小英，最後有幾里路？

【Comment】

「九二共識」也的確是發明者蘇起承認的「政治包裝」，一種承認各說各話（agree to disagree）的外交話術。

只剩修憲功能的國民大會選舉於1991年12月21日舉行，任期從1992年元旦起算。

真正具有立法機構功能的中華民國立法院，首次立法委員全面改選（第二屆）於1992年12月19日舉行。

1992年11月3日的香港會談，形式上的確是「政權對政權」的間接談判。但1992年的總統在1990年5月20日就任，其選民仍是萬年國大（直到1996年總統直選）。

無論葛來儀與卜睿哲對「九二共識」本質的意見是否相同，但對於蔡英文的疑慮卻是一致的。這點令人不安。

卜睿哲不認同九二共識是黨對黨協議○自由 (2015.02.07) http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1226875

〔駐美特派員曹郁芬／華府六日報導〕布魯金斯東北亞中心主任卜睿哲今天表示，九二共識是由中華民國與中華人民共和國兩個政府授權的機構所達成的，他不認為這是兩個政黨間的協議。

戰略暨國際研究中心資深研究員葛來儀上週曾表示，九二共識是國民黨與共產黨之間達成的共識，中國應該和民進黨建立新的共識。卜睿哲今天在研討會後被問到這個問題時提出不同看法。

卜睿哲說，相信民進黨主席蔡英文仍在擬定兩岸政策，她還有一年時間，也瞭解這是必要任務，詳細內容還得等待。美方「在定義上」不反對民進黨，但關切民進黨所提出的政策，美國官員對台灣兩黨提出的政策有高度興趣。

美國東亞助卿羅素日前才表示，美國不對國境以外的選舉議題採取立場，和台灣的朝野政黨都會繼續保持溝通，美國會等待台灣人民決定自己的領導人，不過他說，美台關係過去發展良好是因為兩岸關係的進展。

對於國安會秘書長金溥聰請辭，卜睿哲表示，馬英九高度評價金的能力與忠誠，金也貫徹執行總統的政策，他沒有理由懷疑金的離任還有其它原因。卜睿哲說，相信國民黨很清楚自己必須好好整頓，特別是黨主席朱立倫。至於台灣的政治發展，一切都言之過早，國民黨的實力與靭性從來都不是由一人決定，國民黨內有許多人才，大家需拭目以待。

Richard Bush 可能的發言場合（但我只找到類似的，從1：26起的問答）

China’s Rise: Implications for U.S. National Security and the Defense Budget on 2015.02.06 at the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, the Brookings Institute

Audio  China’s Rise: Implications for U.S. National Security and the Defense Budget

US doesn't take position on Taiwan's elections: official

Describing cross-Taiwan Strait relations as “one of the things that make the U.S.-Taiwan relationship productive” in recent years, Russel said Washington supports, welcomes and facilitates cross-strait ties.

Bonnie Glaser’ comment on 1129 election  2014.12.01

Today, Tsai still rejects the “1992 Consensus” and is unclear about her China policy, though she favors cross-strait dialogue and cooperation.  Her basic position is that Taiwan’s future should be decided by its 23 million people and independence should remain an option.  In an interview last July, Tsai said that Beijing would be compelled to adjust its strategy toward the DPP if the party performed well in the local elections.

The most likely and strongest KMT presidential candidate is Eric Chu, who was just re-elected for a second term as mayor of New Taipei City by a razor thin margin of less than 25,000 votes (1.28 percentage points).  Chu has not articulated a policy toward Mainland China, but it is likely that he would not stray too far from the current policies pursued by Ma Ying-jeou.

Q4: What are the implications for U.S.-Taiwan relations and cross-strait relations?

A4: U.S.-Taiwan relations will not be significantly affected by this election.  The Obama administration will probably strengthen communication with the DPP.  When Chair Tsai visits Washington in February, U.S. officials will probably encourage her to find ways to narrow her party's differences with the Mainland.  The United States has an interest in the preservation of stable cross-strait relations and believes it is best if problem solving approaches are adopted by both sides of the strait and communication channels remain open.  Prior to the 2012 presidential election, a senior Obama administration official told the Financial Times after meeting with Tsai that there were “doubts about whether she is both willing and able to continue stability in cross-strait relations.”

Beijing is likely quite worried about the DPP's significant victory and the setback for the KMT.  Mainland China fears the return of the DPP to the presidency.  When Chen Shui-bian, the first and only DPP president, was in power from 2000-2008 he pursued provocative, pro-independence policies that agitated Beijing and increased tensions.  Xi Jinping supports the policy of “peaceful development’ conditioned on opposing Taiwan independence and upholding the “1992 Consensus” designed by his predecessor Hu Jintao.  Xi has also reminded Taiwan’s citizens that the Mainland’s goal is to reunify with the island under a variation of the “one country, two systems” formula that was applied to Hong Kong.  In the near-term, Beijing is unlikely to alter its Taiwan policy. Progress in cross-strait relations is beginning to stall, but a reversal is unlikely during Ma’s tenure.  As the presidential elections near, if the DPP does not accept some formulation of “one China,” Beijing is likely to criticize the party and Tsai harshly, and may take various measures to attempt to prevent a DPP victory in 2016.

http://csis.org/publication/analysis-taiwans-nine-one-local-elections