【Commt】
The Diplomat 作者 Michal Thim 以實際例子批駁馬、經濟部與其他作者口徑一致的「不過服貿有損台灣國際信譽」，而認為根本不會有影響。
國際上，簽署完成之後未獲批准，或因未被批准而重啟談判的例子太多了。只要是民主國家都能其他理解民主國家批准程序的複雜性。美日絕不會因為服貿不過而延宕台灣的TPP談判。
有人認為，作為ECFA 的一環，它只是行政命令，無需立院通過，但同時外交部卻認為必須經立法院批准才能生效。
作者也提及國民黨圖個方便而毀棄協議。
作者也注意到若北京因此而抱負，只證明台灣社會的顧慮是對的。而香港社會也在注意這案子的發展。
無論如何，未來兩岸協商已很難再密室授受。
作者注意到：馬正在挽救其統治的正當性，但卻斷言必敗無疑。
既然如此，為何馬執意要國會通過呢？除了自己的面子之外，有無不可告人的承諾或私人利益？
Protests Won’t Undermine Taiwan’s Reputation○The
Diplomat / （2014.04.01）
Claims that the Sunflower Movement will hurt
Taiwan’s ability to join regional trade pacts are misguided.
Towards the end of second week into the occupation
of Taiwan’s parliament by students and other protesters, there is still no sign of resolution. The protesters oppose the Cross-Strait Service
Trade Agreement (CSSTA, also dubbed the Trade in Services Agreement – TiSA) and
the way its negotiation and subsequent legislative review were handled by the
government. They demand sending the
treaty back to the Executive Yuan where it
will be halted until the Legislative Yuan creates a monitoring mechanism that
would provide a legal framework for dealing with future cross-Strait negotiations.
In addition, protesters are demanding that the CSSTA still be reviewed
clause by clause. They also seek to hold
a citizens’ constitutional assembly that
would prepare constitutional reform, of which one of the intended goals is to clarify the balance of powers between the executive
and legislative branches. The
last response from President Ma
was of mild agreement to demands for a clause-by-clause review, passing a
monitoring mechanism and the option of holding civic constitutional meetings,
but the key demand of returning the CSSTA to the executive branch was flatly rejected.
In a meantime, opposition to CSSTA has become known as the Sunflower
Movement after flowers that were given to the student protesters by florists. Events so far culminated on March 30 when between 350,000 and 500,000 people gathered
to support the Sunflower Movement in the area surrounding Ketagalan
Boulevard in front of the Presidential Palace.
One of the central points pushed forward by the government is that
reneging on the treaty would harm Taiwan’s international reputation and delay
Taiwan’s entry into regional free trade arrangements. Background on the issue prepared by Taiwan’s
foreign ministry reads (emphasis
added):
“If the TiSA cannot be passed and thus come into force, the three major
repercussions will be: Taiwan’s service industries will lose the advantage of
early entry to the mainland Chinese market; Taiwan’s accession to regional
economic integration mechanisms—including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—will be delayed; and
future talks with mainland China under the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA) on a trade in goods agreement and dispute settlement
mechanism will be influenced, which will jeopardize the development of Taiwan’s
external trade.
In a similar tone, Jonathan Spangler
“…deleterious effects of failure to implement the CSSTA would not only
be domestic or bilateral; the international implications would be equally
grave… Reneging on a bilateral agreement, such as
the CSSTA, would serve as a clear indication to the international community
that the local government lacks the capacity to effectively engage in
international relations.”
Spangler further adds that “…If Taipei cannot succeed in fulfilling
an already signed trade agreement with its closest neighbor and most
significant trading partner, the risks involved for other countries in
deepening economic ties with Taiwan may outweigh the potential benefits.”
However, this claim lacks substantial
supporting evidence. In fact, states do often
renegotiate treaties and usually there
is a mechanism for such a procedure embedded in the treaty. The consequences are rarely as grave as is now
being claimed. Ireland
did not became an international outcast when it failed to approve the Lisbon
treaty in a 2008 referendum and the Nice
treaty in a 2001 referendum. In
both cases, negotiations
were opened again, changes were made and both treaties eventually entered into
force.
In addition, the argument can be made that other democracies do understand the
complexity of the ratification process, especially when it comes to
free trade (or free trade-like) agreements. It is also likely that other governments would
recognize
that agreements with China are different than Taiwan’s dealings with other
governments. The United States would hardly stop
promoting Taiwan’s Trans -Pacific Partnership membership
just because Taipei failed to ratify the CSSTA with China, nor would
the failure to ratify the treaty deter Japan from entering into negotiations
with Taiwan. In other words, Taiwan’s deals
with China are not a reliable benchmark for measuring Taiwan’s reputation.
It is hard to think that Taiwan’s
partners are not aware of this.
Moreover, unless the treaty can be ratified by the government without
legislative approval, the text of each treaty needs the consent of the
legislature and therefore is not legally binding. Indeed, part of the controversy over CSSTA is
that proponents of the pact argue that as a part of ECFA (itself approved by the LY),
it is an
executive order that does not require legislative approval. Yet, the MoFA’s
letter quoted above seems to suggest that legislative approval is necessary for
the CSSTA to come into force. Ultimately,
this issue has to be settled by Taiwan’s courts. However, the key problem here is that a thorough review of CSSTA was agreed upon by a
government majority in the LY. Whatever
the government claims, it does not make for good public relations when the government backtracks from a commitment made
by its legislative majority simply because it is convenient.
Naturally, Beijing would hardly be pleased if CSSTA were ratified with
some major changes. Likewise, it is
certainly not pleased by the emergence of a civic movement that crosses party
lines and aspires to hold the government accountable. This is especially true because Taiwan’s
movement appears to be seen as a model
in the increasingly restive Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which
Beijing is already struggling to control. If (and only if) the Sunflower Movement
succeeds in pushing CSSTA back to the negotiation table, Beijing will face a certain dilemma: if it
appears to retaliate, it will only confirm that protesters were right to
suspect sinister intentions. Moreover,
any future arrangement between Taipei and Beijing will be under very close
public scrutiny. Maybe it is, after all, a better option for Ma (and Beijing) to
appease public opposition and return to the negotiation table.
At the end of the day, Ma’s administration has only itself to blame for
its lack of transparency during the negotiations stage, for ditching the review
process in the LY, and ultimately for ignoring a concerned public and trying to
use scare tactics when the public demanded accountability. At the beginning of the legislative siege,
Ma’s government could have argued that the “group of students” was not
representing the public at large. Yet, a
TVBS (generally considered as KMT-leaning media) poll
from last week showed lackluster support for the CSSTA and majority
approval for the movement’s occupation of the LY. In the light of Sunday’s
protest that may have very well been the largest of its kind in Taiwan’s
democratic history, the government finds itself in an increasingly
awkward position, fighting a losing battle in trying to legitimize its
actions. So are the KMT
lawmakers who will soon seek re-election; January
2016 is close enough to make them feel very uneasy about their prospects.
Michal Thim is a Ph.D. candidate in the Taiwan Studies Program at the
China Policy Institute, School of Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of
Nottingham and a Research Fellow at the Prague-based think-tank Association for
International Affairs. Michal tweets
@michalthim.
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