The Root Cause of Error in Legislator Weng Hsiao-ling's Claim of "Parliamentary Supremacy" HoonTing 20251216

錯誤的倒閣權，自傲的立法委員

The Root Cause of Error in Legislator Weng Hsiao-ling's Claim of "Parliamentary Supremacy"

Upon assuming office, Kuomintang (KMT) legislator Weng Hsiao-ling expressed the idea of parliamentary supremacy to Premier Chen Chien-jen during the general interpellation and stated in committee that she was superior to her colleagues. This reveals that, due to the KMT (Blue camp) holding a relative majority in the Legislative Yuan and gaining support from the Taiwan People's Party (White camp) to form an absolute majority, there arose an intention to confront the executive branch of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). To legitimize her confrontational behavior, Weng must assert that "legislative power is superior to executive power."

The Principle of Separation of Powers and Contract Theory

As previously explained, the branches of power separation are merely functional distinctions, not one being superior to another, nor based on the chronological order of power formation—the sequence of power branches in contract theory is merely a temporary tool borrowed for explanatory convenience, not the actual order of generation. Governing power has long existed, but it was originally mixed together. Through the theoretical framework of contract theory, we entered modern politics.

The Characteristics of "Parliamentary Supremacy" in Cabinet Systems

The "parliamentary supremacy" revealed by Weng Hsiao-ling is modeled after cabinet systems in countries like the UK, Germany and Japan. In such countries, there is only "one general will" from citizens who perform power through their election of parliamentary members (the legislative branch). After parliament is formed, the majority party or party coalition forms the cabinet, which holds executive power. This political system is not about checks and balances through separation of powers, but rather a synthesis of powers, in with the executive power deriving from the legislative power. Only under these circumstances can one assert "parliamentary supremacy." However, even with parliamentary supremacy, the people remain the ultimate source of sovereign authority.

Deadlock Resolution Mechanisms in Cabinet Systems

In cabinet systems, if a deadlock occurs between the executive and legislative branches, there may be a no-confidence vote or parliamentary reelection:

• After a no-confidence vote, the prime minister may request the head of state to dissolve parliament and hold new elections.
• A no-confidence vote may not necessarily lead to parliamentary reelection. In cases of internal strife within a coalition government, as long as the cabinet reorganizes its party composition, it can continue governing without reelection.

The fairness of the cabinet system lies in the fact that executive power originates from legislative power, so when the legislative branch seeks to dismantle the executive, the executive can, at its own cost, counter-dismantle the legislative. This is a rational design for a national system with only "one general will": ultimately returning to the true General Will.

The "Two popular wills" and Checks and Balances in Presidential Systems

However, presidential systems have "two popular wills": one elects the president (executive power), and the other elects congressional members (legislative power). Both are expressions of the popular will, so there is essentially no distinction in size or superiority, and because they possess procedural legitimacy, there is neither the possibility nor the necessity to differentiate them as new or old in legal terms. The relationship between the two powers, therefore, cannot involve one dissolving the other, but rather mutual checks and balances through specific procedures while both continue to exist, to prevent either from dominating. The United States is an example of this.

Taiwan's Governing System Positioning and Problems

After constitutional amendments, Taiwan's governing system, based on the sharing of executive power between the president and the premier, is generally regarded as a "dual executive system leaning toward presidential system," where both the president and the premier belong to the executive branch. In other words, Taiwan's political system originates from "two popular wills": one elects the executive branch, and the other elects the legislative branch. Such a system is not a cabinet system designed around "one general will," so it cannot emulate cabinet systems, nor can parliament be superior to the cabinet. It must instead emulate the presidential system with "two popular wills," designing and viewing the operational relationship between legislative and executive as functional separation with checks and balances.

Therefore, our several constitutional amendments have maintained the no-confidence vote design, particularly the original requirement that a bill passed by a simple majority (1/2) must be overridden by a 2/3 vote in parliament, but it was changed in the amendment so that the override still maintains the identical passage standard of 1/2. This is truly treading water and wasting energy; the designers are geniuses who fundamentally misunderstood the basic assumptions of the system. Even more astonishing is that such genius constitutional scholars become legislators. The more serious and self-assured she is, the greater the harm to our political system. If there are ulterior motives or even influence or manipulation by external hostile forces, that would be covertly aiding the enemy.