《中共的干涉行動：美國與其他民主國家應有反應》導論與結論 雲程譯

《中共的干涉行動：美國與其他民主國家應有反應》導論與結論　雲程譯

The Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Interference Operations: How the U.S. and Other Democracies Should Respond    Jonas Parello-Plesner ＠ Hudson Institute  20180620

INTRODUCTION

“History and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.”

—President George Washington’s Farewell Address, 1796.

「歷史和經驗證明，外國影響力是共和政府最有害的敵人之一。」雲程喬治華盛頓總統1766年告別演說

Russia’s interference and election meddling dominate the headlines and Washington’s attention.  But beneath the radar, another country’s interference is expanding, dwarfing Russia’s short-term disruption.  The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under General Secretary Xi Jinping has put enormous resources into influence abroad, estimated at $10 billion a year.¹

俄羅斯的干涉和選舉干預，主宰了頭條新聞和華盛頓的關注。但在報導的背後，另一個國家的干擾正在擴大，這使俄羅斯的短期中斷變得相形見絀。習近平總書記領導的中國共產黨在國外影響力巨大，估計每年達到100億美元雲程

Xi has elevated and expanded United Front activities, a so-called “magic weapon” that relies on coopting Chinese diaspora communities and building relationships with Western enablers to make the “foreign serve” the CCP.²  Unlike Russia, with its relatively quick interference operations, the CCP builds varied and long-term relationships.

習近平提高並擴大了統戰活動，這是一種所謂的「神奇武器」，依靠親近的中國僑社和建立與西方菁英的關係，使之為中共所用。與俄羅斯不同，俄羅斯的干擾行動相對較快，中共則旨在建立各種長期的關係。

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a distinctive system that blurs the lines between classical espionage, clandestine operations, and influence-seeking. 雲程We will primarily examine CCP interference operations that are covert, corrupt, or coercive, the so called “three Cs.”³  If an activity falls into these categories, we will call it “interference.”  On the other hand, if the state-controlled funding source is generally transparent—as with Chinese state-owned television, China Global Television Network, or Confucius Institutes—it makes sense to employ the term “influence,” which is broader than interference.⁴  In practice, the two are not always clearly differentiated.

中華人民共和國有一個獨特的系統，模糊了古典間諜活動、秘密行動和尋求影響力間的界限。我們將主要考察中共之隱蔽，腐敗或強制，即所謂的「3C」。如果一項活動屬於這些類別，我們稱之為「干涉」。另一方面，國有資金來源通常是透明的—就像中國國有電視台，中國全球電視網或孔子學院一樣。使用「影響力」這一術語是比較合理的，這個術語比干涉更廣泛。在實踐中，兩者並不總是能被明確區分的。

The CCP’s goal is to quell dissenting and negative voices at home and abroad and influence civil society and governments abroad.  Its targets range from prominent politicians and businesspeople to academics, students, and the American public. 雲程With deep coffers and the help of Western enablers, the CCP uses money, rather than Communist ideology, as a powerful source of influence, creating parasitic relationships of long-term dependence.

中共的目標是平息國內外不滿和消極的聲音，影響國外的公民社會和政府。它的目標包括知名政治家、商人、學者、學生和美國公眾。在雄厚資金和西方推菁英的幫助下，中共利用金錢而非共產主義意識形態作為強大的影響力來源，創造了長期依賴的寄生關係。

The effectiveness of United Front strategy is on open display in Australia and New Zealand, two Western democracies whose political, media, and business life have been pierced by the United Front, leading to Beijing’s almost complete takeover of Chinese-language media in the two countries.  A former Chinese army spy trainer now serves in the New Zealand Parliament and secures Chinese funding for his party.  In 2017, the disgrace of an Australian senator caught hewing to the Party line on the South China Sea led to discovery of an avalanche of dubious funding.  In Australia, the two main parties have been propped up by foreign money through United Front operatives.  Academic freedom has come under pressure in both countries.  The CCP’s aim is to gradually wean the two countries off their alliance with the United States while boxing in their public debate about China.  If the two realign their political affiliation and attachment to the U.S. and the West, this would be a big win for China.

統戰的有效性在澳大利亞和紐西蘭活生生的展現眼前。這兩個西方民主國家的政治，媒體和商業生活已經被統戰所刺穿，導致北京幾乎完全接管了兩國的中文媒體。一名前中國軍隊間諜訓練師目前在紐西蘭議會服務，並為他的派對獲得中國資金。雲程2017年，一位澳大利亞參議員的醜聞，引起了南海問題黨派陣營的he led，導致發現了一系列可疑的資金。在澳大利亞，這兩個主要政黨都有統戰的外國資金支持。兩國的學術自由都受到壓力。中共的目標是在有關中國的公開辯論中，逐漸擺脫紐澳與美國的盟國關係。如果兩國重新調整對美國和西方的政治派系和依附關係，這對中國將是一個重大勝利。

In the United States, CCP interference and influence operations are aimed at politicians, businesspeople, academia, the media, and Chinese diaspora communities.  Already in 1996, the U.S. experienced CCP meddling in presidential and congressional elections, but the 2016 election showed continued vulnerability.  CCP- and United Front–connected funding has also intruded into the realm of ideas, influencing think tanks, academia, newspapers, and other media outlets.  United Front–connected organizations posing as NGOs have also been embedded within Chinese diaspora communities.  More broadly, this raises fundamental questions about how much influence to allow China’s state-controlled system and companies in the United States.

在美國，中共干涉和影響力行動的對象，如雲程政治家、商人、學術界、媒體和僑社。早在1996年，美國就曾經經歷過中共干預總統和國會選舉，但2016年選舉表現出持續的脆弱性。中共和統戰的資金也進入了思想領域，影響著智庫，學術界，報紙和其他媒體。作為非政府組織的統戰組織也融入了僑民社區。更廣泛地說，這提出了根本性的問題，即能允許中國的國家控制體系和公司在美國具有多大的影響力？

The CCP, by changing how democracies speak and think about the PRC, is making “the world safe” for its continued reign.  That is the priority for United Front strategy.  With the United States, whose geostrategic power the Party perceives as the ultimate threat, the goal is a long-term interference and influence campaign that tames American power and freedoms, in part by limiting and neutralizing American democratic discussions about the CCP.  Liberal values such as freedom of expression, individual rights, and academic freedom are anathema to the Party and its internal system of operation. 雲程

透過改變民主國家對中華人民共和國的言論和思考，中共正在以「使世界安全」為名，服務其統治。這是統戰策略的優先事項。美國的地緣戰略力量被中共認為是最大的威脅，其目標是一場長期的干涉和影響力運動，馴服美國的權力和自由，部分是透過限制和抵銷美國關於中共的民主討論。黨與其內部運作體系敵視，諸如言論自由，個人權利和學術自由等自由主義的價值觀。雲程

There has been no comprehensive public debate about this since publication of the congressional reports following illicit Chinese financing in the 1996 presidential and congressional elections.  Thus, it is long overdue. 雲程

自從1996年總統大选和國會選舉之後，國會發表有關中國非法資助選舉的報告以來，對此沒有進行全面的公開辯論。因此雲程，這是早該做而未做的事情。

The U.S. National Security Strategy document mentions an ambition to counter such measures.⁵  This report addresses that goal by shedding light on these activities and outlines suggestions for a global democratic resilience package.

美國國家安全戰略文件提到了打擊此類措施的雄心。本報告透過闡明這些活動來解決這一目標，並概述了全球民主應對一系列計劃的建議。

The aim is not to cast all Chinese influence abroad in a negative light.  The message is simply that the story of China does not belong exclusively to the CCP, which seeks to subsume “China” and “Chinese” under its banner.⁶ Citizens of Chinese origin are an important part of societies globally, including many democracies.  There are almost 5 million Chinese-Americans, and they have made their choice on citizenship.⁷ No foreign power should be allowed to try to undo that choice and loyalty.  The problem originates with United Front logic, which views overseas Chinese as “sons and daughters” and part of the CCP’s extended family. 雲程Democracies need to shield the Chinese diaspora and in particular, dissidents.

目的不是要把所有中國人的影響力投向國外。這個信息只不過是中國的故事並不完全屬於中共，它試圖在其旗幟下包含「中國」和「中國人」。中國血統的公民是全球社會的重要組成部分，包括許多民主國家。有近500萬華裔美國人，他們已經選擇了公民身份，不應該允許任何外國力量來試圖消除這種選擇和忠誠。問題源於統一戰線的邏輯，它把海外華人視為「兒女」，是中共大家庭的一部分。民主國家需要保護海外華人，特別是持不同政見者。

CCP interference and influence operations target the vulnerabilities in democratic systems, such as Australia’s and New Zealand’s lack of stringent political campaign finance rules.  Worldwide for educational institutions, Chinese government–run Confucius Institutes are an increasingly attractive means of offering Chinese studies because of the absence of alternative, independent funding. 雲程Cash-strapped Western media seem increasingly willing to accept dubious sources of revenue.  Prominent news outlets even knowingly publish Chinese propaganda, although it is labelled as advertisement.  Retired Western politicians willingly peddle pro-CCP agendas for cash and other benefits.

中共干涉和影響力行動針對的是民主制度中的脆弱性，例如澳大利亞和紐西蘭缺乏嚴格的政治競選財政規則。中國政府辦的孔子學院，在全球範圍內為教育機構提供中國研究的手段越來越有吸引力，因為缺乏其他獨立資助。資金匱乏的西方媒體，似乎越來越願意接受可疑的收入來源。著名的新聞媒體甚至有意出版中文宣傳，儘管它被貼上了廣告。退休的西方政治家，也樂意在親中共議會中推銷現金和其他利益。

The traditional assumption was that engaging and trading with China would lead it to become more liberal and even democratic. 雲程In 2018, it is clear that such a transformation is not happening.  China’s economic freedoms have not been complemented by increasing political freedoms.

傳統的假設是，與中國進行交易和交易會使其變得更加自由和民主。2018年，很明顯這種轉變沒有發生。中國的經濟自由並沒有導致日益增強的政治自由。

Now, the U.S. and democracies globally face a reverse situation.  It is no longer solely about engaging with China to promote liberal reforms, but equally about safeguarding democracies from the CCP’s authoritarian and corrupting influence.  Initially, democracies wanted to export liberal values and help build civil society in China.  Now we need to defend these values on home ground.

現在，美國和全球民主國家面臨逆轉的局面。不再僅僅是以與中國合作的方式來推動自由主義改革，反而是同樣要保護民主國家免受中共獨裁和腐敗的影響。最初，民主國家希望出口自由主義的價值觀，並幫助建立中國的公民社會。現在我們需要在家鄉保衛這些價值觀。雲程

In this report, we provide specific recommendations for the U.S.  and the broader community of democracies on how to enact proactive and protective measures.  First and foremost, the National Security Council should finalize a whole-of-government mapping of CCP interference and influence, mapping the boundaries between counter-intelligence and law enforcement and over to legislation and civil society initiatives.  To further transparency and public scrutiny, Congress should mandate a yearly report on the issue.  Civil society, think tanks, China scholars, and journalists should join together and create a “United Front tracker.” And stronger defenses are needed, such as increased donor transparency in campaign finance and tightening of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) and Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA).  A civil rights approach should provide targeted protection to Chinese-American communities from foreign interference.

在這份報告中，我們為美國和更廣泛的民主社區提供了有關如何制定積極和保護措施的具體建議。首先，國家安全委員會應該完成政府對中共干涉和影響的整體測繪，繪製反情報和執法之間的界限，以及立法和民間社會舉措。為了進一步透明化和公眾監督，國會應該就此問題每年發布一次報告。民間社會，智庫，中國學者和記者應該聯合起來，創建一個「統戰追蹤」組織。雲程需要更強大的防禦措施，比如增加捐獻方的透明度，加強〈遊說公告法〉（LDA）和〈外國代理人註冊法〉（FARA）。公民權利方式應該為外國干涉華裔社區提供有針對性的保護。

Internationally, we suggest collaboration among democratic governments to create a “United Front of Democracies” and explore counter-measures.  These could include more funding of media and education worldwide to provide Chinese diaspora communities with news not controlled by Beijing and countering the attractiveness of Confucius Institutes by securing more independent funding for Chinese-language studies and China research.

在國際上，我們建議各民主政府合作建立「民主國家統一戰線」並探討對策。這可能包括為全球的媒體和教育提供更多的資金，為僑民社區提供不受北京控制的新聞，並通過獲得更多獨立的中文研究和中國研究經費來抵消孔子學院的吸引力。

In the end, transparency and legislation can only go a certain distance.   Democracy is kept alive by democratic citizens and well-functioning institutions.   The citizens of the United States and other democracies need to personally invest in safeguarding their democratic traditions rather than selling out. 雲程This is the genuine long-term inoculation against the challenge from authoritarian interference and influence.

最終，透明度和立法只能前進一定距離。民主是由民主公民和運作良好的機構來維持下去的。美國公民和其他民主國家，需要親自出手保護，而不是出賣他們的民主傳統。這是真正的長期接種反對專制干涉和影響的挑戰。

 ¹ David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect,”Foreign Affairs, July 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-soft-power-push.  ↝

 ² Anne-Marie Brady, Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping, Wilson Center, September 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/magic-weapons-chinas-political-influence-activities-under-xi-jinping.  ↝

 ³ The Australian government has employed this definition in its pending legislation; see chapter 2.  ↝

 ⁴ We are indebted to Peter Mattis for this distinction.  See Peter Mattis, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Chinese Communist Party Interference in the Public Square,” War on the Rocks, March 7, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/talk-talk-chinese-communist-party-interference-public-square/.  ↝

 ⁵ National Security Strategy of the United States, Whitehouse.gov, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.  ↝

 ⁶ As a linguistic counter-measure, the terms People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are employed.  Xi Jinping is listed under his party title, secretary general, which is where his power resides, rather than calling him president.  ↝

 ⁷ “Chinese in the U.S.  Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, September 8, 2017, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/fact-sheet/asian-americans-chinese-in-the-u-s/.  ↝

CONCLUSION雲程

This report marks only a first step in unearthing Chinese Communist Party interference in the United States.   It is based on informal talks with an excellent group of scholars, journalists, think tankers, civil society activists, and former and current administration officials. 雲程The work continues, and many more need to join in.   Uncovering United Front strategy in action will be a continuous effort, which is why we recommended launching a “United Front Tracker” as a joint effort between civil society and think tanks. 

這份報告只是彰顯出中共干涉美國的第一步。報告由一群優秀的學者，記者，智庫，民間社會活動家以及前任和現任政府官員的非正式會談所得。這項工作還在繼續，還有更多人需要加入進來。將統戰行動曝光出來，將是一個持續的努力，這就是為什麼我們建議啟動一個「統戰追踪」作為民間社會和智庫之間的共同努力課題。

Many topics not covered in these pages are major areas for further study.   One is United Front work in Taiwan, the original United Front target.   This is why the names of many UFW organizations contain the term雲程reunification.   We also did not cover United Front work within Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, where United Front strategy raises even deeper societal issues because of the large Chinese diaspora communities and their proximity to China.   Additionally, we did not cover the effect of United Front strategy on fledgling democracies or semi-authoritarian states, and how such activities stifle the development of liberal democracy. 

本報告未涵蓋許多可進一步研究的主要領域議題。一個是台灣統戰工作，這是統戰的原始目標。這就是為什麼許多統戰組織的名稱包含「統一」這個詞。我們也沒有涵蓋東南亞國家的統戰工作，如印度尼西亞，馬來西亞，菲律賓和新加坡，因為統戰策略由於散居中國的大型社區和他們接近中國而引發了更深層次的社會問題。此外，我們也沒有涵蓋統戰對新興民主國家或半獨裁國家的影響，以及這些活動如何扼殺自由民主的發展。雲程

Thus, there is much work to be done.   It is our hope that this report will inspire others to pursue further research on this complex issue.

因此，有很多工作要做。我們希望這份報告能激勵其他人對這個複雜問題做進一步的研究。