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2017-05-05

北京在2049年想拿下台灣? By: Willy Lam 翻譯 Taimocracy

Is 2049 Beijing’s “deadline” for Taking Over Taiwan?
北京在2049年想拿下台灣?
By: Willy Lam  翻譯  Taimocracy
Dr. Willy Lam is a Senior Fellow of the Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C.

Experts on Chinese foreign policy over the past few months have been focused on events in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, yet relations across the Taiwan Strait have expectedly undergone a relative deterioration since Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) became Taiwan’s president in May.
過去幾個月來,中國的外交政策專家一直專注於南海和東海的事態發展,且五月份民進黨蔡英文將成為台灣總統,台海關係預計也會相對惡化。


China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held war games in the summer geared toward taking over islands held by hostile forces.  Elements of the 31st Group Army based near Xiamen, where President Xi Jinping served in the 1980s, were heavily involved.  Beijing has made plans to squeeze Taiwan’s international space by buttressing ties with the 22 countries that still maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Chinese authorities have even prevented scholars deemed close to the DPP from taking part in forums in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Beijing has also laid roadblocks to Taiwan’s participation in APEC meetings to be held in Peru later this year.
中國人民解放軍在夏季舉行演習,旨在接管敵對勢力的島嶼。在二十世紀八十年代,在習近平總統服務過的廈門附近,第三十一集團軍的大量參與此演習。北京計劃與仍和台灣維持的外交關係的22個國家加強關係的關係,來擠壓台灣的國際空間。中國當局甚至阻止與DPP接近的學者參加香港特別行政區的論壇。北京也為台灣參加今年晚些時候在秘魯舉行的亞太經合組織會議鋪路。

In the realm of cross-Strait psychological warfare, some have speculated that ultra-nationalist President Xi, who is also General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and commander-in-chief, has set 2049 as the “deadline for Taiwan’s liberation.”  While the word “deadline” has never appeared in top CCP leaders’ speeches on Taiwan, Xi has cited national unification as a key objective for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” which the supreme leader hopes to accomplish by 2049.
在兩岸心理戰爭的場域,有人猜測,中國共產黨總書記與解放軍統帥,強硬民族主義者習近平,已把2049年定為“台灣解放的最後期限”。實際上,“最後期限”一詞從來沒有出現在中共中央領導人對台灣的演講中,這位國家最高領導人是重申國家統一是「中華民族偉大復興」的重要目標,希望能在2049年實現。

This overarching ambition was first raised by Xi one month after he came to power in November 2012, when he uttered perhaps the most important slogan of his tenure: the “Chinese Dream” (中國夢).  The Chinese Dream follows the timeline of the so-called “two one hundreds.”  By 2021, the centenary of the establishment of the CCP, Chinese society will have achieved a “moderate level of prosperity” (小康水平).  More significantly, what Xi and his Politburo colleagues call the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (中華民族偉大復興) will be accomplished by 2049, the centenary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
201211月上旬以來,習首次提出了這一首要任務,當時他說了也許是最重要的口號:「中國夢」。「中華夢想」隨著所謂「二個百年」的時限。到2021年,中國共產黨建立百週年,中國社會將實現「中等水平的繁榮」。更重要的是,習和他的政治局同仁說「中華民族偉大復興」,將在2049年中華人民共和國成立百週年之際完成。

In his speech on July 1 this year, which marks the 95th birthday of the CCP, Xi noted that “it is the historic mission of the CCP to resolve the Taiwan issue and to realize reunification of the motherland.”  The promotion of unification was clearly identified as an integral component of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” As Yang Yizhou, Vice-President of the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots noted, “under the leadership of the CCP, we are compared to any eras in history, closest to the objective of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” He added that “national unification is the necessary pointer to the rejuvenation of the [Chinese] people.”
習近平在今年71日發表的中共95週年紀念發言中指出,「中國共產黨解決台灣問題,是實現祖國統一的歷史使命」,促進統一是顯而易見的,被認為是「中華民族偉大復興」的一個組成部分。中國全國同胞聯合會副主席楊義舟指出,「在中共的領導下,我們與歷史上的任何時代進行了比較最接近中華民族復興的目標」,他補充說,「國家統一是中華民族振興必不可少的指標」。

Notably, on different occasions when he met with visitors or delegations from Taiwan, Xi has linked the reabsorption of Taiwan to the 2049 goal of “national rejuvenation.”  He said for example in 2014 that “national reunification is a historical necessity [in the course of] the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”  During a meeting with former Taiwan vice-president Vincent Siew Wan-chang in 2013, Xi noted that “taking the long view, the long-standing political differences across the Taiwan Strait must eventually be gradually settled.” The supreme leader added that, “it won’t do for [the differences] to be passed along from one generation to the next.”
值得注意的是,習近平與台灣的訪客或代表團會晤時,將台灣的重新併入與2049年的「民族復興」目標聯繫起來。如2014年,習近平指出,「國家統一是 “中華民族的偉大復興的歷史必然」。在2013年與台灣前副總統蕭萬長的會晤時說,「從長遠來看,台海長期存在的政治歧見,應逐漸解決。」最高領導人補充「歧見不能從一代人傳給下一代。」

While 2049 seems a long way away, the pressure exerted by the Xi administration on Taiwan has created a high sense of immediacy.  Paradoxically, military intimidation in the short term may not turn out to be the most devastating.  Analysts estimate that the Chinese naval threat to Taiwan will become significantly more severe only after the two new aircraft carriers now being manufactured in China go on-stream around the end of the decade.  Different reports say that the country’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier should be completed by year’s end.
2049年似乎還有很長的路要走,但習當局對台灣的壓力卻造成了高度的急迫性。矛盾的是,短期內的軍事恐嚇可能不具破壞性。分析人士估計,中國海軍對台灣的威脅,只有在中國製造的兩艘新航空公司在2020年之後下水時,才會更加嚴峻。不同的報導說,該國首個本土建造的航空母艦,應會在年底前完成。

Economic coercion may prove to be as effective in the CCP’s effort to win hearts and minds in the so-called  “breakaway province.” On September 12, some 10,000 Taiwanese hit the streets to voice their discontent over the declining number of mainland tourists. Demonstrators waved banners that read “The two sides (across the Taiwan Strait) belong to the same family” and “No job, no life.”
經濟威嚇可能在中共所謂「分裂省分」中有效的贏得人心。912日,約有一萬名台灣人在街上對內地遊客人數下降表示不滿。示威者揮舞著橫幅,「兩岸同一家」,「沒有工作,活不下去」。

Yet the biggest threat to Taiwan’s national security could come from the need of the CCP—and President Xi, who, many believe, wants to stay in power until 2027—to justify the party’s legitimacy.  It is common knowledge that, after the ostensible death of ideological socialism, with the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, there are only two viable pillars of legitimacy for the “perennial ruling party.”  One is high economic growth; the other is nationalism. At a time when even Chinese economists think that GDP expansion will follow an “L-shaped trajectory,” the importance of nationalism as a legitimizing agent for the regime has increased substantially.  If the CCP’s authority is challenged by social-political stability—for example, a large scale labor unrest event involving more than 100,000 laid off workers—it is possible that the leadership, under Xi, may want to divert attention from domestic woes by engineering a crisis in the Taiwan Strait.
然而,對台灣國家安全的最大威脅可能來自於中共的需要,而習近平可能認為,繼續執政到2027年,以證明黨的合法性。眾所周知,在思想社會主義表面上死亡之後,隨著柏林牆1989年的倒塌,「萬年執政黨」只有兩個合法的支柱,一個是經濟高速增長;另一個是民族主義。即使中國的經濟學家也認為,國內生產總值成長也將是「L形軌跡」,從而,拿民族主義作為政權合法化的重要性大大增加。如果中共的權威受到社會政治穩定的挑戰 - 例如涉及10萬以下失業工人的大規模勞工動亂事件,那麼習以下的領導人,有可能希望轉移關注國內困境的焦點到台灣海峽危機。

Much, of course, also depends on the extent to which the United States is prepared to stand by the Taiwan Relations Act.  As part of President Obama’s pivot to Asia, plans are afoot to shift about 60 percent of American naval capacity to the Asia-Pacific area.  The perception among some American politicians is that Taiwan forms an integral part of an emerging architecture aimed at thwarting Beijing’s overweening ambitions.  This could promote confidence in the Tsai administration that the United States will not stand idly by in the event of PLA aggression against the island. However, at a time when the international media is focused on Chinese adventurism in the South China Sea, Taipei needs to be more proactive in explaining to the international community the real and present danger that the vulnerable, self-ruled political entity faces from a CCP regime that has a poor record in observing international laws. 
當然,很大程度上也取決於美國的程度。準備遵守《台灣關係法》。作為歐巴馬總統對亞洲再平衡的一部分,計劃正在將約60%的美國海軍能力轉移到亞太地區。一些美國政客的看法是,台灣是此旨在遏制北京過份野心的新興架構的一部分。這可以促進對蔡政府的信心,即若解放軍侵略台灣,美國不會坐視不管。然而,在國際媒體關注中國南海冒險主義的時候,台北需要更加積極地向國際社會解釋這個脆弱的,自治的政治實體,正面臨著不守國際法規中共的真實且急迫的危險。

The main point: While the word “deadline” has never appeared in top CCP leaders’ speeches on Taiwan, Xi has cited national unification as a key objective for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” which the supreme leader hopes to accomplish by 2049.

要點:「最後期限」一詞,從來沒有出現在中共中央領導人對台灣問題上的演講中,他認為國家統一是最高領導人希望在2049年實現「中華民族偉大復興」的重要目標。

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