網頁

2014-12-23

12/22,朝鮮網路斷訊9.5小時

 Comment
奇怪,朝鮮算是世界上顯著的網路部隊國家,可是本國網路設施卻很原始。
原始?直觀是不會受到攻擊的影響。但,其網路數量很少,只有4個(人口數與朝鮮類似的台灣,網路數達5030個),集中管理,其技術與路徑又只依賴中國China Unicom,是網路戰中的脆弱國家


這樣脆弱的國家對外發動網路戰,很敢~只能當打手。
這次算是朝鮮網路實力被摸底!


North Korea went off the Internet Monday, 22 December 2014, at 16:15 UTC (01:15 UTC Tuesday in Pyongyang) after more than 24 hours of sustained weekend instability.  Dyn continually measures the connectivity and performance of more than 510,000 individual networks worldwide, identifying impairments to Internet commerce.  It’s a rare event these days when an entire country leaves the Internet (as Egypt did, or Syria).  Even so, when North Korea’s four networks went dark, we were not entirely surprised, based on the fragility of their national connectivity to the global Internet.

Who caused this, and how?  A long pattern of up-and-down connectivity, followed by a total outage, seems consistent with a fragile network under external attack.  But it’s also consistent with more common causes, such as power problems.  Point causes such as breaks in fiberoptic cables, or deliberate upstream provider disconnections, seem less likely because they don’t generate prolonged instability before a total failure.  We can only guess.  The data themselves don’t speak to motivations, or distinguish human factors from physical infrastructure problems.

As the sun rises in Pyongyang, the national Internet disconnection continues.  An outage of this duration is not without precedent for North Korea.  As we’ve written before, countries that have a very limited set of international connections are more likely than their better-connected counterparts to suffer from nation-scale disconnections, regardless of the cause.

In this case, North Korea has significantly less Internet to lose, compared to other countries with similar populations: Yemen (47 networks), Afghanistan (370 networks), or Taiwan (5,030 networks).  And unlike these countries, North Korea maintains dependence on a single international provider, China Unicom.  That’s a fragile state of affairs.

Update: All four North Korean prefixes have been restored to service at 01:46 UTC, after a national outage of nine and a half hours.  Traffic is routing through China Unicom, just as before.


4 則留言:

  1. 經過長時間的觀察,Google Blogger的留言,只要刪除任一留言,右方的留言欄酒會整個不見。
    一直到,完全刪除,才會再度出現。
    請大家注意一下這現象。

    回覆刪除
  2. 如果沒猜錯,朝鮮的網路攻擊並非本國人力培植出來,而是"用錢買就有",也許是解放網軍的經費外快。
    說到這個,突然發現我所知道的北韓在中國留學生(包含軍事交流),數量質都完全不知道。

    回覆刪除
  3. 作者已經移除這則留言。

    回覆刪除
  4. 這篇只有口述,沒有實證,照片也許是其他軍事設施單位的照片,可信度與還原度有點折扣。

    揭秘北韓 121 局:駭客培養基地
    作者 雷鋒網 | 發布日期 2014 年 12 月 26 日 | 分類 資訊安全

    http://technews.tw/2014/12/26/we-spoke-to-a-north-korean-defector-who-trained-with-its-hackers-what-he-said-is-pretty-scary/

    回覆刪除

請網友務必留下一致且可辨識的稱謂
顧及閱讀舒適性,段與段間請空一行