假使101變軍火倉庫？評：Commentary: The Gradual Undermining of Taiwan○Defense News

【Comment】

如同作者所言，2014年300萬中國觀光客中只要1％就是3萬，足以成為解放軍祕密部署侵台前導部隊。

實際上，是期間存量的概念。

中國觀光客來台的時間多半為一週。年間300萬，則一週的人數為5.76萬。

一車50人，藏5個解放軍，就是1/10，外表看不太出來。意即可能隨時有5,000-6,000名解放軍在台灣。

自由行的旅客，另外算。

這些人來來去去無所謂，重要是讓人民、政府，特別是山姆習慣。

重要是存量，要維持5,000-6,000名解放軍在台。若時多時少，則增加到10,000人，也不是難事。

我曾經不只一次見過中國觀光團，其中有半數為年輕、壯碩、理平頭的男性，好像前年中國反日遊行中喊打喊殺的那些人。

這些人在上班時間來台灣觀光？或「來台觀光」反而是「上班」？

至於武器，只要取得輕武器即可制伏中樞機關，配合一條龍經營的遊覽車。哪裡都去得成，只要同時多點攻擊，保證台灣手忙腳亂。

輕武器哪裡來？

文章說：「一般的海運走私反坦克飛彈，或是可攜式防空系統（MANPADs）」，「未來的自由經濟示範區可望讓走私武器入台更為簡單。」

輕武器要擺在哪裡？

一定是觀光區，中國客可輕易集中又不被起疑台北最好，基地附近也成。

101空間多，當然是一個最理想地點。我是解放軍，我一定要取得所有權、經營權。

大巨蛋也很好，地下層空間多。

忠烈祠旁邊是海總，再過去是國防部；故宮附近有中影，兩者都近恆山指揮所。野柳附近有萬里，山上也有「好東西」。

台南學甲中國出資的超大冷凍倉庫，也很好用。

七星潭附近，也多得是農舍。等等

配備輕武器的數千人可以制服台北市政府、總統府，癱瘓捷運路網、滲透機場、松指部、戰管中心，並逐步搶得重武器。只要等上1天，可以獲得解放軍後援。

最後兩段的「想定」牽涉外部政治效應。

北京軍事上可能的抉擇是

First, sending forces to disrupt China's operations in Taiwan would require US political decisions.

Second, Beijing could deploy a certain level of military presence close to Okinawa in order to pin down the US forces.

Without external intervention, organized resistance in the rest of Taiwan would not last long, and guerrilla warfare could be strategically meaningless.

但馬英九還在繼續開放中國客的上限。

Welcome to the real world.

競選開始了嗎？

Taipei's increasingly cooperative attitude toward Beijing since 2008 makes such a scenario unlikely unless a more independence-oriented administration forms in Taipei.¦

美《國防新聞》︰共軍喬裝遊客來台 可輕取國軍基地○自由 (2015.02.11) http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/paper/855031

松機、桃機間建立共軍空中走廊

〔編譯李信漢／綜合報導〕美國《國防新聞》九日刊登新加坡南洋理工大學「拉惹勒南國際關係學院」（RSIS）研究員吳尚蘇的評論文，指出台灣對中國的開放政策導致大批中國旅客來台，給予解放軍祕密部署侵台前導部隊的機會。一旦解放軍發動攻擊，埋伏在台的「第五縱隊」可輕易奪下國軍基地，並在松山機場和桃園機場間建立「空中走廊」，供解放軍快速輸送後援部隊。

去年300萬中國客 逾1％是臥底部隊

評論文指出，光是在一四年就有超過三百萬的中國旅客訪台。吳尚蘇認為，其中有超過一％的中國旅客可能涉入對台軍事行動。而這些偽裝成一般旅客的臥底部隊，可能對台北當局造成意想不到的傷害。吳尚蘇認為，台灣在二○○八年之後和中國日趨合作的態度，使得這種狀況不太可能出現，除非未來台灣出現一個傾向獨立的政府。

現在為方便兩岸經貿往來，台灣海關對於入境的中國旅客及貨物僅施以簡便的檢查，這給予解放軍可利用的機會。比如，解放軍可利用一般的海運走私反坦克飛彈，或是可攜式防空系統（MANPADs）。未來的自由經濟示範區可望讓走私武器入台更為簡單。此外，大多數的台灣軍事基地防禦能力不良，潛伏的「第五縱隊」可能趁機奪取基地中的武器和彈藥。

而這支「第五縱隊」只要取得基本的火力就可以癱瘓指揮部門和台灣的防空網路，為空襲行動鋪路。再則，儘管台灣的領導人身邊有警衛保護，但他們通常很容易受到攻擊或暗殺。一旦領導人陣亡，群龍無首的情況將嚴重影響軍事決策機制。另外，台灣數量有限的雷達站、地對空飛彈很容易受到地面攻擊，只要摧毀這些基地外露的天線，就可以顯著縮減其戰力；空軍基地也很容易遭到可攜式防空系統與狙擊手的封鎖，無法讓戰機升空執行任務。

若拿下台北 美軍可能不敢回應

若解放軍的首波攻擊順利拿下台北，接下來的挑戰就是合法性和美國的干涉。吳尚蘇認為，近年來不論是泛藍還是泛綠政治人物，都在中國取得了政治和經濟上的利益。因此，北京要在台灣找到一個「賣國賊」組成臨時政府、聽命北京，並不是件難事。

在美國的干涉問題上，屆時部署在沖繩的美軍可能會受到解放軍的牽制而不敢輕舉妄動。華府也會謹慎評估是否要冒險與中國起衝突。一旦美軍決定不予回應，台灣的反抗就會變成「反叛」，台海戰事亦將成為一個地區內戰。

Commentary: The Gradual Undermining of Taiwan○Defense News (2015.02.09) http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/02/09/commentary-gradual-undermining-taiwan/23128393/

China's biggest challenge to invading Taiwan has been the ability to project force across the Taiwan Strait and establish a fait accompli there, but the political transformation in the latter significantly eases the former's difficulties.

Taipei's increasingly open policies to Beijing have opened more channels for Chinese to visit the island, such as for tourism, education, employment, commerce and so on.  More than 3 million Chinese visited Taiwan in 2014; such a huge number presents the People's Liberation Army (PLA) a great opportunity to dispose "undercover" troops prior to invasion.  Only 1 percent of Chinese visitors is tantamount to two divisions and more than 1 percent of those visitors could be involved in a military action against Taiwan.  Their non-combatant guise could create more strategic and tactical surprises to Taipei than regular troops.

Although the PLA's "forward deployed" units would not bring their equipment during trips, smuggling and local capture could supply light arms and more.  To facilitate efficient trade, Taiwan's customs officials can only check a limited number of containers and other cargo, not to mention conducting comprehensive exams inside.

Thus, firearms, anti-tank guided missiles and man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs) may be smuggled through regular sea transport.  Taiwan's upcoming free economic pilot zone, intended to ease trade restrictions, may provide an easier access to smuggle arms due to simplified import processes.

In addition, fishing boats, which have been used by local gangsters for decades, provide some access to light weapons.

Most military bases in Taiwan are not defended well.  Unless alerted, most personnel inside are unarmed.  The limited number of armed guards and contingent units in their fixed locations would be in an inferior tactical position.  As a result, weapons and ammunition could be captured from local military bases.

This Chinese "fifth column," with only basic firepower, could paralyze the command chain and neutralize Taiwan's air defense network, helping pave the way for an airborne invasion.  And despite being protected by bodyguards, Taiwan's political leaders are usually vulnerable to assaults or assassination.

With relatively sufficient force, the concealed Chinese units may even be able to launch simultaneous attacks on most key positions and annihilate, or at least disable, the political leadership.  The lack of political decision-making would hamper the military command chain.

As for Taiwan's air defense network, the limited number of radar stations and surface-to-air missile sites are vulnerable to ground attack, because destroying their exposed antennas would significantly decrease their capabilities, and a few air bases stationed with fighters could be blockaded by MANPADs and snipers.

Furthermore, the Chinese fifth column does not need to attack all targets of Taiwan's air defense network but only establish an air corridor to the Songshan airport in downtown Taipei City, perhaps including the Taoyuan airport.  As long as the air corridor is open, the PLA's airborne Army and other units can rapidly reinforce their pioneers with transporter aircraft and civilian passenger liners.

After securing the capital, the following challenges would be the legitimacy and the potential US intervention.

Since 2008, many political elites in Taiwan, both "pan-blue" and "pan-green," have gained their political and economic interests in and from China.  Thus, it would not be very difficult for Beijing to find one or more "quislings" to form a temporary regime under the former's direct control.

Under the "one China" policy, this regime could be named Taiwan "provincial" or "district" government to display its subordination to the central authority of Beijing.  As a result, the resistance in Taiwan would become a rebellion — a domestic affair.

Regarding any American intervention, US military units in Okinawa and other adjacent locations would have a chance to stop this scenario but face several constraints.  First, sending forces to disrupt China's operations in Taiwan would require US political decisions.  The potential for heavy casualties in armed conflict with China could cause hesitation, causing the military to miss its window of response.

Second, Beijing could deploy a certain level of military presence close to Okinawa in order to pin down the US forces.  This would force front-line US commanders to decide whether to carry out intervention or defend their own bases.  Without external intervention, organized resistance in the rest of Taiwan would not last long, and guerrilla warfare could be strategically meaningless.

Taipei's increasingly cooperative attitude toward Beijing since 2008 makes such a scenario unlikely unless a more independence-oriented administration forms in Taipei.¦

__________

Wu Shang-Su is a research fellow in the Military Studies Program at the S.  Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.