The issue of operational control in South Korea has
long been held prisoner to fickle domestic politics.
Last Thursday U.S. and South Korean officials agreed
to postpone the transfer of operational control (OPCON) indefinitely. In peacetime, South Korea will remain in charge
of its own military forces. But in the event
of war with North Korea, U.S. military commanders will take control of both U.S.
and South Korean forces. U.S. control over
South Korean forces in the case of war with North Korea has been the official policy
since the U.S. took over operational control during the Korean War.
10月22日，美韓官員無限期延擱戰時指揮權 (operational control, OPCON) 移交韓方的時程。意即，維持韓戰後的狀態：平時韓軍歸韓國管，戰時則歸美國管。
According to Stars and Stripes, the agreement calls “for the transfer
of operational control to be ‘conditions based,’ meaning the move has been postponed
indefinitely.” The delay is meant to give
South Korea time to develop “the core military capabilities needed for the OPCON
transfer to take place by mid-2020.” Both U.S. and South Korean officials agree that
the security conditions on the peninsula are too precarious (and South Korea’s capabilities
too underdeveloped) for an OPCON transfer to take place. Choi Kang, Director of the Center for Foreign
Policy and National Security at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, reiterated
these reasons for a domestic audience in a special commentary segment forKBS.
新的協議稱「看情況」，暗示了無限期延擱。表面理由是半島的情勢嚴峻，要給韓軍有時間增強自己的能力，以承接2020年中的移轉。
While the reasons given for the delay are quite valid
– provocations, missile tests, nuclear weapon developments, and the chance of border
skirmishes leading to larger conflict or full-scale war – the OPCON issue has been
as much a political issue as a strategic one.
While U.S. control of armed forces on the peninsula may make strategic sense,
not having full operational control of its own military forces in a time of war
has historically been a divisive issue.
理由似乎冠冕堂皇，但OPCON移轉是政治問題，而不僅是戰略議題。要韓軍在戰時不控制自己的部隊，雖然有戰略考量，但爭議性很大。
A JTBC report on the history of the OPCON issue briefly summarizes
the political positions of South Korean presidents. Park Chung-hee, though not as openly confrontational
with the U.S. as Syngman Rhee, was in the midst of a national building effort, the
primary objective of which was to develop South Korea’s economy and military (a
goal reflected in his Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive in the 1970s). In 1968, President Park Chung-hee brought up the
issue of OPCON transfer – a move we can interpret as his effort to wrestle a higher
degree of national autonomy.
The JTBC report also points to Roh Tae-woo’s 1987
campaign promise to seek OPCON transfer and the relocation of Yongsang military
base (where USMFK was and still is located), although Roh is cited as being unsure
as to whether the South Korean officer corps was ready to be fully independent. In 1994, Kim Young-sam negotiated the transfer
of peacetime control of the military forces.
However, it was in 2007 that a cavalier Roh Moo-hyun, who campaigned on an
anti-U.S. platform, negotiated the return of operational control, which was to take
place by 2012.
盧泰愚在1987年的大選中承諾要實現OPCON移轉，以及遷移首爾市內的美軍龍山基地。1994年金泳三進行OPCON和平時移轉的協商。但是OPCON的完整移轉要等到2007年，才由反美的盧武鉉進行協商，並敲定在2012年實現移轉。
It is in Roh Moo-hyun that one sees clearly a different
side of the OPCON issue. Quoted in a Stars and Stripesarticle, the American Enterprise Institute’s
Michael Auslin argues that the OPCON transfer negotiated by Roh was driven by domestic
politics. “It stemmed originally from domestic
[South] Korean politics, to get rid of the inequity of not having control over their
own troops in times of war.” He goes on,
“It wasn’t driven by military planning and analysis… but rather it was based on
politics.”
OPCON移轉的議題到了盧武鉉手上，新添了國內政治的面向。去除戰時軍令的不平等，多半是基於國內政治，而不是戰略考量。
A separate JTBC report identifies Roh Moo-hyun as being the first
president to seriously push the issue of South Korea having complete control of
its national defense (chajukukbang). During
the report, a clip is played from a 2006 speech where Roh tells his audience what
he thinks about South Korea not having full operational control of its own armed
forces. He says, with much zeal:
盧武鉉是第一個推行完整國防軍令權的總統。他曾在2006年的一次演講中激動地表示：
What has the
South Korean military done to this point?
They [South Korean military commanders] have built a military that cannot
watch over the country or manage its own operational control — and yet they boast:
“I’m the Minister of National Defense” and “I’m the Chief of Staff.” One after another they’ve come out and stated
that operational control cannot be transferred.
Is this not a dereliction of duty?
They should be ashamed of themselves. [my translation]
南韓軍方在這件事情上做了甚麼？身為軍人卻無法建立完整的軍事指揮，竟能厚著臉皮自命為國防部長或參謀總長。他們一個個都說無法移轉OPCON，這不是玩忽職守嗎？真是丟臉。
The conditions under which Roh pushed for, and eventually
got, an agreement for OPCON transfer were, it must be pointed out, quite different
from the current climate: a serious effort at North-South détente (theSunshine Policy),
a sharp increase in anti-U.S. sentiment following the death of two school girls
after they were struck by an American armored vehicle, and, as shown in the quote
above, a president dissatisfied with the U.S. military commanding South Korean troops
in the event of war with North Korea. The
resulting agreement, concluded in 2007, was based on the mutual
understanding that the transfer would be an opportunity for South Korea to improve
its military capabilities.
我們必須指出，盧武鉉取得OPCON移轉協議的當時，時代背景與現在迥異。當時，南北情勢緩和 (陽光政策)，反美勢力高漲 (尤其在女學生被美軍撞死之後)，而韓國總統對於美軍控制戰時指揮之事相當不滿。2007年的協議基礎，在於雙方都明白南韓需要時間改善其軍事能力。
Obviously, the OPCON transfer did not go through. In 2010, Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama
agreed to a delay, concurring that the security situation was unsuitable
given the then-recent hostilities (the North’s sinking of theCheonan and the shelling
of Yeongpyong Island) and North Korea’s nuclear weapons posture. Lee Myung-bak also led a rekindling of ROK-U.S.
relations, taking a posture towards the U.S. very different from his predecessor. Current President Park Geun-hye, who has maintained
strong ties with the U.S., can be seen as continuing the relationship established
during Lee’s tenure. And while North Korea
hasn’t engaged in any provocative acts on the level of theCheonan sinking, North-South
relations are not improving. The security
situation is, indeed, still precarious.
但OPCON移轉並未實現。2010年，李明博與歐巴馬同意：局勢不穩定（天安艦、延坪島、與核子試爆），不適合OPCON移轉。李明博與前任不同，恢復了美韓關係。目前的朴槿惠也維持與美友好，可視為依循李明博的路線。目前情勢仍險峻，即使沒有天安艦事件層級的衝突，南北關係也未見好轉。
While the Sunshine Policy era is over and the ROK-U.S.
alliance is seemingly as strong as it has ever been, it is worth remembering that
South Korean leaders have not always been as willing as Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye
to extend U.S. operational control over South Korean forces “indefinitely.” Domestic politics have, and most likely will,
play a major role at some point in the not-so-distant future. And, although public support for the ROK-U.S.
alliance is currently high, that could quickly change (as public opinion
is wont to do). Operational capabilities
may not be as high as some military planners may like, but the desire for autonomy
is a strong force and one that could catapult another Roh-like politician to the
Blue House.
陽光政策已結束，美韓同盟如前，但是南韓領袖不會一直如李明博、朴槿惠一樣允許美軍無限期控制韓軍。在過去與可見的未來，國內政治都會扮演重要角色。目前美韓同盟支持率高漲，卻也可能迅速改變。即便韓軍能力不足，韓人渴望自治，青瓦台隨時可能再出現另一位盧武炫。
【相關閱讀】
一直覺得這是個假議題
回覆刪除原因是
美國是安理會授權的駐韓聯合國軍總司令
這個頭銜不除
南韓軍戰時還是要受盟軍總司令的管制
C大好眼力！
刪除歸還「戰時指揮權」，無非是個無中生有的外交籌碼！