Encouraged Impetuosity by Taimocracy (2014.04.07)

Encouraged Impetuosity

by Taimocracy

Around 1988, the year of the demise of Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, the world was undergoing drastic changes.

  The Soviet Union dissolved, and People’s Republic of China began to rise as an economic power that sucked up tremendous capital around the world.  To dilute the economic impact and protect Taiwan from being drained up by China, successive President Lee Teng-hui adopted conservative policies in cross-Strait commerce.  As Lee safely piloted vibrant Taiwan economy under the threat of her waking giant neighbor, he did try to initiate contact with China and managed to conclude a few pragmatic agreements, including the later distorted consensus to “agree to disagree.”

However, the new sprout was upset by the emergence of the third Taiwan Strait Crisis, in which China conducted missiles tests and military maneuvers to deter Taiwan’s first direct presidential election.  The semi-official contact finally closed down in 1999, after Lee proposed “special state-to-state theory.” The third Wang-Koo Summit, scheduled to occur in Taipei, was therefore canceled and Wang Daohan (汪道涵) missed the chance to put his feet on Taiwan, the subtle meaning of which would have been presented as Taiwan being part of China.

Bolder than his predecessor, President Chen Shui-bian challenged the status quo and switched Lee’s economy-security mode to one that openly advocated independence and refused to shy away from competing with China on the global stage or doing business.  Investments in China were encouraged and cross-strait interaction pressed on.  Continuous official contacts finally resulted in Taiwan, as an independent customs territory, and China joining WTO on the same day in 2009.  Nonetheless, Chen’s radical pro-independence position totally upset Beijing and Washington.  The former passed Anti-Secession Law in 2005, and the latter tried every way to avoid the possibility of a military conflict that might involve the US.  And that was the perfect stage for Ma Ying-jeou to fulfill his “Great China” nationalism and personal heroism. 

When Ma was elected President of Taiwan, he was ardently expected to make up for the damage supposed to be done by Chen.  Ma was too earnest and too sweet to disappoint Beijing or Washington.  Less than a month after he took office, he approved direct flights and tourism, which had actually been scrutinized by the Chen Government for quite a while.  In less than six months, China’s special envoy was greeted by both the government and the “mob” in Taipei.  Two years into Ma’s first term, ECFA was signed in spite of domestic protest.

While Ma’s efforts to improve cross-strait relationships were highly valued by Washington, scholars like Bonnie Glaser noticed that there was neither an English version of ECFA nor a formal report to WTO.  ECFA seems to be more like a secret agreement across the Strait.

Viewed from a regional perspective, Taiwan’s agreements with any other territory have much to do with the security in Western Pacific.  And that security also significantly lies in Taiwan’s domestic political stability.  Unfortunately, most inhabitants in Taiwan have flunked Ma in both diplomacy and domestic administration.

For a small island like Taiwan to interact with a big power like China, confidence on Taiwan’s part is the premise.  This essential confidence breeds from a strong economy and effective defense.  Yet, as if to doom the economic structure, Ma substantially lowered inheritance tax and corporate income tax once he took the office, but failed to create new industries to accommodate the huge backflow of capital.  The result is a devastating soaring of estate prices, which in turn spurred a drop in wage and a rising unemployment rate.  The income average in 2013 is back to the 1997 level.  Social instability followed.

Ma also seems to aim at weakening Taiwan’s other factor of confidence—defensive ability.  Before he took office in 2008, Ma the KMT Chairman instructed his party legislators, the absolute congress majority, to deter defense budget for more than 200 times.  After he became President of Taiwan, Ma switched the compulsory recruitment to a mercenary system, under the objection of Defense Department.  Now, once regional conflicts rise, Taiwan might prove to be a liability rather than an asset. 

Without the vital factors of confidence, Taiwan is utterly vulnerable in dealing with China.  However, through his confidant King Pu-tsung, Ma claimed to Washington in 2011 that he was determined to reach a political agreement with China in ten years.  He denied later, of course, but did not slow down his negotiations with China, despite the widely-expected difficulty at the political level.

Secret diplomacy has been Ma’s key to his old game.  He is used to negotiating and concluding agreements with Beijing without noticing related individuals or institutes, such as congress or industry leaders.  And then his majority comrades will pass his deals in appointed time. 

The practice was quite successful until students were enraged and launched the student protest dubbed “Sunflower Movement” in mid-March. 

Secret diplomacy is definitely not the students’ dish.  They fear that the huge inflow of Chinese money might further rocket the already-unaffordable house prices and that the aggressive inflow of Chinese workers might take jobs from young Taiwanese.  In fact, according to a TVBS survey, almost half of the young people are considering finding better jobs abroad.  Yet, a still bleaker vision than hard living is the loss of democracy, the democracy that has sacrificed countless lives under the rule of KMT.  The desperate students had no choice but to occupy the legislature chamber.

For the students cultivated by democratic values, authoritarian administration and secret diplomacy are totally unacceptable.  Interaction with other countries is inevitable, but legal controls have to be applied.  Therefore, they demand an effective supervisory mechanism and new laws to regulate the negotiation and conclusion of agreements with foreign countries.  On March 30, around 500 thousand black-clad protesters took to street to support these brilliant brave students that embrace real democracy whole-heartedly.

This April is the 35th anniversary of TRA (Taiwan Relation Act).  In 1979, the US enforced TRA “to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”

But this April is also the 120th anniversary of the permanent secession of Taiwan and Penghu from the Qing Dynasty to Japan.  Under the pressure of Beijing, the Ma administration seems preoccupied with pushing Taiwan into an economic unification with PRC.  Beijing and Ma are collaborating to shift the focus from TRA to a unilateral interpretation of The Three Communiqué: “The U.S.  side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.  The United States Government does not challenge that position.  It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.”

This turbulent April might see drastic changes in both Taiwan’s future and regional stability, and both Beijing and Washington have to ponder carefully on how they should look at this young Sunflower and make a decision.  It might defy prediction, but one thing is for sure.  The Sunflower always looks to where the sun is.