰賴互相協調而環環相扣的後勤、海、空支援，以及電子戰。其目標是突破或者繞過海岸防禦點，建立並構築灘頭陣地，運輸人員及物資至台灣西部或南部海岸線預定的登陸點，接著發動攻擊奪取並佔領首要目標和/或整個島嶼。

    解放軍有能力在不發動全面入侵的狀況下，完成各種兩棲作戰。不須在日常訓練之外進行明顯的軍事準備，中國即可侵佔台灣在南海所控制的小島，譬如東沙島或太平島。解放軍也有能力入侵中型、防衛較佳的離島，譬如馬祖或金門。此類侵略行為，一方面展示了軍事實力和政治決心，另一方面也可獲取實質的領土並同時表現一定程度的克制。然而，此類操作具有重大的，即使不是過高的，政治風險。因為它可能會激發台灣島上的台獨情緒，並招致國際反對。

    大型兩棲入侵是最複雜、困難的軍事行動之一。成功取決於空中和海上優勢、岸上補給的快速集結與維續、以及不間斷的支援。侵犯台灣將使中國的武裝軍力負擔沉重，並引發國際干預。這些壓力，加上中國戰鬥力的磨損，以及城市戰與反侵略戰的複雜性（假設登陸與突圍成功），都使得兩棲入侵台灣帶著重大的政治與軍事風險。而台灣在基礎設施及防禦能力方面的投資，也將阻撓中國達成目標。此外，中國似乎並未建構此類戰爭所需的傳統兩棲運輸。

【解放軍針對台海衝突的準備】

    為美國可能干涉的台海衝突做準備，仍然是中國軍事現代化計劃的主調。

    導彈部隊：第二砲兵部隊，進行著導彈攻擊與精確打擊的準備，目標是台灣的空防系統、空軍基地、雷達站、導彈、太空資產、指揮控制中心及通訊設施，企圖瓦解台灣的防禦能力，使台灣的領導失效，或摧毀公眾的戰鬥意志。

    空軍：解放軍的空軍一直保持著具有多方技能的戰鬥姿態，準備好在戰事發生時對付台灣。首先，它在毋需中途加油的距離內進駐了大批先進戰機，使它具備優異的能力足以對台發動具有空中優勢及對地攻擊能力的行動。第二，多套遠程防空系統提供了中國強大防禦網，以對抗反擊。第三，中國所發展的支援機，提供了進步的情監偵系統(ISR)，可支援中國空軍。

    海軍：解放軍海軍正在改進其防空及反艦作戰能力，建立可信的海上核武威懾力，並針對台灣設置了新的載台。額外的攻擊潛艇、多任務水面戰艦、以及第四代海軍戰機，都加入了海軍，為的是在第一島鏈之內取得海上優勢，同時阻嚇及對抗任何可能介入台灣衝突的第三方。

    地面部隊：配備了日益增加的現代化系統(譬如武裝攻擊直升機)，解放軍陸軍現在常進行聯合訓練軍演，演練犯台腳本。解放軍陸軍經常在全天候及夜間等真實情境之下，進行包括兩棲登陸等等操練。改良的網絡系統，在各單位對內及對外提供了即時的資料傳輸，使指揮控制(C2)更趨理想。此外，解放軍陸軍持續防衛先進的防空裝備，大為加強對C2要素及其他關鍵資產的守護，而這些資產極可能拿來對付台灣。由於解放軍陸軍所擁有的這些新系統的數量在成長，其兩棲入侵部隊抵擋反侵略者傳統及先進武器，以成功防守對岸兩棲據點的能力，將不可避免地提升。

【台灣的防禦能力】

    台灣歷來仰賴多項軍事的可變因素以阻嚇解放軍的侵略：解放軍無法跨越台灣海峽投射充裕的軍力；台灣軍隊的技術優勢；以及海島天然的地理防禦優勢。然而中國日益增加的現代化武器及載台（超過1,200枚的傳統彈道飛彈、反艦彈道飛彈系統、艦艇與潛艇、戰機、改良的C4ISR指管通資情監偵系統），已然侵蝕或抹滅了其中的許多優勢。

    台灣正在採取重要步驟，建立戰爭儲備，增強國防工業基礎，提高聯合作戰及危機處理能力，並強化官兵。這些改進措施，部分可解決台灣衰退的防禦優勢。台灣目前正在過渡到募兵制，並將兵力編制從275,000裁減至175,000人，意在創造「小而精良的軍隊」。在即將於2019年全面實施的這個計劃之下，裁減軍隊所省下來的成本，將騰出資源來增加志願役的薪資與福利，雖然這些經費並不足以支付志願役的費用。募兵制為了吸引並留下人才，已經造成額外的人事開銷，佔用了對外採購和自製武器的經費，還有近期的訓練與備戰經費。此外，台灣的軍費開支已下降到國內生產總值的2％左右。同時，中國官方國防預算已經增長到約台灣的10倍。意識到中國的軍費開支持續增長，台灣正在努力將創新、不對稱戰爭的概念，納入國防計畫，以制衡中國不斷增長的能力。

    美國對台政策源於一個中國的政策，基於三個聯合公報和台灣關係法（TRA）。美國的政策反對任何一方單方面改變台灣海峽的現狀。美國將繼續支持兩岸人民都能接受的和平解決方案。

    遵循臺灣關係法(TRA)，美國向來協助維護台海和平、安全、穩定，提供了國防用品及服務，以維持台灣足夠的自衛能力。為此，美國自2010年以來已經宣布了超過120億美元的對台軍售。

Military and Security Developments

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014

Chapter 5: Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency

Security in the Taiwan Strait is largely a function of dynamic interactions between and among mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. China’s strategy toward Taiwan has been influenced by what it sees as positive developments in Taiwan’s political situation and approach to engagement with China. However, China’s overall strategy continues to incorporate elements of persuasion and coercion to deter or repress the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence. China and Taiwan have made progress in expanding cross-Strait trade/economic links and people-to-people contacts.

Alongside positive public statements about the Taiwan Strait situation from top leaders in China following the re-election of President Ma Ying-jeou in 2012, there have been no signs that China’s military posture opposite Taiwan has changed significantly. The PLA has developed and deployed military capabilities to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has been based historically upon the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

CHINA’S STRATEGY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

China appears prepared to defer the use of force, as long as it believes that unification over the long term remains possible and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat to use force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and to prevent Taiwan from making moves toward de jure independence. China has refused for decades to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, despite simultaneously professing its desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems.”

The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island’s declarations of its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances, or “red lines,” have included:

Ø    Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;

Ø    Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;

Ø    Internal unrest on Taiwan;

Ø    Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;

Ø    Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;

Ø    Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and,

Ø    Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.

Article 8 of the March 2005 “Anti-Secession Law” states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China”; if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur; or, if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The ambiguity of these “redlines” preserves China’s flexibility.

CHINA’S COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN

The PLA is capable of increasingly sophisticated military action against Taiwan. It is possible China would first pursue a measured approach characterized by signaling its readiness to use force, followed by a deliberate buildup of force to optimize the speed of engagement over strategic deception. Another option is that China would sacrifice overt, large-scale preparations in favor of surprise to force rapid military and/or political resolution before other countries could respond. If a quick resolution is not possible, China would seek to:

Ø    Deter potential U.S. intervention;

Ø    Failing that, delay intervention and seek victory in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; and,

Ø    Fight to a standstill and pursue a political settlement after a protracted conflict.

Maritime Quarantine or Blockade. In addition to direct military engagement, PLA writings describe potential alternative solutions — air blockades, missile attacks, and mining to force capitulation. China could declare that ships en route to Taiwan must stop in mainland ports for inspection and/or transshipment prior to transiting to Taiwan ports. China could also attempt the equivalent of a blockade by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches to ports, in effect closing port access and diverting merchant traffic. The PLA employed this method during the 1995-96 missile firings and live-fire exercises. There is a risk, however, that China would underestimate the degree to which any attempt to limit maritime traffic to and from Taiwan would trigger countervailing international pressure and military escalation.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. China might use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, likely in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the populace’s confidence in the Taiwan leadership. Similarly, PLA special operations forces could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. China could use missile attacks and precision strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the Taiwan people’s resolve.

Amphibious Invasion. Publicly available Chinese writings describe different operational concepts for amphibious invasion. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air, and naval support, and EW. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets and/or the entire island.

The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-held islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better defended offshore island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within China’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability and political resolve while achieving tangible territorial gain and simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation includes significant, if not prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate international opposition.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations. Success depends upon air and sea superiority, rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies on shore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would strain China’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with China’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency (assuming a successful landing and breakout), make amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. Taiwan’s investments to harden infrastructure and strengthen defensive capabilities could also decrease China’s ability to achieve its objectives. Moreover, China does not appear to be building the conventional amphibious lift required to support such a campaign.

THE PLA’S CURRENT POSTURE FOR A TAIWAN CONFLICT

Preparation for a Taiwan conflict with the possibility of U.S. intervention continues to dominate China’s military modernization program.

Missile Forces. The Second Artillery Force is prepared to conduct missile attacks and precision strikes against Taiwan’s air defense systems, air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and C2 and communications facilities, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight.

Air Forces. The PLA Air Force has maintained a force posture that provides it with a variety of capabilities to leverage against Taiwan in a contingency. First, it has stationed a large number of advanced aircraft within an unrefueled range of Taiwan, providing them with a significant capability to conduct air superiority and ground attack operations against Taiwan. Second, a number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense of China’s mainland against a counterattack. Third, China’s development of support aircraft provide it improved ISR to support PLAAF operations in a contingency.

Navy Forces. The PLA Navy is improving anti-air and anti-surface warfare capabilities, developing a credible at-sea nuclear deterrent, and introducing new platforms that are positioned to strike Taiwan in a cross-Strait conflict. The additional attack submarines, multi-mission surface combatants, and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve sea superiority within the first island chain as well as deter and counter any potential third party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

Ground Forces. Increasingly armed with more modern systems such as armed attack helicopters, the PLA Army is conducting joint training exercises that will prepare them for a Taiwan invasion scenario. The PLA Army often conducts training, including amphibious landing training, under realistic conditions, including all-weather and at night. Improved networks provide real-time data transmissions within and between units, enabling better C2 during operations. Additionally, the PLA Army’s ongoing fielding of advanced air defense equipment is significantly enhancing the self-defense of key C2 elements and other critical assets assessed as likely tasked for potential use against Taiwan. As the number of these new systems grows in the PLA Army, the ability of an amphibious invasion force to defend cross-Strait amphibious lodgments successfully against counterattacks by both legacy and advanced weaponry will inevitably increase.

TAIWAN’S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES

Taiwan has historically relied upon multiple military variables to deter PLA aggression: the PLA’s inability to project sufficient power across the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwan military’s technological superiority, and the inherent geographic advantages of island defense. China’s increasingly modern weapons and platforms (more than 1,200 conventional ballistic missiles, an ASBM program, ships and submarines, combat aircraft, and improved C4ISR capabilities) have eroded or negated many of these factors.

Taiwan is taking important steps to build its war reserve stocks, grow its defense industrial base, improve joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthen its officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. These improvements partially address Taiwan’s declining defensive advantages. Taiwan is following through with its transition to a volunteer military and reducing its active military end-strength from 275,000 to approximately 175,000 personnel to create a “small but smart and strong force.” Under this plan, which is slated for full implementation in 2019, the cost savings from a smaller force will free up resources to increase volunteer salaries and benefits, although these savings will not be sufficient to cover the costs of volunteers. The transition has led to additional personnel costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the volunteer system, diverting funds from foreign and indigenous acquisition programs, as well as near-term training and readiness. In addition, Taiwan military spending has dropped to approximately 2 percent of GDP. Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget has grown to roughly 10 times that of Taiwan’s. Recognizing China’s continued growth in military spending, Taiwan is working to integrate innovative and asymmetric measures into its defense planning in order to counter-balance China’s growing capabilities.

U.S. policy toward Taiwan derives from its One-China Policy, based on the three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). United States policy opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by either side. The U.S. continues to support peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States has helped to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. To this end, the United States has announced more than $12 billion in arms sales to Taiwan since 2010.