有關對台灣20％的「國家別附加關稅」 1909年〈佩恩-奧爾德里奇關稅法案〉（Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act）

As the deadline for implementing reciprocal tariffs approaches, the White House must act decisively to uphold its credibility. Failure to do so risks undermining trust in future commitments.
Taiwan presents a compelling case for distinct treatment in tariff negotiations, grounded in two key points: first, unlike Japan and South Korea, where U.S. military forces are stationed, Taiwan hosts no American troops; second, the unique "special relationship" between the United States and Taiwan warrants tailored consideration.
The U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security is primarily expressed through a low-cost "posture" of ensuring freedom of navigation, rather than robust military defense. Consequently, the financial and strategic burden of supporting Taiwan’s security is significantly lighter than that for Japan and South Korea. This disparity must be reflected in any tariff framework.
If the United States seeks to recalibrate its post–World War II trade architecture—originally shaped by the Marshall Plan's emphasis on strategic investment and preferential treatment for war-affected allies—then Taiwan’s tariff rate warrants serious reconsideration. Given the minimal scale of direct U.S. military or economic support to Taiwan under that framework, a reduction in tariffs would not only reflect a more equitable policy posture but also advance shared strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.
Moreover, Taiwan’s relationship with the United States is unique. As Taiwan’s "Principal Occupying Power," the U.S. regards Taiwan not as a conventional "state" under the Constitution but as "foreign in a domestic sense." This distinctive status demands exceptional treatment—though not necessarily preferential—in U.S. policy.
To align with historical precedent, Taiwan’s "country-specific additional tariff" should mirror the quota-based duty exemptions granted to U.S. territories under the 1909 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act. For trade exceeding this quota, a tariff rate of approximately 10–12%—derived from the 15% applied to Japan and South Korea, adjusted for Taiwan’s lower security costs—would be both equitable and strategically sound. Such an approach reinforces the U.S.-Taiwan partnership while acknowledging their unique bilateral dynamics.

隨著實施對等關稅的最後期限臨近，白宮必須果斷行動，以維護其信用。若未能如此，將有可能削弱外界對未來承諾的信任。
在關稅談判中，台灣有充分理由獲得特殊對待，這主要基於兩個關鍵點：第一，與駐有美軍的日本和南韓不同，台灣並未駐紮任何美軍；第二，美國與台灣之間的「特殊關係」本身就值得予以個別考量。
美國對台灣安全的承諾，主要是透過低成本的「姿態」（posture）來展現，例如保障航行自由，而非透過強而有力的軍事防禦。因此，相較於日本與南韓，美國對台灣安全的財政與戰略負擔輕得多。這種差異應該在任何關稅框架中反映出來。
若美國打算利用「針對特定國家的附加關稅」來回復二戰後「馬歇爾計劃」中對盟友的戰略性投資的回收，那麼台灣的關稅稅率應該明顯較低。考量到美國對台軍事投資極少，降低對台關稅，無論從公平還是戰略邏輯來看，都是合理的。
此外，台灣與美國的關係具有特殊性。作為台灣的「主要佔領國」（the Principal Occupying Power），美國並未將台灣視為憲法意義上的傳統「國家」，而是視為「境外的國內」（Foreign in a Domestic Sense）。這種特殊地位要求在美國政策中給予台灣例外性的對待——雖不一定是優惠，但應是量身打造。
為與歷史先例保持一致，台灣的「特定國家附加關稅」應類似於《1909年佩恩-奧爾德里奇關稅法》（Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act）下美屬地區獲得的配額型免稅待遇。對於超過該配額的部分，關稅稅率應定在約10–12%之間——這是從對日本與南韓15%的稅率中，根據台灣較低的安全成本所調整而來的。此一安排既公平又具有戰略意義，能加強美台夥伴關係，同時反映其獨特的雙邊互動模式。