以「制度炸彈」侵略台灣 翁曉鈴隻手癱瘓憲法法庭

【雙魚之論】
波蘭民主倒退 劇本在台重演？ 馬揚異＠今週刊 20251211
The process of the Polish parliament paralyzing the Constitutional Tribunal can be divided into three stages, seemingly orchestrated by experts behind the scenes:
1.  Obstructing previous nominations and self-appointing: The new president and new parliament prevented the five judges nominated by the previous government from taking office, while the ruling party (PiS) appointed five judges on its own.
2.  Amending laws to raise operational thresholds: The law was revised to increase the quorum for unconstitutional declarations from 9 to 13 people (out of a total of 15, requiring a two-thirds majority approval), making it difficult for the tribunal to function under vacancies.
3.  Refusing to publish unfavorable rulings: The tribunal ruled that PiS's amendments and appointments were unconstitutional, but the government refused to publish the decisions.

In Taiwan, KMT legislator Weng Hsiao-ling led the amendment of the "Constitutional Court Procedure Act" and unconditionally blocked the review of supplementary nominations for justices without providing reasons. The practical effect is to paralyze the Constitutional Court. This makes it difficult for the executive branch to implement laws or budgets formulated or revised by the blue-white camp due to procedural flaws, leading to obstructions in national governance.
The Constitutional Court incident led by Weng Hsiao-ling appears to follow a clear roadmap, not random actions.
Reviewing her background: In the early 1990s, she studied abroad in Munich, Germany, and obtained her degree in 1999. She likely paid close attention to political events in Germany and Eastern Europe, including the origins, staged tactics, and key points of how parliaments in Hungary and Poland paralyzed their constitutional tribunals. However, such a roadmap cannot be accomplished by an individual alone; she may have been guided by foreign experts behind the scenes or directly followed the precedents of Hungary and Poland.
What is even more questionable is that the petitions and rulings of the Constitutional Court primarily aim to protect people's rights. According to statistics, during the Constitutional Court period, petitions from the public accounted for over 97.5%, court petitions only 2.28%, agency petitions about 0.2%, and inter-governmental constitutional interpretations and rulings only a minority. As a representative of public opinion, Weng Hsiao-ling is willing to halt the protection of people's rights to achieve her own political purposes, which can only be understood from the perspective that her stance lies outside Taiwanese society, or even viewing her as an enemy.
Further consideration reveals that the true benefit of paralyzing the Constitutional Court lies in the condition that the next president is elected from the KMT candidate, while the parliament remains under its control—only then does paralyzing the Constitutional Court have constructive significance; otherwise, it only has destructive effects, and even short-term benefits are nonexistent.
Finally, it is noteworthy that KMT committee member Chen Yu-chen (May 23, China Review News) and chair Cheng Li-wen (November 21, TVBS) coincidentally mentioned "We don't know if there will even be an election in 2028" or "Taiwan may not make it to a peaceful election in 2028." This is clearly not a slip of the tongue. People assume they are discussing the possibility of war in 2027, but unbeknownst to them, the war has already begun in the form of "institutional destruction"—more precisely, through Weng Hsiao-ling's "institutional bomb" that infringes on people's constitutional rights, which gives them such confidence in their statements.

波蘭國會癱瘓憲法法庭的過程可分為三個階段，這背後似有高手幕後操控：
1.  阻礙前任提名並自行任命：新總統與新國會阻止前任政府提名的5位大法官上任，執政黨（PiS）自行任命5位大法官。
2.  修法提高運作門檻：修改法律，將違憲宣告的出席門檻從9人提高到13人（總額15名，需三分之二多數同意），導致法庭在缺額情況下難以正常運作。
3.  拒絕公布不利判決：法庭裁定PiS的修法及任命違憲，但政府拒絕公布判決。
在台灣，中國國民黨立委翁曉鈴領銜修改〈憲法法庭訴訟法〉，且不附理由的全面封殺大法官補提名審查，實質效果是癱瘓憲法法庭。這使得藍白陣營制訂或修訂的法律、預算案因程序瑕疵而讓行政部門難以推動國政。

翁曉鈴主導的憲法法庭事件，似乎遵循一條明確路線圖，並非隨機行事。
回顧她的背景：1990年代初期赴德國慕尼黑留學，至1999年取得學位，她很可能密切關注德國與東歐的政治事件，包括匈牙利與波蘭國會癱瘓憲法法庭的來龍去脈、階段性手法與關鍵點。然而，這種路線圖非個人所能獨力完成，她可能背後有境外高手指導，或是直接依循匈牙利、波蘭的前例。
更令人質疑的是，憲法法庭的聲請與判決對象，以保障人民權益為主。根據統計，憲法法庭時期人民聲請佔97.5%以上，法院聲請僅2.28%，機關聲請約0.2%，政府間的釋憲與判決僅佔少數。作為民意代表的翁曉鈴竟不惜停止人民權利保障，來遂行自己的政治目的，這只能從她的立場位於台灣社會以外、甚至將她視為民主敵人的角度來理解。
進一步思考，癱瘓憲法法庭的真正獲利條件在於：下一屆總統由中國國民黨候選人當選，同時國會仍由其掌控，癱瘓憲法法庭才有建設性意義；否則僅具破壞性效果，甚至連短期利益都無從談起。
最後，值得注意的是，中國國民黨籍委員陳玉珍（5月23日，中評網）與主席鄭麗文（11月21日，TVBS）不約而同提及「都不知2028還有沒選舉」或「台灣不一定等得到2028年的和平選舉」，這顯然並非一時失言。大家以為他們在討論2027年戰爭的可能性，殊不知戰爭已以「制度破壞的方式」，更精確的說是翁曉鈴丟出「制度炸彈」侵害人民憲法權利而悄然開打，這讓他們說話如此有底氣。